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2016年10月24日月曜日 Regents of the University of California
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY: SOME MARXIST QUERIES Author(s): Richard Lichtman
Source: Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 15 (1970), pp. 75-94
Published by: Regents of the University of California
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY: SOME MARXIST QUERIES*
Richard Lichtman I
For positivism, the social world is a given fact, and knowledge con-
sists in describing it as it is. The object of inquiry is not understood as a purposive moral being engaged in a struggle for its self-realization, but
as a finished thing. At each moment of existence it is as r e a 1 or final as
at the next. In fact, it would be more accurate simply to say that these categories do not apply. Human beings are given to the inquirer; they are
facts in the world. That is alL We do not attempt to re-create their moral struggle, for we do not know of it. But how do we select among the proper- ties of the object those which are worthy of being known? These character- istics also are given merely as constituents of what we wish to know. The criteria of our inquiry are allegedly as neutral as the beings into whom we inquire.
The banal perversity of this position has understandably given rise to
an alternative which emphasizes much that positivism denies. It is a posi-
tion with a joint foundation in symbolic interactionism and phenomenology . Its key progenitors are Mead and Husserl, and its current argument is sus-
tained by thinkers like Blumer, Seeley, Berger and Luckmann, and Peter Winch. I shall refer to it as a social idealism, though this is obviously a
curious title for a movement which can trace one side of its parentage to so behaviorist a thinker as Mead.
The following propositions are designed to recall the mood of the posi- tion, not to define it as a coherent theory.
Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them. *
The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows. 2
The meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the way in which other persons act toward the person in regard to the thing.
Originally prepared as a series of notes on the thought of Mead and Berger and Luckmann, this essay is offered in its present form as a prolegomenon to a Marxist interpretation of symbolic interactionism and of its bearing on the sociology of knowledge. A fuller version of these reflections, includ- ing additional remarks on positivism, will appear in a radical anthology ed-
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ited by David Coif ax and Jack Roach --ed.
7 6 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
Their actions operate to define the thing for the pers
The "worlds" that exist for human beings. . . are composed of
"objects" and. . . these objects are the product of symbolic in- teraction. 4
A theory about human beings if widely held tends to bring about
its own confirmation. . . . The only value that money has, for instance, lies in our belief that others believe it to be valuable.^
Men are largely. . . what they think themselves to be. . . . 6
Persons (and social "units" and "societies") become what
they are by virtue (very largely) of what they are said to be. . . ?
The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society. ... It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these. 8
. . . the "logic" of institutions. . . does not reside in the institu- tions and their external functionalities, but in the way these are treated in reflection about them. 9
There is a great deal in this position which must be incorporated in a Marxian perspective. Although a carefully stated Marxism already includes what is significant in "social idealism, "the central insights of this position deserve further elaboration, including:
a) Its emphasis on the social nature of humanity and human activity.
b) Its view of the person as a subject-agent who acts toward the world and is not merely reacting to its pressure or stimuli.
c) Its approach to social humanity through a focus which highlights the uniqueness of the human enterprise --the construction of a meaningfully interpreted, reciprocal and ongoing project. This point accords well with
Marx's emphasis on the fact that people always remain human no matter
how thoroughly debased; even their reification can only be grasped through the distortion of their humanity.
d) Its advance over Weber's conception of social action which requires only that one explicitly direct his or her activity toward the inter- preted meaning of others. For "social idealism" every person is intrin - sically social regardless of how solitary and isolated he appears.
e) Its emphasis on methodology as coextensive with the entire scienti- fic enterprise (Blumer).
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o
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY 77
f) Its insistence on direct acquaintance with the social world of activity.
But the view is inadequate as it stands: it is overly subjective and volun- taristic, lacks and awareness of historical concreteness, is naive in its account of mutual typification and ultimately abandons the sense of human beings in struggle with an alien reality which they both master and to which they are subordinate. It is a view which tends to dissolve the concept of
"ideology" or nfalse consciousness" and leaves us, often against the will of its advocates, without a critical posture toward the present inhuman reality.
II
Human action can b e understood neither independently of t h e meaning which the actor gives it, nor simply identified with his
own interpretation. Recognition of the false consciousness of the actor
is necessary to comprehend the nature of his acts. Activity has an objec-
tive structure which is often discrepant with its intended meaning. Human
beings may act under the belief that they are productive, free and equal when the opposite is the case. Defining their activity as they comprehend it will lead us to misconstrue their act. Such mystification is the very purpose
of ideology. Most Americans view the political structure of this country as predicated upon a two-party system. They "understand" their own political activity as freely chosen between genuinely divergent alternatives. Objec - tively, the situation is different. The "two partiesM are rival contenders
for power within a single structure of corporate -capital control. Human
beings can only act toward the world on the basis of some "understanding, " but it does not follow from this that their activity, or the world, possesses
the character which they "understand" it to have. This insight must be incorporated into a critical posture which is obscured by social idealism.
m
We cannot understand social reality if we disregard the consciousness
of its agents. But we cannot stop there. Weber's rejection of the notion of objective meaning was closely tied to his idealization of social movements . Consider The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. "Spirit of Capitalism?" What was the reality of this system whose spirit Weber investigated? He defined it largely in terms of its own rationalized account
of its "rationality, " that is, in terms of its spirit. What became of these features of the capitalist system which were not part of its self - celebration -- exploitation, class conflict, internal instability? These were relegated to
a minor role in his analysis. In defining capitalism, Weber tended to identi- fy his theoretical perspective with that of the bureaucratic technocracy exist- ing within the system itself. This stratum was the concrete social praxis which guided Weber's theoretical inquiry. The effect of accepting Weber's account is to subordinate one's cognitive and practical efforts to the give"
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h
78 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY requirements of capitalism.
IV
What is the objective meaning of the First World War? For many Americans at the time it was a war to make the world safe for democracy. What of making the world safe for corporate expansion? This goal was the explicit consciousness of a few, and they may be said to have acted fully in behalf of it.
Human beings make and are made by history, but these two conditions
are not of equal weight, and their significance varies among social classes.
A critical understanding of any society requires a two-fold comprehension
of the social system: (1) as it officially understands itself, and (2) as it exists objectively. Clearly, these two factors must be viewed dialectically.
The possibility for the advance of the human condition which exists, in fact,
at a given historical moment cannot be separated from the nature and ciar -
ity of social consciousness as it exists at that time. Human beings who believe that human nature requires constant warfare and social violence cannot be said to harbor the real possibility of mutual co-operation and love.
But a given view of the world may itself be mistaken-- and in this case it is . What are the social factors responsible for producing this illusion? We can-
not merely hold that in such conditions human beings face a hostile world because they define it as necessarily hostile. We need also inquire into the origin of this mistaken view and the social function which it in fact serves.
And these are not merely matters of the consciousness of the agents involved.
The world is understood through intended meaning, but this meaning i s
in turn shaped and misshaped by the world. Human beings are not only formed through society, they are also malformed and systematically mis- informed through society. "Man alienated from himself is also the thinker alienated from his being, i. e. , from his natural and human life. " ^ Inten- tion and reality often diverge, because intentions are systematically defeat-
ed in the world. The defeat of our intentions must also b e comprehended through socially constructed meaning. But our acts do not intend to defeat themselves and are not defeated merely or exclusively through what they intend. They are defeated also through the obduracy of nature and social reality. Or the intentions of the masses may persistently fall to the inten-
tions of a ruling minority, without the masses understanding or proposing
this condition. In short, one can agree that beliefs are constitutive of human beings and that any definition of humanity must therefore include
such awareness as human beings actually possess. But human beings need
not be defined as conforming in fact to what they believe themselves to be .
V
How many true descriptions of a social act are available? An indefi- nitely large number. What is it that I do when I lecture? Amuse students, undermine the university, rationalize the pretended liberality of American society, satisfy parental expectations, earn a living, remove my efforts
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY 79
from an indefinitely large number of alternatives, etc.? The list is end- less. The same situation holds for any action. Why does one conception
come to dominate the social perspective of the agents in a given community? How is the meaningful interpretation of action constituted? Democrati- cally? Hardly. The channelling of interpreted meaning is class structured.
It is formed through lived engagement in the predominant class -controlled institutions of the society. What of the character of those institutions which more specifically pattern the development of socially shared meaning --mass media, schools, etc. ? They too are under the predominant control of that class of men who exercise hegemony over the means of production, distribu- tion, exchange and consumption upon which society vitally depends. The definition of activity, the shared description of an act and the very meaning of the function of acting, are largely shaped through the nature of productive
power.
If workers believe that they bargain with employers as equal disputants
in a reasonable encounter, this is not surprising. If they fail to notice their participation in their own continuing alienation, their subordination to the control of others, or their contribution to corporate imperialism, this is not unintelligible either. Again,
1. We cannot dispense with the concept of false consciousness if we are to explain the fact that men often act against their own interests.
2. The social inquirer cannot dispense with the recognition that he faces a choice in the selection of his basic concepts, and that in exercising this choice he is to some degree supporting or subverting the system in power. There is a fatal lack of substantive class analysis in the writings of Mead, Husserl and Schutz: this myopia prevents them from seeking the critical self-awareness they themselves appear to advocate.
There is often an ironic tension running through the perspective of social idealists. On the one hand they hold to the view that the world is as it is defined. On the other hand, they tend to be theoretically and socially criti - cal. The views of others are criticized as mistaken, conservative, deluded,
or exploitative. But if the works of others are inadequate, this means that the world is different from the way some persons define it. ^
"Culture as a conception. . . is clearly derived from what people do. TT ^ But the culture of a people is permeated by its sense of what ought to be don felt, believed, and instituted. And the inquirer brings to the study of the
culture of others a definite culture of his own. Nor is it a solution to take
the other at his or her word. There are too many others and too many words.
We must select. In selecting we must be critical --we must reject the
world as some people conceive it.
VI
There is too easy an identification of social life with symbolic inter- action interpreted as the capacity to respond to the shared meanings of the reciprocal gestures of both parties in the transaction. We allegedly
play the role of the other in social process by internalizing the other fe intention.
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80 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
"A human society. . . consists of people in a social life is only a deformed and rudimentary one: we are fragmented,
alienated, mutually isolated from each other and ourselves. The same sym-
bolic gestures which join us also disjoin us. The other is not only the one
whose role we can play, but the other -- unfathomable, unknown, opaque and threatening. MeadTs work must be remade through the awareness of Kafka, Pirandello and Beckett. Do the exploited and the exploiter play each other's roles? Do black and white; man and woman; you and I? Can I grasp my own role? Are my own gestures intelligible to myself? Do I know why I am here and what my proper function is? No - that is some part of the truth in anguish. To know this impoverishment is to begin to know why the social world must be remade. Mead's world is too light and transparent. It is untouched by alienation. Concretely, it is not our world.
Consider the postulated connection between the individual and society:
The individual. . . is social, in his present nature. . . he lives in society as organically as he may be said to live in action. . . we do not mean that the two can be abstracted. . . and viewed as
mutually influencing each other, but that they are one and the same thing in different manifestations. ^
I am in the society that is in me- -as I am and can only be in that grace. . . that is in me. ^
. . . the self not only lives in a society of others but is^a society of selves. ^
What is true in this account is vitally true. * ' But something is also missing. There is also a point to Simmers declaration: "The a priori
of empirical social life consists of the fact that life is not entirely soci The self cannot but be social, but it is not only social. Self and society
are counterpoles, and they can only maintain their intimate relation if their difference from each other is maintained. My relationship to society is
analogous to my relation with my body; I both am a body--am embodied, and
have a body, simultaneously. Society permeates me, but it does not exhaust
me. For I am a unifying center of social being; atranscendent subject,
agent, recipient and actor in the social world.
There is a moment of concreteness, privacy, creativity and transcen-
dence which cannot be dissolved. As your friend I am with you. But lam
not yet you. That is why we can be related. The romantic ideal of total iden- tification with the other can only move through relative to absolute dissolution. That is why its archetypes are sexual orgasm and death.
vn
The reason power and force can be exercised against another is becau the agent does not experience what the object of this violence is made t go. In loving we become as one, and cannot bear the other's pain. But our
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY 81
experiences remain literally two, not one. When there is only one self, there is only self-love. In short, the unity among individuals is not identi- cal to the unity within the individual. Society and person are dialectical aspects of each other, and their distinctness must be maintained along with their continuity. If their continuity alone is emphasized, the self becomes
a passive and even trivial aspect of social life.
For Mead too, the self disappears. This may be vigorously denied but
the truth is that the self as a self-conscious subject of its own existence is dissolved in Mead's extreme social behaviorism. Mead explicitly rejects
the view that the social process is a product of mind- -"in direct contrast is
our opposite view that mind presupposes and is the product of the social pro-
cess. " 19 But then, how does the social process originate, and why among human beings? What are the beings that constitute the social process if not human and conscious?
For Mead the subject never possesses a direct awareness of his own being as subject.
For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only in so far as he first becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him. . . 2^
But the individual is not merely first an object for Mead: he is never experienced as anything else. "The self-conscious, actual self in social intercourse is the objective fme! or 'me 's' with the process of response con-
tinually going on and implying a fictitious 'I' always out of sight of himself." 21 If the I is fictitious, our sense of being unique, active, dynamic centers of experience is equally fictitious and consequently unintelligible. If only the
me is actually given, to whom is it given? Who is the subject of this "me"? The "me" is everything absorbed through the social structure-- if only the
"me'is presented in consciousness, only society is presented. The self as transcendent agent is lost.
At bottom, Mead is a Kantian. The "'me' is inconceivable without an
'I'" and "is always an object, i. e. , a 'me1. " ^2 Mead stumbles over him- self as ingloriously as Hume who wrote: "when I enter most intimately into
what I call myself ... I can never catch myself. . . and never can observe anything but the perception. " 23 Hume is forced to affirm what he denies . Who is it that cannot catch himself without a perception? Apparently the subject. But how can this be the case if there is no subject? Only a self
can deny anything, including the existence of a self. How does Mead fare?
"The individual enters as such into his own experience only as an obj ect , not as a subject. " 24 Not much better. Only the presented s e If i s left . To whom is it presented? The fictitious^"? But we cannot grasp our- selves as 'I', as experienced subject, agent, initiator, possessor of our
own conscious being. Hopeless.
Only the "me" is left. But not really. For what can the "me" be w h e n it is not the 'me' of an experienced "I"? Still, Mead is clear; "the T is not a"me" and cannot become a 'me1. "25 What can my presented self be if it
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82 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
is not continuous with what I am as subject? It cannot It cannot be my objective self. When the transcenden
the self as a limitation to be transcended disappears with it. vni
If we are what others believe us to be--because we are others-- the self- fulfilling prophecy becomes the paradign of social action. There is a formid-
able range of activities for which this is true. The child who i s continually told he is stupid or bright will tend not merely to believe himself to be one or the other, but will become so. And again, money only has value because it is
taken to be valuable. But there is another side to this issue which cannot
be ignored.
a) Some beliefs cannot be self-confirming because they are d bly false under all conditions --the belief that human beings are separate
from society.
b) Some beliefs are self-disconfirming; a child may rebel against the report of his stupidity by working more diligently.
c) Some beliefs make social facts possible but do not establish the con- crete nature of these facts: money does require our belief in it, but how it fluctuates under disparate conditions is not merely a matter of belief.
d) A belief can be self- confirming only when it calls out a tendency latent in the facts as they exist independently of the belief: the belief must conform to^ the structure of possibility inherent in the facts. **
Some activities become possible only through a belief in their possibil- ity; but others remain beyond any limit of self-confidence. This point has
its obvious political counterpart. Revolutions, though they cannot be made independent of a widespread willed belief in their possibility, do not occur whenever there is such a widespread belief. In politics too we find the counterparts of epistemological doctrines. For positivism, which defines knowledge as the passive reflection of reality, we find the economist theory of crisis; for idealism, voluntarism, conventionalism, we find adven- turous anarchism. Social reality does include the influence of our will, but
it can also resist our will.
For social idealism the world is our world. We make it what it is. Its
objects are anything we can construct as the referent of our conscious inten-
tion. On the other hand, Blumer rightly insists upon the obduracy of the
world. 27 Empirically reality can resist us, and it is this feature of experi- ence that makes the challenge of science possible. But when this fact is emphasized what becomes of the distinctiveness of "symbolic interaction"?
The experienced world is now viewed as a joint product of independent real-
ity and human conception. The fundamental problem is the particular con- tribution to this world made by each of these factors.
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY 83
At one point Blumer notes that" the world of reality' exists only human experience. " 28 it is the phraseTTthe world of reality, " in qu that signifies the difficulty. If this phrase only means that the worl experienced occurs within experience, it is a tautology. If it means t reality has no being independent of experience, it is inconsistent wit realism of Blumer's insistence on obduracy. Only that being which has
an independent nature can resist us. And it need never be known to human beings to exert its power against them. It is certainly logically possible ,
and even probable, that factors of which we have no knowledge in our
social world are presently shaping us. We may never come to know them.
And we can only make our knowledge of such factors intelligible on the
claim that they exerted causal influence prior to their being known.
If we wish to concede the obduracy of the world, we must grant that objects are not merely made, but taken. They can also be mistaken. At some stages of history this misconception is a necessary fact of social life. For example, the misconception that the "two-party" arrangement in American politics ensures the electorate of real alternatives is necessary
for the legitimacy and stability of the ruling class. It is a systematically promulgated belief, not an intellectual aberration, and illustrates the fact that we can to some extent control and be controlled by the degree of obdur- acy in the world. The nature of this control is determined by ownership of the means of production, communication, and education in a g i v e n class structure. This is the point that is fatally ignored by symbolic interaction- ism.
IX
If reality cannot be completely ignored, perhaps it can be bracketed -- our judgment about its nature simply suspended. This is the phenomeno- logical approach adopted by Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality.
The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or rather of the subjective experience of everyday life, refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses, as well as from assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena analyzed. 29
Yet on the very same page we are informed that the world of everyday life "is a world that originates in their thoughts (the ordinary members of society) and is maintained as real by these. " This is not the avoidance of
a theory of reality; it is an idealist theory and also a causal and genetic hypothesis.
The quest for a suspended ontology is a delusion. Yet it is easy to understand its lure. There are so many definitions of knowledge and reality, how are we to choose among them? Won't we be imposing our standard upon another? But can we conceive of another human being if we suspend our criteria of human- social reality? Aren't human beings in reality intrinsically purposive, self- evaluating and directed toward the
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84 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
world through their activity? To suspend ontological criteria is to sus-
pend understanding, so the criteria force themselves upon us. But which criteria? Phenomena are real when "we cannot Twish them away, TtT and knowledge is defined "as the certainty that phenomena are real and that
they possess specific characteristics. " 30 But we can will to alter the nature of our consciousness by producing images, thoughts, and memories by mental fiat. Are these phenomena unreal? Don't we have knowledge
of these supposedly unreal phenomena? Accounts of knowledge and reality cannot be avoided - the only question is whether they are adequate.
The approach is unstable. Neutrality and selectivity are often advoca-
ted together. "It is our contention, then, that the sociology of knowledge
must concern itself with whatever passes for 'knowledge* in a society. " 31 An attempt at neutrality, again. But what passes for knowledge in a society? Whose view of knowledge shall we adopt - the view of the society in que s - tion, or our own, or the view of some third society? Suppose, in other words, that the society in question does not accept the minimal definition of know-
ledge offered by Berger and Luckmann? Why is society chosen as the defin-
ing unit rather than individuals who may deviate from the societal definition? Choices simply cannot be avoided, but they can be masked.
Taking every claim to knowledge as valid makes knowledge unintelligible. Error and contradiction are dissolved. Can we comprehend the claim to knowledge when it has no negative counterpart? The claim is self-defeating.
Social Construction of Reality (SCR) begins with a claim to clarify the reality of everyday life "as it is available to the common sense of the ordi- nary members of society. "32 Shall we use the categories of common sense or of phenomenological analysis? If we choose the first alternative, we
shall stay locked in common sense and fail to analyze it. If we choose the second, will we not falsify common sense? Weber was correct on this point:
Reflective knowledge, even of one's own experience, is nowhere and never a literally "repeated experience" or a simple "pho- tograph" of what was experienced; the "experience" when it is made into an "object, " acquires perspectives and inter -relation- ships which were not "known"in the experience itself. 33
The terms used by the analyst of common experience are not those employed by common sense. As soon as a phenomenological or any other analysis begins, knowledge, as understood by common sense, has already been abandoned. But for SCR reality is defined by knowledge and so the
reality of common sense is also undermined. The method of epistemologi-
cal isolation or neutrality has turned into a striking imperialism. "I am conscious of the world as consisting of multiple realities. " 34 is this the language of common sense? But language is held to define reality. "The language used in everyday life continuously provides me with the necessary objectifications and posits the order within which these make sense and with- in which everyday life has meaning for me. " 35 Common sense do e s not bracket its own claims to reality. It takes these for granted. Bracketing
remakes what it alleges neutrally to describe. The countless practitioners **f common sense are not likely to heed SCR!s insistence on an idealist
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY 85
theory of everyday life in any case.
The primary purpose of SCR is to synthesiz e two fam
proclamations: "Consider social facts as things" (Dur sociology. . . and for history, the object of cognition is the subjective
meaning- complex of action" (Weber). The basic problem for analysis is
how subjective meanings become constituted as objective facts. Since
Marx's analysis of alienation is also concerned to explain this phenomenon,
it will be helpful to set out the basic theory proposed in SCR as follows:
a) We typify each other; classifying each other according to the con- cepts of our society. All such schemes are reciprocal or mutually applied.
b) As we move away from direct encounter these typifications become anonymous.
c) Our subjectivity becomes embodied in signs and symbols, whic detachable from the direct expression of subjectivity. My dancing may ex-
press anger though I am not directly angry.
d) "I encounter language as a facticity external to myself and it is coercive in its effect on me. " 36
e) Our activity is subject to habitualization which embeds our meanings in selective routines.
f) Habitualization precedes institutionalization, which is a "re
typification of habitualized actions, " 3? a public focus for the em of diverse habits.
) The crux of the analysis: a hypothetical case of the meeting individuals who observe and begin to type each other. They produce a com-
mon routine which orders their lives. When this routine is transmitted to
children, it becomes an historical institution "experienced as existing over
and beyond the individuals who 'happen to f embody them at the moment. " 38
The institutions are now present as "an external and coercive fact. " The institution has achieved the character of "objectivity"; it has been objectified.
For the parents who created the original routine, it was malleable. The world was intelligible to them because they made it. Now for the children ,
it is hard and opaque. They can only come to understand it by participating
in it. However massive the objectivity of the social world appears, it
remains a human construction, "it does not thereby acquire an ontological
status apart from the human activity that produced it. " 39 Social reality is a dialectical process: "Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product. "
The original producers of the social world can recall its purpose-- that is, their purpose in it. For the children to whom the institution is transmit- ted, it must be interpreted and explained. It must be legitimated through
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86 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
various formulas which will have to be consistent and comprehensive . Institutional definitions and legitimations are maintained against deviates.
This requires that diverse patterns of institutionalization be "functionally
or logically integrated. " 40 in fact, institutions do tend to "hang together. "
"Language provides the fundamental instrumentality for imposing logic
on the Tobjectivatedr social world. The integration of an institutional order
can be understood only in terms of the 'knowledge* that its members have of it. " 41
h) The extreme conclusion of the process of objectivation is reifica-
tion - "the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things ... as
if they were something other than human products. " 42 At the stage of
"objectivation" institutions were experienced as "possessing a reality of
their own, " but now that character is more concretely specified. Human-
ity is now in the form of thinghood. The dialectic between social producer
and product is lost to consciousness. The world is experienced as a
"strange facticity. " Rather than reification representing a cognitive fall from grace, the authors claim that primitive awareness is more heavily reified than our own; we could not grasp reification as we do if it were not through a process of creative dereification of consciousness.
X
Against the background of contemporary vulgar social science The
Social Construction of Reality is a serious attempt to incorporate "the
insights of movements as diverse as Marxism, Phenomenology, Pragma-
tism, Existentialism, and Classical Sociology. Our interest here is in a comparison of SCR with Marxism, and we concentrate therefore on speci- fic points of difference. These are some of the themes which our future work will have to articulate:
(i) The analysis is most important precisely where it violates its own professed methodology. Remember the original claim to neutrality: "Th phenomenological analysis of everyday life. . . refrains from any causal o genetic hypotheses. " Now consider two of a multitude of conflicting sta ments strewn along the way:
It i s important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world. . . is a humanly produced, con- structed objectivity. . . despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human acti-
vity that produced it. 43
Typically, /fn reification/ the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in consciousness. Man,
the producer of a world, is apprehended as its product, and human activity as an epiphenomenon of non-human process. " 44
Several important points emerge from reflection on this contradiction.
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY 87
First, knowledge cannot wholly be a matter of social definition, SCR rejects the prevalent social definition of knowledge. A moment of
realism and transcendence from society is involved. Second, if the
s o ciai account of knowledge does not apply to the authors, it cannot be a
correct account of the subject as a whole. The subject matter (object) of the inquiry, the human being inquired into, will have to be granted a simi- lar transcendence. Third, and most important, why does the claim to neutrality break down. Imagine that in response to the first point in this paragraph the authors replied as follows: "Knowledge is still a matter of social definition because we two belong to a specific society- a theoretical tradition - in which knowledge is defined as we have articulated it. " Ignore
the validity of the claim that this tradition constitutes a society. Still, what would this leave us? As many accounts of knowledge as there were groups with their own definitions of knowledge. As many accounts , perhaps as there were individuals, defined through the shifting phases of their lives. In this absolute relativism no theoretical claim- the claim of
SCR included ^-could stand. The loss of cognitive realism here is a loss of meaningful intellectual activity.
There are two related problems: (1) Can we grasp a conscious-
ness which is wholly reified when we nave already passed beyond it? N without expunging our own consciousness. At this point SCR is
clearly in opposition to the consciousness it means to describe. "Reifica -
tion is the apprehension of human phenomena as if_ they were things. . . " The "as if" is added by the analysis. It cannot be part of the original experience without destroying the meaning of the experience itself. The world is said
to be experienced as a "strange facticity. " To us; not to reified conscious- ness itself. (2) Using the categories of reification, were it possible, is still a choice. We simply cannot avoid a perspective from which to carry out our analysis. To choose the viewpoint of the social consciousness we
are inquiring into is no less a choice than the commitment to a derei-
fied perspective. The choice of a cognitive perspective is unavoidable, a it carries with it a fundamental ontological claim. To be a cognitive bei is to claim some definite awareness of a world possessing a specific struc ture. Such awareness is clearly not equivalent to a reified consciousness in-
sofar as the inquirer seeks a critical posture toward an inhuman reality.
(ii) The entire account of objectivation is curiously abstract and ahis- torical, which is its clearest difference from the position of Marx. The ac- count in SCR is not concretely social. Its paradigm of the process of objec-
tivation- -two persons from different social worlds beginning to interact- -is so detached from any actual social situation that its fundamental structure
remains unintelligible. We cannot even answer basic epistemological ques- tions: how do these persons know they are doing the same things?; how would we know?; what is the criterion for understanding the activity of the others? For Marx, society only poses such problems as it can solve because the criteria of intelligibility are defined by the evolving needs of concrete class interests in society.
For Marx, man is first made helpless in the face of natural forces
he overcomes through a paradoxical dialectic which makes him helpless
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88 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
before the forces of society. The entire foundation of MarxTs perspective
is realistic. Human beings express themselves in the world because they
are directly natural beings, living not only from nature, or even through nature, but simply, as natural. The being of human beings is not a self- sufficient substance, but a process stretched between the embodied self and the natural world of its presentation. It is not economics, but Marx's naturalistic anthropology that leads him to root humanity in the world. But
the human condition is also creative and self -transcending, through its modification of its own natural condition. The objectification of human con- sciousness, purpose and meaning is mediated through a developing produc- tive process, whose fundamental social stages mark off the periods of human history. Marxian theory has a fundamentally concrete and histori- cal perspective from which to view the question of human objectification, alienation and reification. This is not the case for the analysis in SCR, or
for Meadfs position either.
(iii) For Marx, knowledge is an active penetration of the world as medi-
ated by social need and tested by practice. For Berger and Luckmann, it is essentially a social construction. When idealists become concrete in their linguistic analysis, however, they often reveal the real foundations of the human use of language.
In Hopi history, could we read it, we should find a different type of language and a different set of cultural and environmental in- fluences working together. A peaceful agricultural society iso-
lated by geographic features and nomad enemies ina land of
scanty rainfall, arid agriculture that could be made successful
only by the utmost perseverance /hence the value of persistence and repetition/ necessity for collaboration /hence emphasis o n the psychology of teamwork and on mental factors in general/? corn and rain as primary criteria of value, need of extensive preparations and precautions to assure crops in the poor soil
and precarious climate, keen realization of dependence upon
nature favoring prayer and a religious attitude toward the
forces of nature, especially prayer and religion directed toward the ever-needed blessing, rain- -these things interacted with Hopi linguistic patterns to mold them, to be molded again by them, and so little by little to shape the Hopi world-outlook. tf
/B. L. Whorf7
On idealist grounds, knowing is identified with making. The reception of the labors of others must be marked by mystification. Institutions are regarded as having a reality of their own. The institution is a ncoerciveTt
force. This is the old liberal assumption of a pre- social human nature restrained by society. But of course human nature is only formed in
society and is given its structure, power and freedom through the same process which delimits its possibilities. Human nature can only be limi-
ted after it is social, because as pre-social it is non-human. In brief, coercion can only apply within the social structure and cannot character-
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY 89
ize the total relationship between society and the individual. Lan not "a facticity external to myself . " It is the principal mediu which I formulate my very notions of "self, " "externality" and "fa and consequently, my self and my world.
Language is not external to me because I am formed in the pr its utilization. When I feel compelled by the patterns of language, this can
only be because I find a particular language foreign, or unsuitable to my
need. If prose confines me, poetry may suffice; awareness of its origin is
not the measure of its efficacy. I can be its creator as well as its creature, and both possibilities are part of my subjective range of options in approach- ing the world.
(iv) Consider the paradigm of created and inherited meaning. For those who made the original social fact it appears as "fully transparent. " Their reciprocally typified actions are wholly lucid. This is so because they made their world and can remake it. But is this really persuasive? When I im- provise in jazz I make a melody which I have the power to change. But why
did I produce just that line? I canTt say. It seemed right, but the same
thing could be said of other inventions. There are numerous examples o f
this unintelligibility of apparently lucid acts. When I speak casually the con- versation is intelligible; but why did it move in precisely that direction? Why
did I refocus its direction at one point? These are my acts, but I do not whol- ly comprehend them. I have not made myself. And if I had, how would I have proceeded? In truth, every making is founded on a material which is taken. Often, I have little choice over the nature and scope of the material available
and even less preparation in the skills needed to make or remake the materi-
al at hand. If I am not fully conscious of these limitations on the meaning I
can produce at a given time, I am all the more blinded as to my own encap - sulation in a world I did not make and stifled as to my capacity for acting against its tyranny.
(v) But if most people are unable to alter or control social institutions they experience as impenetrable, the institutions are in fact impenetrable re- gardless of an outside observers imputations to the contrary. Neither Mead nor Berger and Luckmann consider the vast extent to which social reality i s impenetrable in this sense, or the concrete means by which human beings in
a revolutionary process can act to transcend this impenetrable reality.
(vi) The world requires legitimation. The creators of the institutions
can recreate their decision; the inheritors cannot, and must have the institu-
tions justified for them if they are to acquiesce in them. Through this
process^ individuals are integrated into institutions and institutions them- selves are integrated into society. (1) Is legitimacy a matter of recalling an original situation? This seems merely the conservative paradigm of
loyalty to an ancient covenant. (2) Can an original agreement be illegiti- mate , or is any institution which people create together thereby legitimate? (3) Is an agreement which is voluntary or consciously created, but actually antagonistic to one's own interests, a legitimate agreement?
(vii) The model of objectivation in SCR is strongest, despite all its dif- ficulties, in describing the apparent coherence and permanency of the social world. It is a model based upon successful instances of ideological hegemony.
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90 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
But this is precisely its failure. Like KuhnTs account in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, it is weakest in explaining why given paradigms break down. This is a difficulty inherent in all idealist and conventionalist theories, for if the world is as it is defined, and if its definitions become socially embodied, how could they be open to challenge? Where, in fact,
could the agency of challenge reside? Not in a dialectical interchange with material and social reality, because that reality is constituted by the social process which defines it. We noted above that the SCR account was insuffi- ciently social. Now we note that too much is given to social structure. Both difficulties derive from a common source--the lack of a concrete, histori-
cal mediation.
(viii) In SCR the irrationality of social alienation is consistently
to our alleged ignorance of the actual construction of the world. This view
is ahistorical. The experience of alienation would seem to require compari-
son at a given social situation with the prevailing criteria of human agencies.
Only a world which viewed human beings as producers of their own situation
can grasp social facticity as alienation. The very criteria which define
human activity develop through the realization of the activity they define.
Hegel made this point brilliantly in the introduction to the " Phenomenology of
Mind, Tt and Marx reaffirmed it in the elaboration of his dialectic of transcen-
dent human need: "the evolution of all human powers as such, unmeasured
by any previously established yardstick. ft ^5 whether we are alienated or
experience ourselves as alienated depends on the development of our social
and rational power at a given historical moment. Such development is not a
function of whether we happen to define ourselves as having such power unless
we also do in fact have it. As our powers develop, our rationality is also
articulated, and this process may make possible a stronger conceptual awareness of the alienation of our situation.
(ix) The relationship between the development of alienation a development of the awareness of alienation is difficult to comprehen
the one hand, bourgeois analysis tends to identify alienation with subjective states like anxiety or anomie. This is an ideological account which loses the social-objective condition which is both the cause and diffused content of
the feeling; it also makes impossible any grasp of the propensity of society to deflect and obliterate the awareness of estrangement. But, on the other
hand, a theory of alienation must include a theory of the alienated transfor- mation of consciousness. For consciousness is not an epiphenomenal reflec- tion of our underlying being: it is a necessary constituent in that being whose changes are both causes and effects of our concrete development. We can change our being by our conscious grasp of the world. Alienated conscious-
ness, by contrast, leads to a deteriorating ability to master the world.
(x) For Berger and Luckmann, reif ication is the process through which
human activity is apprehended in the form of things - "facts of nature, results of cosmic law, or manifestations of divine will. " ^6 What is supposedly lost sight of is the nature of human beings as producers. What theanalysis in SCR overlooks is precisely the fact that human beings cannot be the sole pro- ducers of their own nature, for the very reason that even human self-
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY 91
determination is carried out through a medium with its own structure. Starkly put, this is the area of the connection among freely chosen human acts and their necessary consequences.
It is tempting to react to the theory of fixed human nature with a con-
trary thesis of limitless or open-ended creation. Human nature is not unchanging. But it is false to hold that there are no lawlike connections
among its aspects. Take some overly simple examples: frustration causes
hostility, emotional deprivation produces impoverishment of self, etc.
These are conditional statements: If A then B. We can have free -
dom to define ourselves if we are not compelled to choose or accept as
"given" the original condition. However, it is precisely because there isa
lawlike connection among aspects of human activity that any kind of fore-
sight and planning, including socialist planning, is possible. If we had absolutely no knowledge of how people would react under specified condi- tions, we would lack any reason for performing any particular act in com - parison with any other. This is the point of validity in the claim that free-
dom requires mastery of necessity. If the initiation of A could lead to C , D, or E. . . as well as B, why choose it? The object of socialist struggle
is precisely to win the power to determine which initial conditions are to
be introduced along the whole condition of our life.
In this sense, human beings can alter the significance of social rules and laws for their own activity. In socialist planning, a real difficulty will emerge because people will have increased freedom to transcend any parti- cular plan. Social idealism affords little recognition of or insight into the need for coping with this difficulty.
(xi) The relation between objectivation and reification in SCR is mis- leading; they are too closely identified. As a result, the Marxian distinc-
tion between the anthropological necessity of objective human representa- tion or embodiment and the historical transiency of inhuman reification is obscured. In SCR the social formations introduced by individuals tend with
the acquisition of historicity. . ./to7 acquire another crucial qual- ity, or, more accurately, perfect a quality that was incipient as soon as A and B began the reciprocal typification of their conduct: this quality is objectivity. 47
But objectivity is the characteristic which institutions acquire as they become "crystallized, " as they are experienced over and above particular individuals who happen to participate in them. Objectivity is intrinsic to social life. Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things. But how would an institution experienced as "over and above individuals" be apprehended if not "as if" it were a thing? How different
is reification from objectivation? In discussing reification, Bergerand Luckmann come close to noting the difficulty:
... as soon as an objective social world is established, the possi-
bility of reification is never far away. The objectivity of the social
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92 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
world means that it confronts man as something o himself. The decisive question is whether he still retains
the awareness that, however objectivated, the social world
was made by men- -and, therefore, can be remade by them.48
Yet, in the earlier discussion to which the authors here allude, objec- tivation was defined precisely as the loss of awareness that the world is
made by man--tfinstitutionsare now experienced as possessing a reality of
their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coer-
cive fact. " 49 The basically conservative ideological position of SCR is manifest in this equivocation. SCRfs view that human nature necessarily
tends toward reification most strikingly ignores any historical perspective
which might relate the stages of human loss through reification and eventu-
al transcendence and self-recovery. Instead, an abstract characteristic prevalent in one historical period is removed from its time and postulated
as an independent subject with the power to manipulate social relations. This account of reification is itself reified. A transitory characteristic of human activity has become a permanent agent of deformity. With the death and rebirth of self-determination forgotten, the human condition is perilously contracted.
(xii) If reality is understood exclusively as the object of socially structed meaning, one is bound to overlook the following considerations.
(a) Concrete physical and social reality is neither identical to nor exhausted by beliefs or judgments about that reality. A feeling is a con- scious state, and so is an explicit judgment about that feeling. But the feeling is not equivalent to the belief or judgment about it. The validity of
the judgment cannot be ascertained unless one knows of the actual existence and specific nature of the feeling about which one is inquiring. Genuine freedom requires an awareness of alternatives, but it does not require a specific belief about the necessity of alternatives.
(b) Beliefs are about an independent reality; the relationship between this reality and belief about it is not identical to any belief about that relationship.
(c) Beliefs have a relationship to each other which is not itself a
belief. "Objects" cannot be exclusively the product of symbolic interaction
per jse because symbolic interaction depends upon procedures and criteria of correct reasoning for its own significance. (Mead's own view of langu- age and social consensus would seem to support this consideration. ) Our symbolic activity --communication within and among social selves - either conforms to criteria of appropriate intellectual activity or cannot be
taken as meaningful symbolic interaction. (Again, Mead himself insists that the social self is essentially cognitive; Berger and Luckmann fail to take into account the sense in which Mead conceives of the self asa cog- nitive participant in symbolic interaction. )
(d) Human activities have a relationship to each other which i s an objective constituent of the world. These relationships may come to be known , but they are obviously not identical to any knowing of them. Lenin makes this point very nicely:
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL REALITY 93
In all social formations of any complexity --and in the capitalist social formation in particular - people in their intercourse are not conscious of what kind of
social relations are being formed, in accordance with what laws they develop, etc. For instance, a peasant when he sells his grain enters into "inter- course" with the world producers of grain in the world market, but he is not conscious of it: nor is he conscious of the kind of social relations that are formed on the basis of exchange. TM
A task for philosophy and the sociology of knowledge is to inate these social relations in the service of a revolutionary self- awa for those who would otherwise be the unwitting victims of social This is a crucial mandate for our time, but one which neither Mead Berger and Luckmann recognize with any sense of urgency.
An elaboration of the aforementioned themes promises to r cile the humanizing insights of symbolic interactionism with the co sive explanatory power of Marx's theory of knowledge and society.
NOTES
1. Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism (Englewood Cliffs, N p. 2.
2. Idem.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
k. Ibid. , p. 10.
5. John Seeley, The Americanization of the Unconscious (New York: Inter-
national Science Press, 1967) 5 p. Il6. 6. Idem.
7. John Seeley, "Thirty Nine Articles" in The Critical Spirit, edited by Kurt Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967)5 p. 151.
O. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction ot Keai- itv (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966), pp. 19-20.
9. Ibid., p. 61+.
10. Karl Marx, Early Writings, edited by T.B. Bottomore (New York: McGra
Hill, I96U), p. 216.
11. Seeley holds both that (l) social facts tend to become what they are
largely in virtue of beliefs about them, and (2) problems exist whether or not they are recognized as problems. These two positions need to be reconciled. See Chapter Ik of The Americanization of the Unconscious.
12. Blumer ,_op_. cit. , p. b.
13. Ibid., p. 10.
Ik. John Seeley, The Americanization of the Unconscious, p. 113.
15. Idem.
l6. Ibid., p. llU.
17. The work of symbolic interactionists in general, and John Seeley in
particular, make a crucial contribution to social understanding. Marxists must absorb what is vital in this perspective, for if they crudely reject it
as non-Marxist they will inflict an enormous loss upon themselves. The tendency
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94 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
of many movement activist theoreticians to avoid views which are not immedia- tely "practical" is not merely an obvious detriment to theory, but an insur- mountable obstacle to Marxian praxis as well.
18. Georg Simm el, "How is Society Possible?" in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, edited by Maurice Natanson (New York: Random House, I963), p. 81+.
19. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, edited by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 193*0, p. 22*1.
20. Ibid. p. 219.
21. Journal of Philosophy, IX (1912), p. 163.
22. Journal of Philosophy, X (1913), p. 3lk.
23. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature Book I, Part IV, sec. vi.
2k. Mind, Self and Society, *p. 225.
25. "The Self and the Organism," in George Herbert Mead on Social Psycho-
logy, edited by Anselm Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books), p. 229.
26. Seeley is very clear on this point; O. cit. , p. 117. 27. Blumer, op. cit. , p. 22.
28. Idem.
29. Berger and Luckmann, op. cit. , p. 20. 30. Ibid. , p. 1.
31. Ibid., p. 3.
32. Ibid., p. 19.
33. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 19^9), p. 178.
34. 0. cit_. , p. 21. 35. Ibid.% p. 22.
36. Ibid. , p. 38.
37. Ibid. , p. 5I+.
38. Ibid. , p. 58.
39. Ibid. , p. 6l. Berger and Luckmann use the term "objectivation in order
to emphasize the logic of their position. 1+0. Ibid., p. 63.
kl. Ibid. , p. 65.
42. Ibid., p. 09.
1+3. Ibid. , p. 6l.
1+1+. Ibid. , p. 89.
1+5. Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (New York: International
Publishers, New World Paperback, I965), p. 85.
1+6. 0. crt. , p. 89. 1+7. Ibid. , p. 50. 1+8. Ibid. , p. 89. 1+9. Ibid., p. 58.
50. Cited in Oscar Lange, Political Economy (New York: Pergamon Press , 1963), p. 2k.
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