German intelligence agencies discuss ongoing espionage and hybrid challenges

Conference AgendaTHE 5TH SYMPOSIUM ON the Law of Intelligence Services (Symposium zum Recht der Nachrichtendienste) took place in Berlin, Germany, on March 21-22. In view of the public criticism that German intelligence agencies have faced in recent times, it was probably a relief for their officials to be able to talk more-or-less among themselves for once.

The event (see agenda in .pdf) was organized by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Chancellery Office. This year’s topic was: “Intelligence Agencies and Armed Conflicts”. It included the tried and tested mix of academics —predominantly legal scholars—, practitioners and heads of various government authorities. The majority of the external experts discussed the complicated and, in Germany, arduous parliamentary procedures that would arise in the event of a war.

In view of the controls increasingly being placed on German intelligence agencies by various bodies and authorities —which were also represented at the symposium— a certain discrepancy became apparent repeatedly in the presentations: How can the German intelligence agencies react adequately and quickly to hybrid threats when these types of threat do not concern themselves with administrative-legal subtleties and parliamentary procedures? Although the concept of hybrid threats was generally taken for granted and therefore hardly discussed in terms of content, those present agreed at a minimum that disinformation is part of it. All the more worrying was the statement by one speaker who explained that there was no official definition of disinformation within the German security authorities’ legal codes.

In the discussion, the panel moderated by Center for Intelligence Service Training and Further Education (ZNAF), the common training and study location of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), clearly stood out and underscored that this relatively new institution has made a name for itself in the academic intelligence landscape since its establishment in 2019.

However, the symposium also showed that the German security bureaucracy tends to reach its limits when it comes to current developments in the unconventional domain. This was demonstrated, for example, by a speaker’s demand that hybrid risks ought to be assigned to a “state area of responsibility”. The problem, however, lies precisely in the statelessness of hybrid risks. The existing regulations are also proving to be counterproductive, in view of the challenges: there would simply be highly heterogeneous participants in the so-called Cyber Defense Centre, which would also include police authorities. However, due to the strict separation in the legal domain, personal data cannot simply be passed on from the BND to the Federal Police, for example. Read more of this post

Tradecraft observations on the Reichenbach/Fischer espionage case

Germany ReichstagSEVERAL CASES OF CHINESE espionage have been announced recently in Europe. Thomas Reichenbach and Herwig and Ina Fischer —a married couple— were arrested on April 22, 2024, for illegal exports of dual use technology with military (naval) applications.

Reichenbach lists himself as a contract marketing manager for the Hong Kong Trade Development Council. He studied at Peking University in the mid-1980s. He worked in China, speaks Mandarin, and has a Chinese wife.

Herwig and Ina Fischer own a small engineering consulting company named Innovative Dragon in Duesseldorf. Both have travelled extensively in China. Innovative Dragon contracts for technical research with universities. Herwig studied mechanical engineering and aircraft and spacecraft construction at the Rhine-Westphalia Higher Technical School, focusing on guidance technology and composite fiber materials. The company headquarters are in London and there are offices in Duesseldorf and Shanghai (Donghua University Science and Technology Park). The London office does not appear to have a functioning telephone number.

Reichenbach is suspected of having been recruited by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) in China. The German government has accused the trio of having illegally exported dual use technology since at least 2022. At the time of the arrests, the suspects were in negotiations on additional research projects useful for expanding the combat strength of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy.

Status: Alleged

Tradecraft observations:

  1. Use of a potential front company in London to facilitate allegedly illegal exports.
  2. Use of third countries to facilitate allegedly illegal exports.
  3. Reichenbach allegedly recruited Herwig and Ina Fischer and handled them as in-country assets.
  4. It is alleged that the MSS probably recruited Reichenbach in China.
  5. An MSS officer allegedly handled Reichenbach from China (linear control).
  6. The MSS allegedly funded the operation through front companies.

Author: Nicholas Eftimiades* | Date: 03 May 2024 | Permalink

* Nicholas Eftimiades is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He retired from a 34-year government career that included employment in the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He held appointments on the Department of Defense’s Defense Science Board and the Economic Security Subcommittee of the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Advisory Council. He is an advisor to the United States Intelligence Community. Eftimiades authored numerous works on China’s espionage methods. His books, Chinese Intelligence Operations (1994) and Chinese Espionage: Operations and Tactics (2020) are examinations of the structure, operations, and methodology of China’s intelligence services. They are widely regarded as seminal works in the field.

Germany arrests sixth alleged spy in less than a month

MSS ChinaAUTHORITIES IN GERMANY HAVE arrested a sixth person in less than a month, in connection with three separate cases of espionage orchestrated by Russian or Chinese intelligence. Last Tuesday, police in the east German city of Dresden arrested an assistant to a leading politician of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland party (AfD). The assistant, who is a dual German-Chinese citizen, is accused of spying for Chinese intelligence, while the far-right politician who employed him is also being investigated, according to reports.

German news reports have identified the alleged spy as Jian Guo, 43, who lives in Dresden with his wife and children. Guo reportedly entered Germany as a student and stayed there after completing his studies, eventually becoming a naturalized German citizen. In 2019 he joined the staff of the office of Maximilian Krah, a senior AfD politician, who had recently been elected to the European Parliament.

According to the German prosecutor’s office, Guo had begun working for Chinese intelligence prior to joining Krah’s office as an assistant. At least some of his alleged espionage activities involved posing as a critic of the Chinese government and joining dissident groups of Chinese expatriates in Germany. He would then provide information about the activities of these groups to Chinese intelligence, according to his indictment. The latter described Guo’s intelligence activity as “an especially severe case” of espionage.

Meanwhile, German authorities are also reportedly investigating Krah himself over payments he allegedly received from pro-Chinese and pro-Russian individuals or groups. In a statement issued late last week, the AfD politician said he had been informed about Guo’s arrest from media reports and that he had no information about this case. Shortly after Krah’s statement, the AfD described Guo’s arrest as “highly disturbing” and added that party authorities would do “everything possible to aid the investigation”.

During the month of April alone, Germany has arrested no fewer than six individuals in a series of apparently unconnected cases of espionage, connected with Russia or China. Two of these individuals are German citizens of Russian origin, who were allegedly assisting Russian intelligence plan acts of sabotage against military installations located on German soil. Three other German citizens were allegedly planning to provide designs of advanced aircraft engines to Chinese intelligence officials.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 29 April 2024 | Permalink

Notes on the assassination of Iranian IRGC Commander Hassan Mahdawi

IRGC - ABTHE TARGETED KILLING OF Hassan Mahdawi, a high-ranking member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon, was carried out by Israel on April 1, 2024. The actual assassination was based on precise operational intelligence, while Israel’s assessment of Iran’s response was wrong.

On the day of the attack, a building adjacent to the Iranian Embassy in the Syrian capital of Damascus was attacked with rockets. The attack killed seven IRGC members: General Muhammad Reza Zahedi, also known as Hassan Mahdawi, his deputy, and five additional officers. Mahdawi is the most senior Iranian commander to be killed since the assassination of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani by the United States in 2020.

Mahdawi had close ties with Hezbollah. He maintained a close relationship with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and was perceived by Israel to be directly coordinating the military attacks on Israel from Lebanon and Syria. In Tehran’s collective memory, Israel’s history of attacks against it includes numerous strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, assassinations of scientists within Iran, and actions against Iranian proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Traditionally, these attacks have been invariably met with attacks by Iran’s proxies in the region.

This time, it was different. Iran recognized Mahdawi’s assassination as a direct attack on Iran that it could not tolerate, and had to respond to differently. Just days following Mahdawi’s assassination, Iran attacked Israel. According to the Israel Defense Forces, 99 percent of the more than 330 weapons fired at Israel (including at least 185 drones and 110 surface-to-surface missiles) were intercepted, mostly over the territory of countries adjacent to Israel. Iran’s attack on Israel was unprecedented. It was launched directly from Iranian territory in contrast to prior cases, when Iran has used its proxies, supposedly leaving its hands clean.

Israel could not tolerate such a blatant infringement on its sovereignty. After Israeli officials vowed a response to the Iranian attack, the Jewish State counter-attacked, causing minor damage to the Eighth Shekari Air Base in northwest Esfahan, a dozen kilometers from the Natanz nuclear facility. It was a calculated response designed to deliver a message to Iran that Israel could and would respond to an attack. Following Israel’s counterattack, the tensions between Iran and Israel have subsided for the time being.

While the attack on General Mahdawi was based on excellent operational intelligence, it became evident that the Israeli assessment regarding a possible Iranian response was erroneous. The Israeli assessment was that the Iranian response would be similar to what occurred in the past —namely limited attacks by Hezbollah on northern Israel and attacks on the Golan heights by Iranian proxies in Syria. Israel simply did not anticipate a direct Iranian attack on Israel from Iranian territory.

It seems that Israeli senior analysts were entangled in a conception of Iran’s past behavior and anticipated that Tehran’s response would be similar to prior cases, namely utilizing Iran’s proxies. Israel did not pay enough attention to the difference between Mahdawi’s assassination and previous attacks against Iran. This time, the attack targeted the Iranian embassy in Damascus and the target was a very senior official, who was close to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

It appears that Israel’s assessment of the Iranian response to Mahdawi’s assassination was a strategic failure. It appears more likely that the Israeli War Cabinet was provided with an incorrect assessment by the nation’s intelligence community, and less likely that it was provided with an incorrect assessment, which it then decided to ignore. There is concern in Israel that the intelligence assessment was once again wrong, after the colossal failure to anticipate the October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas.

Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 26 April 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

Poland and Germany charge Russian operatives with assassination, sabotage plots

Rzeszów-Jasionka AirportAUTHORITIES IN GERMANY and Poland have charged three individuals with working on behalf of Russian military intelligence in planning acts of sabotage and assassination on European soil. One of the plots allegedly involved an effort to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Another aimed to sabotage commercial airport facilities that are being managed by the United States military.

Polish and Ukrainian authorities announced last week the arrest of Paweł K., a Polish citizen, who is believed to have been engaged in collecting information about the security of the Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport. Located in southeastern Poland, Rzeszów-Jasionka is a relatively small provincial airport. Its proximity to the Ukrainian border has made it central to efforts by Kyiv’s allies to supply it with war materiel following the expansion of Russia’s occupation of Ukraine in February 2022. Military supplies are transported to Rzeszów-Jasionka from across the world and then transferred across the Ukrainian border with trucks. Additionally, many high-level meetings between Ukrainian and Western officials take place at the airport. The United States military is currently providing security at the Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport.

Polish authorities said last week that Paweł K. was part of a Russian intelligence collection operation that was “intended to assist in the planning of a potential assassination of a foreign state leader”, namely President Zelenskyy. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said it informed its Polish counterpart agency about the assassination plot, which had been foiled “as a result of the close co-operation” between Ukrainian and Polish intelligence. Paweł K. is not a diplomat and thus has no immunity from prosecution in Poland. If convicted, therefore, he could face up to eight years in prison.

In a seemingly unconnected development, police in the southeastern German state of Bavaria arrested two dual German-Russian nationals, who have been charged with planning to sabotage military and industrial facilities on German soil. The plot appears to be part of broader Russian efforts to disrupt the production and delivery of military aid to Ukraine. At least one of the locations that the suspects are accused of targeting is a local military base under the command of the United States. The two suspects have been identified as Dieter S., 39, and Alexander J., 37. Both were arrested in the small city of Bayreuth.

Germany’s Federal Foreign Office, led by Minister Annalena Baerbock, summoned Sergei Nechayev, Russian Ambassador to Berlin, shortly after the arrest of Dieter S. and Alexander J. Some media reports noted the “unusually hasty” way Nechayev was summoned, which may indicate that German authorities have acquired “unequivocal proof of the link between the plot and the Kremlin”. An announcement made by the Russian embassy in Berlin confirmed that Nechayev had been summoned in connection to the arrests, but added that the ambassador had been presented with “no proof” that the two suspects were connected with Russian intelligence or that they had planned acts of sabotage.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 22 April 2024 | Permalink

Austria: Arrest raises broader questions about counterintelligence capabilities

BVT AustriaON GOOD FRIDAY, MARCH 29, Egisto Ott, a former member of Austria’s now-dissolved domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT), was arrested in his house in Carinthia, Austria’s southernmost state. Ott had frequently been at the center of media attention in the past year, in connection with the network surrounding the fugitive financier and alleged spy Jan Maršálek, as well as alleged misconduct relating to carrying out illegal investigations of persons. Ott also seems to have been involved in an alleged attempt to create an intelligence unit, or even an entire shadow intelligence service, embedded inside Austria’s foreign ministry. Now the veteran police and intelligence officer stands accused by the state attorney of abusing his authority and of being part of an “intelligence activity to the disadvantage of Austria” —the only form of spying that is illegal under § 256 of the Austrian criminal code.

Ott’s arrest came several years after intelligence was first shared with Austria by Western partner services —allegedly the Central Intelligence Agency— that reportedly date from as early as November 2017. Back then, Ott allegedly received classified material from his service’s email address to his personal Gmail account. However, Peter Gridling, director of the BVT from 2008 until its dissolution in 2021, stated in a recent interview that the ensuing investigations did not yield actionable results that could be used in criminal proceedings. This statement is highly interesting, as Gridling filed accusations about Ott with the State Prosecutor’s Office himself, and would hardly have done unless he had access to hard evidence. Ott was consequently removed from the BVT and placed in Police Academy Austria (SIAK), which is responsible for training police officers and conducts research related to police and domestic security.

Nevertheless, according to media reporting, Ott seems to have kept and illegally used certain forms of identification that presented him as a police officer. He is also alleged to have maintained access to several police databases and to have retained his network of trusted informants that provided him with intelligence. These included contacts in friendly foreign police services, whom Ott knew from his time as a liaison officer in Italy and Turkey. According to Gridling, these contacts were unaware that Ott had been removed from the BVT under suspicion of being unreliable and potentially even working for Russia. They therefore continued to help him when asked. Ott allegedly deceived his contacts by claiming that he needed information on cases relating to different kinds of extremism. As it turned out, according to the leaked arrest warrant, several of the individuals referred to by Ott as “suspects” in terrorism investigations were in fact Russian dissidents or intelligence defectors who were living as protected persons in Austria and elsewhere outside Russia.

It appears highly probable that Ott also had people inside the Austrian bureaucracy, including former colleagues in the BVT, who continued to provide him with information and assistance, even after the first allegations against him arose in 2017. As of now, at least one other officer from LVT Vienna (the state unit of the BVT) has been found to have illegally provided Ott with Information. It is likely, given the publicly available descriptions of Ott’s activities, that other individuals may be implicated. It also remains to be seen whether individuals involved in this case were able to join the BVT’s successor agency, the new Directorate of State Protection and Intelligence (DSN). Read more of this post

Interview reveals state of mind of Israeli intelligence prior to October 7 attack

Israeli General Staff MilitaryON MARCH 23, CHANNEL 12 of Israeli television aired a remarkable interview with Sassi Elya, the former director of technology at the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Better known by the acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak, the ISA is Israel’s domestic security service. The interview had initially been scheduled for broadcast as part of the evening news on October 7, 2023. However, its airing was canceled due to the attack on Israel by Hamas, which occurred that morning.

But on March 23, after about 5 months, Channel 12 aired the original interview with Elya. The retired official spoke with glee about the advanced technological capabilities developed by the ISA in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. Elya said Israeli intelligence had built a unique system, known as “the Tool”, which allegedly provided intimate knowledge about the life of every Palestinian living in the West Bank and Gaza. This technologically advanced surveillance system allegedly monitored every move of its targets, all for the purpose of preventing potential terrorist attacks against the Jewish state. Elya claimed that, as a result of this advanced technological system, there was no chance that Israel would be surprised by Palestinian militants. This system was so advanced, he said, that intelligence agencies from all over the world were coming to Israel to learn about it.

Thanks to Channel 12, we can now examine Elya’s interview retrospectively, and especially in light of the ISA’s poor performance on October 7, as well as its failure to warn Israeli authorities about Hamas’ preparations for the attack. Notably, Elya was interviewed again for the same television program. Predictably, he admitted that his prior assessment had been wrong and regretted being so overly confident about the technology.

This case demonstrates the overestimation by Israeli intelligence of its own capabilities, because of arrogance and over-confidence. This approach refutes the basic premise of intelligence work: be skeptical and be modest. Furthermore, this case highlights that Israeli intelligence agencies overly relied on technology (SIGINT) in the lead-up to October 7, while seemingly neglecting the low-tech activity of gathering information through human intelligence (HUMINT).

The system that Elya described in his initial interview as the ultimate counterintelligence tool was reportedly criticized internally by some in the ISA for gathering huge amounts of information without offering sufficient analytical capability. This imbalance between collection and analysis can render an entire surveillance system practically useless. The bottom line is that, almost by accident, we are now aware of the state of mind that the ISA was in before the sudden attack by Hamas on October 7, which cost so many lives as a result of the ISA’s complacency.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 01 April 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

Opinion: Fumbling Russian spies fail to stop ISIS-K attack, despite warnings from U.S.

Crocus City Hall attackNO COUNTRY HAS BETTER intelligence on the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (known as ISIS-K) than the United States. American forces have faced ISIS-K almost from the moment the group was founded in 2015 in Pakistan, just a few miles from the Afghan border. It was there that a group of disaffected members of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP, commonly referred to as the Pakistani Taliban) began turning their backs on al-Qaeda, which they saw as a failing brand, and joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

By 2017, ISIS-K had begun to draw to its ranks hundreds of fighters from central and south Asia, who were inspired by the group’s goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in the lands of the greater Khorasan. The term refers to a historical region that extends from eastern Iran and Turkmenistan, to the mountains of Kyrgyzstan, containing all of present-day Afghanistan, most of Uzbekistan, and even some parts of the Russian Caucasus. Like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) during its heyday, ISIS-K aspires to establish control over a territorially unified entity and then use perpetual war to expand its influence in central Asia and beyond.

Until 2021, the biggest obstacle to ISIS-K’s plan for regional domination was the U.S. By some accounts, American forces and Western-trained Afghan commando units had managed to eliminate more than half of ISIS-K’s 4,000-strong base in northeastern Afghanistan. Since the hurried U.S. withdrawal from the country in 2021 (which was marred by an ISIS-K suicide bombing that killed nearly 200 people, including 13 U.S. troops), ISIS-K has expanded its reach beyond all prior measure. The group has since claimed responsibility for attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and now Russia, that have killed over 600 people and injured thousands.

A primary reason for the proliferation of ISIS-K’s terrorist activity is that the U.S., which has more intelligence than anyone on the group, issues warnings that are not being taken into consideration by the group’s primary targets, namely Afghanistan, Iran, and Russia. Indeed, despite the Washington’s best efforts, its warnings about pending ISIS-K attacks have been ignored by the group’s primary targets. A few days after an ISIS-K attack killed nearly 100 people in Kerman, Iran, The Wall Street Journal claimed the U.S. government had provided Tehran with “a private warning” of an imminent terrorist threat from ISIS-K. If that is true, then the Iranians clearly did not heed Washington’s warning.

It now appears that, once again, Washington had considerable intelligence insight into ISIS-K’s plans to strike inside Russia. On March 7, the U.S. embassy in Russia warned on its website that “extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, to include concerts”. The warning provided no specifics. However, seeing how U.S. authorities issued private warnings to Iran, a country with which the U.S. has no diplomatic relations, then it is highly likely they provided similar information to Russia, which at least hosts American diplomats and intelligence officers on its soil. Yet, not only did the Russians ignore these warnings, but they openly dismissed them. Read more of this post

Book review of “Agent of the Iron Cross” a masterful historical account by Bill Mills

Agent of the Iron CrossFEW THINGS ARE AS valuable in the field of intelligence studies as delving into historical case work. Indeed, the study of intelligence history is indispensable for anyone wishing to engage in the contemporary setting of this often esoteric -yet critical- field. As an academic specializing in intelligence, I find Bill Mills’ Agent of the Iron Cross: The Race to Capture German Saboteur-Assassin Lothar Witzke during World War I, to shed invaluable light on clandestine operations that unfolded on American soil during the tumult of World War I. Mills masterfully chronicles the gripping saga of Lothar Witzke, a German saboteur-assassin, and his audacious exploits on American soil.

Mills’ captivating narrative unfolds against the backdrop of a world engulfed in conflict, where espionage becomes a weapon of choice for a host of warring factions. Witzke’s ambitious mission, orchestrated by German intelligence, epitomizes the high-stakes game of espionage during wartime. It is replete with a host of master spy characters, the inevitable double agents, and even ingenious sabotage devices. Although this book is not a novel, Mills intricately weaves together in a novel-like manner the threads of intrigue, offering readers a riveting account of Witzke’s daring escapades and the shadowy world of espionage that defined that relatively unexplored era in the history of intelligence.

What sets Agent of the Iron Cross apart is Mills’ ability to contextualize Witzke’s actions within the broader canvas of the historical context it which they unfolded. Through vivid prose and meticulous detail, Mills unravels the layers of deception and intrigue that characterized Imperial Germany’s covert operations on American soil. From the near-sinking of the commissioned ocean liner SS Minnesota to the clandestine explosion on Black Tom Island, Mills paints a vivid portrait of a world teetering on the brink of chaos. Standard accounts of that era underplay the role of intelligence, so it is refreshing for a professor specializing in intelligence to read Mills’ detail-oriented narrative.

At its core, Agent of the Iron Cross is a testament to the enduring allure of espionage and its profound impact on statecraft and the course of history. Mills’ narrative prowess and exhaustive research offer readers a glimpse into a little-known chapter of World War I history, underscoring the complexities of intelligence work and its far-reaching consequences. By delving into historical case studies such as this one, Mills provides invaluable insights into the nature of espionage, its challenges, and its enduring relevance in our ever-evolving world.

United States consistently underestimates Cuban intelligence, sources say

AGENTS OF THE CUBAN government have “penetrated virtually every segment of the United States national security structure,” enabling Havana to share actionable intelligence with Russia and China, according to a new report. Citing former United States and Cuban intelligence officers, The Wall Street Journal said on Saturday that Washington’s counter- intelligence efforts are no match for Cuba and its intelligence service, the Dirección de Inteligencia (DI). The DI is “the best damn intelligence service in the world” for cultivating agents, according to Brian Latell, a retired CIA analyst who served as the U.S. Intelligence Community’s National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. Latell told The Wall Street Journal that the Dirección de Inteligencia bears the imprint of Fidel Castro himself, who took a personal interest in running the service during his reign.

Among the strengths of the Cuban intelligence service is its ability to recruit Americans who are motivated by ideological reasons, rather than by financial gain. The Cubans have historically approached Americans at a young age, usually at universities in the United States or other countries in the Americas. They cultivate those relationships by employing strategic patience that pays off many years —even decades— later. By recruiting ideological sympathizers, the Cubans rarely need to pay their agents large amounts of money, as the cases of Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Ana Belén Montes and State Department diplomat Manuel Rocha suggest. Many Cuban agents enter military service in the United States, which means they acquire Secret or Top-Secret clearances. Others are instructed to penetrate anti-communist groups of Cuban-Americans in southern Florida, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The U.S. counterintelligence strategy prioritizes Russia and China, which means that Cuban intelligence operations are treated as “an afterthought,” claims the paper. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), America’s primary counterintelligence agency, dedicates relatively few resources to investigating Cuban intelligence. Its efforts are chronically “understaffed and outmatched” by Havana, according to former counterintelligence officers who spoke to The Wall Street Journal. The paper notes that the FBI is often aware of several dozen cases of “actual or potential” Cuban agents operating in the U.S. However, it routinely lacks the requisite resources to investigate them.

Author: Ian Allen | Date: 18 March 2024 | Permalink

Opinion: Five months into the war, Israeli intelligence failure looks even worse

Israel Hamas warSINCE OCTOBER 7, 2024, when Israel was caught off guard by a sudden and highly damaging attack from Hamas, more information has surfaced regarding why there was no prior warning about the attack and the failures of Israeli intelligence in this regard.

It has become clear that Israeli intelligence miscalculated Hamas’s intentions. The Israeli security concept, spearheaded by the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) and the Israel Security Agency (ISA), was that: (a) Hamas had been deterred from launching large-scale attacks; and (b) Hamas was focused on carrying out terrorist attacks against Israelis in the West Bank and not on Israel proper. This flawed security concept, which had been fully adopted by the Israeli cabinet and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was proven to be groundless. In fact, Hamas successfully exploited it in order to develop and accelerate its attack strategy.

One significant reason for the failure of the IDF, both in the area of intelligence collection and operationally, was its underestimation of the capabilities of Hamas and the intentions of its leader, Yahya Sinwar. There was also an overestimation by many in Israel, including the security establishment, of Israel’s own intelligence Q Quotecapabilities. Another important insight is that the counterintelligence structures inside Hamas were successful in preventing Israeli intelligence from recruiting agents who were close enough to Sinwar to be able to alert Israel about the impending attack. Furthermore, Israel’s collection and analysis of signals intelligence was unproductive, possibly because Hamas was successful in countering Israel’s ability to produce effective intelligence from signals intercepts.

As the IDF moved deeper into Gaza, and as more information was collected from Hamas facilities, it became clear that there were significant gaps in information regarding the preparations for the attack by Hamas inside Gaza. These preparations lasted for a long time and involved numerous operatives who remained undetected by Israeli intelligence. It looks like the compartmentation system inside Hamas, based on a need-to-know only model, was highly effective.

The IDF attacked the Gaza Strip in 2014 in Operation Protective Edge. Its mission was to destroy Hamas’s ability to carry out assaults against Israel through tunnels dug deep inside Gaza and crossing the border into Israel. Indeed, about 20 such tunnels were destroyed during that operation. Later, Hamas built 250 miles of new tunnels in Gaza that were aimed at defense and to hide combatants when Israel attacked. It has been suggested that this construction project was funded by cash sent to Gaza by Qatar, with Israel’s approval —though Qatar denies this claim. Read more of this post

Russian intelligence services intensify efforts to ‘liquidate’ defectors: report

Maksim KuzminovTHE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES have been “bolstering the[ir] architecture” aimed at stopping potential defectors and “liquidating” those who have already defected and are living in exile, according to a new report. In a leading article published on Sunday, The Wall Street Journal said that the list of “unsolved deaths” of the Kremlin’s Russian critics is “lengthening” and may have surpassed 50, according to some accounts.

Since the current phase of the invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, Russian defectors and other critics of Russia’s ongoing war have “died in unusual circumstances on three continents”, according to the New York-based newspaper. Most deaths have occurred inside Russia, but several have occurred in countries such as India, France, and Spain. In the most recent case, Maksim Kuzminov, a Russian helicopter pilot, who defected to Ukraine in August 2023, was gunned down in Villajoyosa, Spain, last month, in what The Journal described as a “mafia-style assassination”.

The paper notes that very few of these killings or suspicious deaths can be directly attributed to the Kremlin. It adds, however, that the Russian government has ordered a redoubling of coordinated anti-defector operations by the country’s three main intelligence agencies —the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU). In their effort to prevent defections and punish defectors, these agencies have blurred their operational boundaries,  “making it more difficult to know which is responsible” for anti-defector operations, says The Journal.

Russian anti-defector operations are also increasingly involving third-country nationals —operatives who have no official connection with Russia, or with the country in which they are operating on behalf of Russian intelligence. In one recent example from last August, authorities in Britain arrested three Bulgarian citizens with spying for Russia. According to British government prosecutors, the suspects possessed forged passports and identity cards for Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Croatia, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 04 March 2024 | Permalink

Netanyahu ignored calls to disrupt Hamas finances, claims ex-Mossad official

Udi LevyA RETIRED SENIOR MOSSAD official has alleged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly ignored, and even frustrated, efforts to stop the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas. This inaction may have enabled the Palestinian militant group to plan, organize and execute Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which killed over 1400 Israelis on October 7, 2023, and sparked the current war between Israel and Hamas.

The allegation was made by Udi Levy, a 30-year veteran of the Israeli intelligence community, who served as an intelligence officer in the Israel Defense Forces before being appointed to head the Economic Warfare Division of the Mossad, Israel’s external intelligence agency. During his tenure in the Mossad, which ended with his retirement in 2016, Levy was a member of Task Force Harpoon, which aimed to disrupt the flow of funds to militant Palestinian groups, including Hamas.

Last week, Levy told the BBC’s flagship investigative television program Panorama that Task Force Harpoon had identified around 40 companies in the Middle East and North Africa, which were part of Hamas’ investment portfolio. These companies, based in countries such as Sudan, Algeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, were active in the areas of real estate, mining, construction, and tourism, among others. Some of the companies were even directly controlled by Hamas, said Levy.

The income from these financial investments allowed Hamas to use “billions, not millions” of dollars to build its military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, according to the former Mossad official. That investment income was supplemented with direct cash infusions from Iran and Qatar, which in some cases arrived monthly through special envoys, according to Levy. He added that Turkey was “a critical focal point” in Hamas’ money network, as it served as a financial hub for the militant group’s holdings.

Levy told the BBC that he personally advised Netanyahu to “target Hamas’ finances” and explained to him that “Israel had the means to crush Hamas by using only financial tools”. However, Levy claims that, not only did the Israeli prime minister ignore Levy’s advice, but he proceeded to shut down the Mossad’s Task Force Harpoon. This is not the first time that Levy has made these claims. In December 2023, he told The New York Times that Task Force Harpoon analysts were so frustrated with the Israeli government’s inertia, that they resorted to “uploading some documents to Facebook” in hopes that the Israeli authorities would be forced to take action once details about Hamas’ finances were disclosed.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 26 February 2024 | Permalink

Ireland halts issuances of Russian diplomatic visas due to espionage concerns

Russian embassy IrelandAUTHORITIES IN IRELAND ARE systematically “freezing” applications for Russian diplomatic visas from Moscow over concerns that the Kremlin is using its embassy in Dublin as a base for espionage activities. In 2018, the Irish government introduced emergency legislation that canceled a previously approved expansion of the Russian diplomatic compound in the Irish capital, allegedly due to concerns about espionage activities by Russian diplomats. Three years later, reports emerged that Irish government officials were concerned about the expanding size of Russia’s diplomatic presence in Dublin.

In April 2022, Ireland expelled four Russian diplomats, which it claimed were undercover intelligence officers. A subsequent report by the London-based Times newspaper alleged that a major reason Dublin had expelled the diplomats was their “efforts to cultivate contacts with dissident republicans and loyalist paramilitaries” in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland, which is British soil. The report added that at least one of the four expelled Russian diplomats was believed to be an intelligence officer for the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces —widely known by its Cold War-era initials, GRU.

On February 10, The Irish Times alleged that the Irish government was “refusing to allow Russia to replace diplomats assigned to its Dublin embassy […] due to concerns over espionage”. The article went on to claim that Russia’s diplomatic presence in Ireland had “dropped by half” and was causing a “tense standoff” between Ireland and Russia. It also quoted a spokesman from the Russian embassy in Dublin, who decried Ireland’s “unacceptable visa and accreditation policy”. The Russians told the paper that their embassy was staffed by just eight administrative staff and six diplomats.

On February 17, The Irish Times said it had corroborated the Russian officials’ claims by speaking with Micheál Martin, Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Martin was approached by the newspaper’s reporters in Germany, where he attended the Minich Security Conference. Martin told The Irish Times that the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs was  carefully “scrutinizing” every new application for a diplomatic visa by the Russian government. The reason for the careful scrutiny, said Martin, was a number of advisories issued by Ireland’s intelligence services, suggesting “that other activities were underway” at the Russian embassy and that some embassy staff “were not actually diplomats but were performing intelligence functions”. Martin added that the Irish government had determined “15 diplomats should be adequate for [Russia’s] needs” in Ireland.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 18 February 2024 | Permalink

Alleged Afghan-born Russian spy tries to regain revoked British citizenship

GCHQAN AFGHAN-BORN MAN, who became a naturalized British citizen and worked for British intelligence for over a decade, is attempting to regain his British citizenship, which was revoked after he was accused of being a Russian spy. The man, who is identified in court documents only as “C2”, was born in Afghanistan and grew up under the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan he left the country alongside the Russian forces and resettled in Russia, where he attended university and married a Russian woman.

By 2000, when he entered the United Kingdom as an Afghan asylum seeker, he was in possession of Russian citizenship due to his marriage to a Russian citizen. He was eventually granted asylum in Britain and began to work as an interpreter for the Foreign Office and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Britain’s signals intelligence agency. His fluency in Russian, Dari, and Pashto, made him invaluable to British intelligence as the United States-led ‘war on terrorism’ escalated in Afghanistan. In the late 2000s, the British Foreign Office sent C2 to Afghanistan, where he worked to build ties between the nascent post-Taliban Afghan government and the British diplomatic corps stationed in the country.

It was in Afghanistan, according to Britain’s Security Service (MI5), that C2 began to develop contacts with Russian intelligence officials. The agency claims that two Russian military attaches stationed in the Afghan capital Kabul, identified in court documents as “Boris” and “Dimitri”, recruited C2 on behalf of the Main Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces’ General Staff, which is commonly known as GRU. The British government claims that, following his recruitment by GRU, C2 traveled to Russia at least six times and once to Cyprus, where he continued to hold regular meetings with his Russian handlers.

On 2019, after he had left government service, MI5 began to question C2 about his alleged connection to Russian military intelligence. He consistently denied that he was a Russian spy. Eventually, MI5 took him “to the roof of a hotel” in London, where he was administered a polygraph examination. A few weeks later, by which time he had returned to his base in Kabul, C2 was informed that his British citizenship would be revoked due to his espionage work for the Russians.

Ironically, the British government evacuated C2 from Afghanistan in 2021 as part of Operation PITTING, during which 15,000 Afghan nationals were transported to the United Kingdom as the Taliban descended on Kabul. Upon arriving in the United Kingdom, C2 was arrested and eventually released on bail. Last week he formally appealed against the British government’s decision to strip him of his citizenship. His case was heard in secrecy at a special hearing of the United Kingdom’s Special Immigration Appeal Commission (SIAC). The SIAC is expected to rule in March or April.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 12 February 2024 | Permalink