Looking at History

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Looking at History

My blog looks at different aspects of history that interest me as well as commenting on political issues that are in the news

PagesHomeMy Books Sunday, 8 August 2021 A horse-drawn society?

The popular image of Victorian England is of a societywhose members travelled by train. Whilethere is little doubtof the massive impactthat railwayshad on British society, itslandscapes and its attitudes, up to 1914 for most people most of the time therailwayswere not the main means oftransport. Britain in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries hasjustifiably been called a horse drawn society:

Railways paradedthe power of the machine across the whole country, they eroded localism andremoved barriers to mobility and they created new jobs and new towns. Their very modernityand success in generating new traffic,however, also generated expansion in older forms of transport, for all thefeeder services bringing freightand passengers to the railway stations werehorse-drawn. This, coupled with theneeds of road transport within the larger towns, produced a three or fourfoldincrease in horse-drawn traffic on Victorian roads.The result, in employment terms, was that there were consistently morethan twice as many road transport workers as there were railwaymen until after1891 and that in the early twentieth century the road transport men, by nowincluding some handling electric trams and soon to include others on motorvehicles, remained easily the largest group oftransport workers.[1]

In early 1830, twenty-nine coaches operated daily betweenLiverpooland Manchester; by early 1831, there were four and only one remained twoyears later. One of the leading coachowners considered annihilation as the most appropriate word to describe theeffects of railways. But this experience was untypical of other parts of the country. Where the new railwaysran roughly parallelto long-established trunk roadsthere was certainlylittle future for stage coaching. Where roadstraversed or fedinto the route of the railway a very different situation existed andhorse-drawn vehicles still played a very important part in the overallprovision of transport services.[2]

Initially the effect of railwayson towns that hadpreviously been important staging posts was disastrous. In 1839, Doncasterfound work for 7 four-horse coaches, 20 two-horse coaches, 9 stage wagons and100 post horses; the total horse populationwas 258.[3] In 1845, after thetown had had railway links for five years, only one four-horse coach, 3 stagewagons and 12 post horseswere still in service and thenumber of horseshad fallen to 60. Trade had suffered badly and the value ofproperty had fallen between 25 and 30 per cent. Where coaches acted as feedersthere were still opportunities for them to stay on the road and, in some cases,increase their business. The completion of the early network by about 1840provided many opportunities for opening up new combined coach and railwayroutes for passengertraffic. In April 1839, the well-known coach magnateGeorge Sherman expressed the opinion that after the railway had driven most ofthe coaches off the long-distance routes:

...there would be as much toemploy more horsesas there ever was through theextra ordinary quantity of omnibuses and cabs that were appearing on thestreets.[4]

In 1839, there were 600 omnibuses in Londonand this increased to 1,300 by1850. There was a parallel increase inhansom cabs: 12 in 1823 to over 4,400 by the 1840s. Such was the importance of horse transport inLondon that, during the cab strike of July 1853, the city ground to a halt:

There was not only a dearth,but an absolute famine of locomotion, and never since the days ofCharlesII, when Hackney-coaches were first invented, have thesight-seeing and outgoing public been reduced to such an extremity ofhelplessness as by the cabmens strike of yesterday.[5]

The result was a significant increase in the cost of horses: in 1872 the Londonand South Western were paying 5417s for the same type of animal that had only cost them 44 10s five yearsearlier.[6] The increaseddemand for horseswas certainly not confined toLondon; there is also significant evidence from the provinces. There was also an increase in privately ownedheavy carriages: from 30,000 in 1840 the number grew to 120,000 by 1870. Over the same period the number of lighttwo-wheeled carriages increased six times.By 1902, 12 out of every 1,000 people in Great Britain owned some kindof private horse-drawn vehicles. This compared with 14 per 1000 in 1870 and 4per 1000 in 1840, and it was not until 1926 that the number of car ownersexceeded the number of persons who had owned horse-drawn carriages in 1870.

Without carriagesand carts the railwayswould have been like stranded whales, giantsunable to use their strength, for these were the only means of getting peopleand goods right to the doors of houses, where they wanted to be.[7]

The number of horses and the need to do something with the bodily waste they produced created major environmental problems in towns and especially the burgeoning cities.By the 1890s, when 300,000 horses lived in London, each producing 10kg of dung a day, the stuff was piled so high that streets became impassable.The result was the creation of a new job, the crossing-sweepers whomade a living clearing a path for pedestrians.Contemporaries described horse droppings coating the roads in a 'warm brown matting' that flung up dust in all directions or, on wet days, flooded the streets in a pea-soup-thick sheet that was spattered by passing vehicles across houses, shopfronts and pedestrians.As cities reached 'peak horse', streets became gridlocked and the clatter of horses and carriage wheelsbecame so deafening that straw was laid outside homes and hospitals to muffle the noise.

The solution to all this pollution and congestion, it was hoped, was the car.Useof the steam engine began to make the horse redundant in farm work though pitponies continued to be used in coalmining. The number of working horseshad already declined before the war. Horse-drawnbuses disappeared in the late 1880s initially replaced by trams. Motor buses appeared in 1898 and there were5,000 by 1904 and 50,000 ten years later.Electric and then petrol-powered metered taxis were introduced in Londonfrom the mid-1890s. The war devastated thetaxi trade with many horsesrequisitioned by the military.

Although machine gun and artilleryfire reduced their value on the battlefield, horsesremained an important part of the war effort.[8]In 1914, the British army had about 25,000 horsesbut this had increased by June 1917 to 591,000horsesand213,000 mules as well as 60,000 camels and oxen. Theywere mainly used for logistical support and were better than mechanisedvehicles at travelling through deep mud and over rough terrain. Horses were alsoused for reconnaissance and for carrying messengers, as well aspullingartillery, ambulances and supply wagons. On average, Britainlost about 15 per cent of its animals each year of the war with losses at 17per cent on the Western Front. The war had a devastating effect on theBritish horse population; Britain lost over 484,000horses, one horse for every two men. Withsome breeds in danger of disappearing, after 1918 working horseswere an increasingly rare part of the Britisheconomy, their role confined largely to recreational purposes.

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[1] Thompson, F. M. L., The Rise of Respectable Society: British Society 1830-1900,(Fontana), 1988, p. 47. See also his Victorian England: the horse-drawn society:an inaugural lecture,(Bedford College), 1970, and Nineteenth-century horse sense, EconomicHistory Review, Vol. 29, (1976), pp. 60-81.

[2] Hart, Harold W.,Stage-coach and train in conflict, Journalof the Railway Canal Historical Society, Vol. 24, (2), (1978), pp.42-45.

[3] Scowcroft, P. L.,From pack horse to motorlorry: freighttransport by road in Doncaster and district, Journalof the Railway Canal Historical Society, Vol. 32, (1997), pp.260-264.

[4] Cit, Bagwell, P.S., The Transport Revolution, 1700-1985,(Routledge), 1998, p. 131.

[5] Londonwithout Cabs, The Times,28July 1853, p. 6.

[6] Turvey, Ralph,Horse Traction in Victorian London, Journal of Transport History, Vol. 26,(2), (2005), pp. 38-59.

[7] Ibid, Thompson, F. M. L., TheRise of Respectable Society: British Society 1830-1900, p. 49.

[8] Butler, Simon, The War Horses: The Tragic Fate of a MillionHorses in the First World War, (Halgrove), 2011.

Posted byRichard Brownat11:47No comments: Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest Wednesday, 9 December 2020 Russia and rebellion in North America

Russophobiais a paradox in the history of Great Britain. Within the United Kingdom there developed early in the nineteenth centuryan antipathy toward Russiawhich soon became the mostpronounced and enduring element in the national outlook on the world abroad. The contradictory sequel of nearlythree centuries of consistently friendly relations, this hostility foundexpression in the Crimean War. Yet that singularly inconclusive struggle is thesole conflict directly between the two nations; theirs is a record of peaceunique in the bellicose annals of the European great powers.[1]

Fearof Russian motives and ambitions in Europe was a persistent theme of Britishforeign and colonial policies during the nineteenth and early-twentiethcenturies. Yet, with the notableexception of the Crimean War in the 1850s, there were no hostilities betweenthe two nations while during the twentieth century it was Russian militarycollaboration with Britain and her allies that played a major role in thedefeat of Germany in 1918 and 1945.Despite this, russophobia, though lacking the stridency of its nineteenth centurypredecessor, remains a feature of British public opinion largely because of thedismemberment of the Soviet Empire and the uncertainty over what Russias aims are today.

The 1830s saw increasing tensions between Britain and Russiaover the changing anddeclining position of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and the Near East. [2]Lord Palmerston was Foreign Secretary for much of this period and his foreignpolicy reinforced certain specific elements of the national character thatwere not confined exclusively to the boundaries of Britain but encompassed itsimperial possessions. [3] This was evident in the colonial press thatcontained detailed coverage of foreign policy generally drawn from Britishnewspapers. Foreign policy in the 1830swas explicitly directed in the interests of liberal causes and patrioticinterests and had broad support across British society. For Britain, preserving the European balanceof power and protecting its international trade, particularly with India, werekey objectives and Russia was perceived as a threat to both. Russian foreign policy was seen in terms ofits desire for westward expansion into Europe something that it sought toachieve by exploiting weakness within the Ottoman Empire. Russia was also seen as willing to useaggressive diplomacy and military force to achieve this objective.

Although the Foreign Office sought to play down differencesbetween Britain and Russiain the mid-1830s, Palmerston came in fordirect and sustained criticism from David Urquhart, a diplomat with experience in Constantinople who sought toportray Palmerston as a Russian agent. [4] He wasconvinced that Russian agents were seeking to undermine Britain and his viewgained significant support among working-class groups in northern England in1839 and especially 1840. In 1839, while seeking to become a Tory candidate forMarylebone in London, Urquhartmet William Cardo,Marylebones ChartistConvention delegate. Cardo was impressed byUrquhartintroducing him to otherdelegates who shared with him a plan for simultaneous outbreaks in the longnights before Christmas in which a Polish emigrant directed militaryorganisationand was to have command in the mountains of Wales. Urquhartsaid that with a fewconfidants he toured Chartistcentres successfullydissuading local leaders from taking part in the rebellion.

Urquhartwas critical in fanningfears of Russian aggression and it is possible that these meetings were largelyheld to promote his ideas on foreign policy. Russophobiacan also be explained bywidespread working-class support for continental nationalist movements. [5]Cardo, Lowery and Warden formed the core of a Chartistforeign policy group andit gained the support of the NorthernLiberator. [6] Although Urquharts claims only surfaced in the 1850s, reference to a meeting between unnamedChartists and Urquhartis made in a letter to his friend PringleTaylor dated 22 September 1839. Cardo, probably at Urquharts instigation, went to Newport tendays after the rebellion where he was arrested on 15November and, because no criminal intention could be shown, he was put on theLondon mail coach the following day. Local magistrates were clearly puzzledwhen Cardo informed them that the rebellion was the result of Russian agencyand identified Beniowski, who they had never heard of, as the agent. Althoughthere may have been talk of sending him to Wales because of his militaryexperience, there is no evidence Beniowski played a direct role in Newportalthough there were vague reports of a foreigner on the coalfield in Septemberand October 1839.

Urquharts belief that the ChartistMarch on Newport wasfomented by Russian agents was dismissed by G. D. H. Cole as the fantasy ofa disordered mind but there is no denying that his view of Russian ambitionsgained widespread support and help explain why rumours that Russian agents wereinvolved in the rebellions in the Canadas in 1837 and 1838 and in Irishnationalist activities in the 1850s were, despite their eccentric nature, givencredence in governmental and diplomatic circles. Russian possession of Alaska until 1867 gavethis viewpoint added force: was it, like Irelandin relation to Britain, thebackdoor into British North America?Although Russians may have reached Alaska in 1648, it was not until theearly 1740s that traders established hunting and trading posts and a furtherforty years before these settlements became permanent. The Russian-American Company acquired themonopoly on Alaskas fur trade in 1799 and was expected to establish newsettlements and establish an expanded colonisation programme. [7]The Russian hold on Alaska was limited to coastal locations and from the 1820sits economic position was weakened by competition from the Hudsons Bay Companyand from American trappers. It neverposed a viable military threat to British North America and at its heightRussian Alaska contained barely 700 Russians.Yet there were Russians on the American mainland and this was sufficientto rouse russophobic fears and those fears could easily give way to rumour. [8]

Thesecond Canadian rebellion occurred in November 1838 with the attack in LowerCanadathat was defeated at Odelltown and an assaulton Prescott in Upper Canada.At the same time, rumours of the implication of the Russian governmentsinvolvement began to circulate. TheMorning Herald of New Yorkpublished an article on 12 November suggestingthat the Russians were favourably disposed to the revolutionaries who weretrying to overthrow the British Empire.[9] It also suggested that Russiawanted to create discord along theCanadian-American frontier sufficient to provoke was between the United Statesand Britain so upsetting its diplomaticinvolvement in Eastern Europe. Therumours circulated widely in North American newspapers and President Martin VanBuren told Henry Fox, British minister in Washington that he had heard thatRussia wanted to finance the rebellions. [10]

On 24 November 1838, the declarationof a prisoner John Bratish Eliovith,[11]known as the Baron Fratellin fed the suspicions of the British government.[12] He claimed that an agent of the Russianconsul in New Yorkpromised to provide him with 5,000 rifles anda sum of $5,000 increasing to $25,000 should the rebellions prove to be asuccess. Fratellin added that MrsKielchen, the wife of the Russian consul from Boston, was living in Montrealand openly plotting with the Frères Chasseurs.[13] On 26 November, following these allegations,the Montreal police force searched her residence and found that the consul waswith her. [14] He was immediately placed under arrest andall his papers were seized.[15]

Following this Henry Fox asked thejournalist and lawyer Stewart Derbishire to carry out a rigorous examination ofthe issue.[16] Derbishire had already reported to Durhamin May1838 that the habitants had nopractical grievances, that it was the malaria of political agitation whichhad produced the rebellion.[17]The malaria, he felt, was still active but his constant warnings during 1838and 1839 to Durham, Lieutenant-Governor George Arthurof Upper Canada, and SirJohn Colbornegave him a reputation as an alarmist. AlthoughArthurwas impressed by Derbishire, Colbornewarned that he was very credulous and shouldnot be encouraged. He submitted hisreport to Fox on 20 July 1839 concluding that, on the basis of the availableevidence that the Russians were engaged in a criminal conspiracy against theBritish Crown and were seeking to create disaffection with Britain in LowerCanada.

Derbishiresconclusions brought together the context of the events in Canada and thesomewhat tense relations between the British and Russians with reports,generally based on unsubstantiated assertions, of Russian intrigue. According to his report, Von Schoultz andCharles Hindenlang,[18]two of the main European rebels involved in events in November 1838 wereactually Russian officers who organised the rebel troops in Canada whileRussian agents in New Yorkprovided the necessary funds. [19]Derbishire also concluded that exile in France provided Papineauwith the opportunity to approach the Russiangovernment and that the arrest of the Russian consul from Boston wasirrefutable proof of the Russian plot.[20]Although he repeated many of the assertions in Derbishires report and came tothe same conclusions about the existence of Russian intrigue, Preston was morecircumspect recognising difficulties with the available evidence: for instance,the belief prevailed, he is reported to have stated, this mans allegedfurther statement, and alleged fact.

It was not until 1937 that the questionof Russian involvement in the rebellions was subjected to detailedanalysis. Stavrianos considered theavailable evidence, or rather lack of it pointing to the inadequacies ofDerbishires conclusions. He demonstrated, for instance, that Von Schoultz, whohad fled to the United Statesafter the Polish revolution of 1831 andHindenlang who sought refuge in New Yorkby 1838 were, in fact, simply revolutionariesnot Russian agents and that they simply wanted to help the Canadian people tobreak free from British domination.[21] He also suggested that if Russiahad really controlled certain rebel activitiesthat agents of Canada and the United States would have informed their superiorsof this. As there is no knowncorrespondence at this level, it is impossible to confirm the charges againstthe Russian government. President VanBurens hint to Fox, something that had some credence given the tensediplomatic relations between Russia and Britain may have been an attempt todivert the British governments attention and was not entirely unfounded. Ifsuccessful, it could have given the Chasseurs far greater freedom of action.[22]

Itis difficult to see what benefit Russian support for the rebels could have achieved. The second rebellion in November 1838 hadbeen disastrous largely because it lacked support among French-Canadiansand where there was support, it was withouteffective military organisation imploding when faced by better trained militiaand regular British troops. However, Bodisco, the Russian minister inWashington, toyed with the idea of aiding the rebellion and did meet Papineau, OCallaghanand Robert Nelsonin his home on 10 December 1838 that hereported in a letter addressed to count Nesselrode. Papineausought political support but it was clear thatRussiadid not wish tointervene in the conflict despite the sympathy of the Russian consul for theCanadian cause. [23] Nesselrodes response to Bodisco made it veryclear that under no circumstances should he become embroiled in the rebellions.[24] Although rumours of such meetings were widelyknown at the time, they were officially denied by authorities in Canada, Russiaand Britain.[25]

The idea of an alliance between theRussian government and the Canadian rebels is difficult to maintain. ThePatriotesopenly supported the independence of Polandfrom Russiaand often drewparallels between the Russian system of government and the British colonialsystem when denouncing the abuses of the latter. Despite the arrest of theRussian consul in Montreal, no incriminating evidence wasfound. His wifes visit to Montreal wasto collect her two daughters who attended school there though he planned toleave his son Peter to finish his schooling. [26]It is clear why the rumours of Russian involvement were taken seriously inCanada and in London especially after the Kielchen affair and Van Burensunfounded insinuations but it is clear that the rumours were never translatedinto practice.

Concerns about Russian intriguesresurfaced in the 1850s when tension between Britain and Russialed to war in the Crimea. This was, for instance, evident in thewidespread coverage of the conflict in the Australia press from late 1853.[27]War in the Crimea finally broke out in March 1854 and when news reached thecolonies two months later, it raised the question of their vulnerability toRussian attack. [28] A Russian naval presencein the Pacific led Australians to realise that they needed Britishprotection. Individuals who had, theprevious year, raised the possibility of a republic now reminded Britain of herobligations to protect Australia if Russia decided to make sorties into thesouthern Pacific. [29]On this occasion, Edward Hawksley, editor of the Peoples Advocate, misjudged the colonial mood when he wrote thatthe war:

willbe a great stroke in our favour and we cannot doubt that our people will takeadvantage if it [it will be] the signal for us to demand our freedom.[30]

Inthe newly established colony of Victoria, the Argus that had threatened independence in 1852 now attacked Britainfor leaving the greatest of her colonial possessions and its gold defencelessagainst a Russian onslaught. [31]Fear of war and perhaps more importantly the threat to Australian trade, forthe moment, ended any imminent possibility of a republic.

By the early 1850s, calls for Repeal and devolution had beenlargely discredited as the dominant form of Irish nationalism. It no longer seemedpossible that demands for peaceful change could quickly deliver greater Irishautonomy. The approach, advocatedforcefully by John Mitchel, that Irelandcould only achieve autonomythrough physical-force appeared also to have been defeated in 1848.[32] Acombination of often disillusioned migrants fleeing the Famine, the arrival ofescaped leaders of the 1848 rising, the nativistreaction across NorthAmerica and Britains foreign difficulties especially the revival of mistrust ofRussiaand then France, historically regarded asIrelands opportunity, ensured that anti-British feeling and the goal of Irishindependence did not disappear and, by the mid-1850s, created conditions inwhich radical, republican nationalismrevived and sought Russiansupport. [33]

In the early 1850s, the United Statesand especially New Yorkbecame a magnet forpolitical exiles and for those Young Irelanders who had been released or hadescaped from Van Diemens Land. [34]They revitalised Irish-Americannationalismand led between 1848 and1857 to the formation of organisations such as the Silent Friends, theIrishmens Civil and Military Republican Union, the Irish Emigrant Aid Societyand especially the Emmet Memorial Association, all of which intended to sendmilitary aid to Irelandin one form or another. TheYoung Irelanders, including JohnOMahony, [35]Michael Doheny, Thomas Francis Meagher and John Mitchelwere seen as political martyrs and feted asheroes on their arrival in the republic.Through their varied propaganda efforts, they sought to sustain arevolutionary nationalismgrounded in an almostpathological hatred of England.

John Mitchelbecame the leadingrepublican ideologue after his arrival in the United Statesin 1853 through the Citizen, his newspaper that firstappeared in New Yorkearly the following year.[36]His rhetoric was splenetic; his cause Irish independence; his method,physical-force. Mitchelwas prepared to condemnBritains empire as often as possible and to spell out to Irish-Americanstheir responsibility toliberate their native country from British dominion. Shortly after thepublication of the Citizen, on 13April 1854 Mitchelhelped to establish theIrishmens Civil and Military Republican Union.The group was open to members of militia companies as well as otherIrish societies and organisations and sought to raise funds to aid othernationalist groups struggling for Irish independence.

With the outbreak of the Crimean Warin March 1854, Mitchelwent from New Yorkto Washington to meet BaronStockl, the Russian minister to seek funds from Russiafor an Irish revolution. [37] Stockl recognised and Mitchel admitted thatit was Mitchels hatred to England and love of Irelandrather than his love forRussia that motivated the request for support.Mitchel argued that the Irish in Ireland and the United Stateswere ready to attackEngland and could do so with Russian aid.Ireland needed munitions as well as the diversion that Russia couldprovide. Although Stockl admitted that England could be attacked throughIreland but he questioned how, with the Baltic and Black Seas blockaded byEnglish and French navies, Russia could transport arms to Ireland. [38]The Irishmens Civil and Military Republican Union did not long survive thissetback and Mitchell concluded that revolution in Ireland was, at least in theshort-term, no longer possible and this, in part, explains his later suspicionsof some Irish-Americannationalist groups especially their use ofsecret tactics.

Unlike Mitchel, John OMahonyescaped abroad after thecollapse of the attempted risingin 1848 initially to Paris leaving France forthe United Statesin December 1853. Although the immediate needs of theIrish-Americanpopulation tended to overshadow the distantutopia of an independent Ireland, Irish America proved a fertile source of support forconspiratorial associations committed to providing an expeditionary force ofliberators for Ireland. The IrishMilitary and Civil Association, founded in New Yorkin February 1855 succeededMitchels organisation as the leading Irish-Americanrevolutionary society. Itsmilitary branch, known as the Emmet Monument Association, was organised intocompanies of single men who drilled in preparation for the invasion of Irelandand was led by OMahonyand Michael Doheny. Its goal was to erect a monument honouringRobert Emmet who had been executed after an abortive rebellion in 1803.

The Association spread quicklythroughout the major cities of the Union and it was composed of more than threethousand men in New YorkCity alone.Like Mitchel, its leaders entered into secretnegotiations with the representatives of Russiain Washington and New York to launch aninvasion of Irelandbut Russiasdefeat in the Crimean Warended any hopes of assistance from their newally. [39] Whether there was a large element of fantasyin their talk of launching an invasion of Ireland, OMahonybelieved that there was the strongest hopesof Russian aid. [40] Negotiations certainly went further than Patriote appeals for Russian help in 1837-1838 but with nogreater success than Mitchels earlier attempt. In the aftermath of this failure, the EmmetMonument Association too was dissolved but its leaders first formed a permanent committee,consisting of thirteen men, representatives of the several divisions of theAssociation with the power to revive the organisation if necessary at a laterdate. After two years, the committee concluded that it was time to prepare fora new Irish revolutionary movement.

After the Crimean War, Russiapursued cautious and well-calculated foreignpolicies until a further Balkan crisis almost caused war in the late1870s. The 1856 Treaty of Paris, signedat the end of the Crimean War, had demilitarised the Black Sea and during the1860s and 1870s Russian foreign policy sought to regain their navalaccess. Russia viewed Britain andAustria-Hungary as opposed to that goal, so foreign policy concentrated on goodrelations with France, Prussia and the United States.This, and the need to sell Alaska to the United States in order toprovide much-needed funds to develop its interests in the Far East, may explainwhy there is no evidence of any Russian involvement in the Fenianincursions into Canada in 1866, 1870 and1871. Russian attitudes to Britain alsocontributed to this stance. AlthoughRussian expansion into Central Asia continued in the 1860s with the conquest ofthe Bukhoro Khanate in 1868, the territories directly bordering Afghanistan andPersia were left nominally independent to avoid alarming British India. [41]

Russian diplomatic and militaryinterests subsequently returned to Central Asia, where Russiahad quelled a series of uprisings in the1870s, and Russia incorporated hitherto independent emirates into the empire.Britain renewed its concerns in 1881 when Russian troops occupied Turkmen landson the Persian and Afghan borders and almost erupted into open warfare afterthe capture of Merv in 1884. This madethe North-West Rebellionled by Louis Riel in 1885, important to Russiaand, like the rebellions in 1837 and 1838, it was widely covered in thestrictly censored Russia press. OneRussian magazine referred to Riel as Canadas Garibaldi and suggested that thealmost simultaneous events in the Sudan with General George Gordons death atKhartoum, China and Canada were shaking the entire British Empirewith Canadasingled out as Britains Achilles heel. [42]

One thing missing from previousdiscussion of the Russian dimension in the rebellions of 1837 and 1838 is howthe fleeting links between rebels and diplomats fitted into Russian foreignpolicy and particularly how the logic of putting Britains imperial possessionsunder pressure linked to Russias broadly continentalistambitions. Destabilising British powerin Canada or in Irelandcould have strengthened Russian status withinthe European Concert. When this is takeninto account, Papineaus plea for Russian politicalsupport in 1838 and the attempts by John Mitchel and John OMahony to obtainRussian aid for rebellion in Ireland during the Crimean War can be seen in anew, less eccentric light. In both 1838and in the 1850s, it was particular circumstances that resulted in a diplomaticdead-end. By 1838, Russian diplomatsrightly surmised that there was no realistic prospect of Patriotesraising afurther rebellion in Lower Canadawhile defeat in the Crimean War meant thatthere was no longer any reason to support rebellion in Ireland. Rumour of Russian support for rebellion inCanada was rather more than contemporaries admitted or historians haverecognised.

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[1] J. H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobiain Great Britain: A Studyof the Interaction of Policy and Opinion, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press), 1950, p. 1.

[2] K. Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841: Britain, the LiberalMovement and the Eastern Question, 2 Vols. (London: G. Bell Sons),1951, Vol. 1, pp. 259-320, and Vol. 2, pp. 527-777, remains the most detailedanalysis. For a more recent account see,Brown David, Palmerston: A Biography,(Yale University Press), 2010.

[3] David Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy, 1846-55, (Manchester:Manchester University Press), 2002, pp. 3-4.

[4] On Urquhart, see the elegant essay by A. J.P. Taylor, Dissenting Rivals: Urquhartand Cobden, in his The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792-1939, (London:H. Hamilton), 1957, pp. 37-61. Shannon, Richard, David Urquhartand the Foreign Affairs Committees in P. Hollis,ed., Pressure from Without in earlyVictorian England, (London: Edward Arnold), 1974, pp. 239-261, and Miles Taylor, The old radicalism and thenew: David Urquhartand the politics of opposition, 1832-1867 in Eugenio F. Biagini, and Alastair J.Reid, eds., Currentsof radicalism: popular radicalism, organised labour and party politics inBritain, 1850-1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1991, pp.23-43, are useful essays. See also, Gertrude Robinson, David Urquhart: Victorian Knight Errant, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 1920.

[5] Geoffrey Claeys, Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire 1850-1920, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press), 2010, pp. 25-26.

[6] Joan Hugman, A Small Drop ofInk: Tyneside Chartism and the NorthernLiberator, in Owen R. Ashton, Robert Fyson and Stephen Roberts, eds., The ChartistLegacy, (London: Merlin Press), 1999,pp. 24-44.

[7] Ilya Vinkovetsky, RussianAmerica: An Overseas Colony of a Continental Empire, 1804-1867, (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press), 2011, pp. 6-73, is a recent study of its development anddemise.

[8] For a contemporary view of Russian intriguessee, T. R. Preston Three Years Residencein Canada from 1837 to 1839, 2 Vols. (London: Richard Bentley), 1840, Vol.1, pp. 229-244. Preston concluded that,given Russias alleged intrigues in British India, astrong degree of plausibility, to say the least, must be attached to the actualprevalence of similar alleged intrigues in British America. He also commented: various suspicious circumstancestranspired, calculated to leave but little moral doubtpositive proof being, ofcourse, in such cases almost impossibleof Russia having individually lentherself to aid the schemes of those who were plotting and endeavouring to wrestthe Canadian provinces from British sway.

[9] L. S. Stavrianos,The rumour of Russian intrigue in the rebellion of 1837, Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 18, (1937), p. 367.

[10] Stavrianos, Therumour of Russian intrigue in the rebellion of 1837, p. 368.

[11] Alain Messier, Dictionnaireencyclopédique et historique des patriotes 1837-1838, (Montréal: Guérin), 2002.p. 195.Fratellin was an adventurer who passed for a gentleman and a baron ofHungarian origin; arrested in November 1838, he was imprisoned in MontrealfromNovember 1838 to March 1839.

[12] Archivesnationales du Québec: E17, Ministère de la Justice, Evénements de 1837-1838. His first deposition (2958) dated 24 November1838, printed in Georges Aubin and Nicole Martin-Verenka, eds., Insurrection: Examens volontaires, Vol.2: 1838-1839, (Montréal: Lux),2007, pp. 177-179; a second deposition (2961) dated 13 December 1838, printedpp. 179-180.

[13] Stavrianos, Therumour of Russian intrigue in the rebellion of 1837, p. 371.

[14] Ibid, p. 368.

[15] Russian archival documents on Canada: diplomatic correspondence fromAmerica, 1812-1841, (Ottawa: Centre for Research on Canadian-RussianRelations), 1997, p. 8. See also, JosephL. Black, The Peasant Kingdom: Canada inthe 19th-Century Russian Imagination, (Newcastle, Ontario: Penumbra Press),2001, pp. 75-77.

[16] Michael S. Cross, Stewart Derbishire, Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol.9, pp. 201-202.

[17] Norah Story, Stewart Derbishires report toLordDurhamonLower Canada, 1838, CanadianHistorical Review, Vol. 28, (1937), pp. 48-62

[18] Hindenlang wrote two letters to Fratellinjust before his execution on 15 February 1839.

[19] Stavrianos, Therumour of Russian intrigue in the rebellion of 1837, pp. 368-369.

[20] Ibid, p. 369. Preston, Three Years Residence in Canada from 1837 to 1839, pp. 233-234,suggested that Papineauhadgone to Paris to make it easier for him to be conveyed in a quiet way to St.Petersburg to meet Tsar Nicholas II.

[21] Stavrianos, p.369.

[22] Ibid, p. 370.

[23] T. H. Leduc,That Rumour of Russian Intrigue in 1837, Canadian Historical Review,Vol. 23, (1942), p. 399.

[24] Ibid, p. 400.

[25] Tishkov, V. A., Rossiia I vosstanie1837-1838, Amerikanski ezhegodnik,(Nauka), 1977, pp. 283-299.

[26] Black, ThePeasant Kingdom: Canada in the 19th-Century Russian Imagination, p. 75.

[27] Between October 1853 and April 1854, the Sydney Morning Herald, for instance,published 141 articles on RussiaandTurkey, many based on newspaper reports from London.

[28] The Declaration of War, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 June 1854, p.3.

[29] For instance, How should Sydney bedefended?, Sydney Morning Herald, 1October 1853, p. 3. See also John D. Grainger,The First Pacific War: Britain and Russia,1854-1856, (Woodbridge: Boydell),2008.

[30] Peoples Advocate, 31 December 1853.

[31] A Russian Fleet; DestinationUnknown, Argus, 19 May 1854, p. 4.

[32] On Young Irelandandthe failed 1848 rebellion in Irelandsee, ChristineKinealy, Repeal and Revolution: 1848 inIreland, (Manchester: Manchester University Press),2009, and Richard Brown, Famines, Fenians and Freedom, (Southampton: Clio Publishing), 2011,pp. 187-200, 210-218.

[33] Fenianism was an umbrella termthat generally referred to the IRB, founded in Dublinin 1858, the Fenians Brotherhood establishedin the United Statesand then Canadaand finally the Clan-na-Gael, initially formedin 1867. The term Fenian, widely used in nationalist andanti-nationalist rhetoric after 1858, encompassed those Irish organisationscommitted to physical force nationalism.

[34] For the men of 48 and their experience inVan Diemens Land, see Brown,Richard, Famine, Fenians and Freedom, pp. 494-504.

[35] Desmond Ryan, John OMahony, in T. W. Moody, ed., The FenianMovement, (Blackrock: Mercier Press),1968, pp. 63-76, provides a good summary of his life.

[36] Bryan P. McGovern, John Mitchel: Irish Nationalist, Southern Secessionist, (Knoxville: University ofTennessee Press), 2009, is particularly useful on the ambiguities of his exilein the United States.See also William, Dillon, Life ofJohn Mitchel, 2 Vols. (London: K. Paul,Trench Co.), 1888, and OHegarty, Patrick, S., John Mitchel: An appreciation, with some account of young Ireland, (Dublin: P. S. Maunsel Co.), 1917, pp. 119-124.

[37] McGovern, John Mitchel: Irish Nationalist, Southern Secessionist, p. 105.

[38] His account of themeeting is contained in Mitchel to James Cantwell, 1 March 1855, reprinted in ThomasConnors, Letters of John Mitchel, 1848-1869, Analecta Hibernica, Vol. 37, (1998), pp. 287, 289-305, at p. 298.

[39] Joseph Denieffe, A PersonalNarrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood giving a faithful report ofthe principal events between 1855 and 1867, (New York: The Gael PublishingCo.), 1906, pp. vii-x, provides an account of the Emmet Association.

[40] Brian Jenkins, Irish Nationalism and the British State:From Repeal to Revolutionary Nationalism, (Montreal: McGill-QueensUniversity Press), 2006, p. 257.

[41] Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy,1860-1914, (London: Berg), 1987, pp. 86-101, 186-187.

[42] Epizod iz vozstaniia v Kanade, Vokrug sveta, no. 20, (1885), p.306. For the reference to Garibaldi, seeibid, no. 45, (1885), p. 716.

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