Soldier Systems Daily - An Industry Daily and Tactical Gear News Blog

Time 2020-09-08 01:05:07

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HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. Editor s note: This commentary was written by a career Air Force Special Tactics operator and expresses his personal opinions based on his experiences.In the Air Force Special Tactics community, we live our lives by certain immutable truths. You may have heard of them “SOF forces cannot be mass produced”, “Slow is smooth; smooth is fast”, “Two is one; one is none.”To the initiated, these (and many more) are repeated so often that you learn to recite them without even blinking. They become part of your own self-talking training, in mission preparation and in combat. Almost like a mantra, you find yourself repeating these things to yourself. “Calm down when we break the plane of the door, go opposite the guy in front of you. Watch your muzzle. Protect the team. Bleeding, airway, get them out. De-conflict fires from friendly positions. Sights, slack out, press. Be aggressive.”After nearly two decades in the Air Force, I have trained, tried and failed so many times that I’ve accumulated a near endless stream of consciousness that is simultaneously conscious and muscle memory. All of these lessons- hard learned and through both failure and victory- came to light during the After Action Report process. We commonly refer to the information gleaned in these sessions as “lessons learned”. Get done with the mission, take care of weapons, sensitive items, and reset. Then, when everything is fresh in your mind, explore what was good, bad, ugly and perfect. Formalize those lessons and most importantly, don’t allow the same mistakes you made last time.I value that process. A saying I’ve gotten used to using is that “Our [standard operating procedures] are written in blood.” Meaning- we have lost many, and we owe it to those men and women to make ourselves better, every single rep. I’d like to share my three ‘“lessons learned”. I won’t claim to be an expert. What I can say, is that I wish someone would have taken me aside as a younger Airman and told me these things. If anything, I hope that my failures and missteps can help someone avoid my mistakes.Failure is always an option.While I understand the intent behind the cliché phrase, “Failure is not an option”, it’s simply false. I have failed many times in my career. I’ll fail many more. I expect my team to fail. In training and unfortunately, in combat. I wish it was different. If it was, I would have friends back, less regrets, less “I wish that day didn’t go like that” statements in my life.In the end, you must try to avoid failure; but at the same time you have to accept and strive to train so close to your limit that sometimes you fall short. You must test and sometimes exceed your limits to know what your limits are. And sometimes you’ll fail.What’s my lesson learned? How you lead through failure is far more valuable to me and my teams than a perfect run. How we deal with failure, with tragedy, with heartbreak and boredom and disillusionment and being unmotivated- in those times we find out what our mettle really is. If you’re going to fail, make it count. Learn from it. Avoid that failure in the future, and don’t be afraid to fail. Always learn, always grow … and always continue to push your limits for the better.You can still be unique and part of a highly functioning team.Air Force Special Tactics attracts the widest range of all personality types, hands down. We actually select out for individuals, capable of making individual decisions that further the mission of the team, the squadrons and entire organizations.Tree hugging, slack lining, hackey sack playing ‘hippies’. Death metal listening, big weight moving, aggressive hyper alpha males. Quiet graduates of Ivy League schools that have diverse stock portfolios. Ultra long distance runners. Powerlifters that hate cardio. Guys and gals that sold everything they own and lived in their van prior to joining and becoming part of the ST team. We value ALL of these personalities.Often times, people have approached me and said, “I don’t feel like I fit in” or even worse, “I’m not getting along with so and so- we are so different.”On my first deployment, I was in exactly such a scenario. I attended two weeks worth of training with a fellow operator; we just couldn’t get along. It got heated multiple times. Months after the initial training, a very wise Team Leader of mine called me out when I was lamenting my interactions with that other operator.He drew a small box, about 3 inches by 3 inches wide on a huge whiteboard. He then drew two dots, in opposing corners.“So,” he said, “You’re these two dots. Couldn’t be further apart. Diametrically opposed, yeah?”I don’t remember my exact response, but it was a pretty solid, “Exactly.”“That box you’re both in contains all the people that have volunteered multiple times and have wanted nothing more than to support and defend the Constitution and have willingly accepted the possibility they might die doing so. Outside of this box, the entire 15 foot by 5 foot white board, represents the rest of humanity. You have more in common with this person you dislike for no good reason than you do with 99.9% of humanity. Maybe grow up.”What’s my lesson learned? It’s ok to be yourself and to be a valued member of Special Tactics. Whether it’s as an operator, Combat Mission Support, a surgeon on a Special Operations Surgical Team, a First Sergeant, a chaplain- we all make the team of professionals we have today, together. We value and foster our differences. Embrace that and don’t let a preconceived notion about someone else- or even worse, yourself- get in the way of what’s important. The team. The mission.Keep an even keel.I was about six months out of completing my two plus year training requirements to earn my beret. We were doing some training, but got the call that a Philippine sailor was gravely ill at sea, and I was going to be part of the rescue team to go get him. After multiple mid-air refuelings, I was hoisted from an HH-60 onto a moving super tanker, assessed and stabilized my patient, packaged him in a litter and we were both hoisted back up. I then cared for my patient until we transferred care to a waiting team in Ireland, about 4-5 more hours in the aircraft. My patient lived.The sense of pride and accomplishment I had was undeniable. It was a lifetime of effort justified in one 24-hour period. The rescue was given an award that year.Fast forward to 2015, somewhere in a combat environment.In support of a huge operation, my team learned that a U.S. Army special forces soldier had been severely wounded by small arms fire. We immediately transferred him to the far-forward operating room- which was just a building close to the fighting- and the surgeons did everything they could do. Unfortunately, it was just one of those ‘perfect’ wounds that was unsurvivable.My close friend and element leader and I knew what had to be done. We had to prepare this fallen soldier for his Angel Flight and it had to happen before his team came back. We placed the flag appropriately and did everything we could to honor him.That event haunts me to this day. I can still feel that emotion and smell those smells when I think about it. I told the trauma surgeon at the time, “I think this one might have really done some damage. I’m not real sure how many more of those I got left.” I have never been so devastated; the whole team took it very, very hard.What’s my lesson learned? This career- this life- holds the highest of highs and the lowest of lows. In order to be successful, you can’t swing too hard in either direction. hubris and complacency lies on one end of the spectrum; inescapable darkness lies on the other end. It’s not advisable to spend too much time at either end.As it stands, I’m still learning now. While my team position has changed, so have I. Some pitfalls I can avoid thanks to a lifetime of “lessons learned”, but the reality is, there are still more to learn. More importantly, the only way we can move forward as an entire enterprise is to share these lessons learned with one another and learn from each other. Good, bad, ugly, perfect.There is no better job in the Department of Defense than Air Force Special Tactics, I firmly believe that.But even if you find yourself in a different career, branch, command, profession- I hope that you’re taking your own “lessons learned” and making yourself a better human, citizen, or member of your team.“First There, That Others May Live.”Commentary by Special Tactics operator, 24th Special Operations Wing, 24th Special Operations WingPhoto by TSgt Sandra Welch Posted in AFSW, Air Force, Guest Post, Profession of Arms, SOF | No Comments “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”– Sun TzuWe are all shaped by life experiences – our own, and the example of others we have the opportunity to observe or read about. In terms of leadership development, I have tried to hammer home the following point many times. There is such a thing as a temporary duty position or acting rank; however, there is no such thing as temporary, acting, simulated or provisional leadership. Either you lead or you do not. “Do, or do not. There is no try.” as the great philosopher Yoda once said. In any case, for those of us who are privileged to lead, experience forges our personal “command philosophy.” That is how we fundamentally think of and approach leadership roles and responsibilities – formal or informal. As with many aspects of leadership, developing a personal philosophy is often a complicated maturation process over time. Therefore, I am going to concentrate on just one vital leadership trait or principle in this article – initiative.Initiative in the military is often described as a binary choice; as in soldiers “taking action in the absence of orders.” If applied literally, that simplistic statement would seem to indicate that there is no option for individual or unit initiative after orders are issued? That cannot be right. I prefer to think of initiative as opportunities for positive action that soldiers – especially leaders – constantly seek out – with or without explicit orders. Moreover, when leaders find the chance, we are duty bound to seize those opportunities. Make no mistake, in peace and war, initiative must always be SEIZED by the individual; it cannot be requisitioned, allocated, disseminated, delegated, or preordained. Initiative starts with trust and confidence. Effective leaders who want to inculcate initiative into their organizations have to know and have confidence in themselves and trust in their subordinates.Some say – and I believe – that asking for forgiveness [works] better than asking for permission. It certainly does speak to the essence of initiative. In practice, I have rarely found it necessary to ask forgiveness for exercising my initiative – within the context of accomplishing my assigned mission. I will share one clear example that happened early in my career. In 1980, I was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds) of the 25th Infantry Division stationed in Hawaii. This was before the “Light Division” initiative of the mid-to late 80s. We were a “straight leg” outfit. I was a promotable Sergeant (E-5) and was initially a Rifle Squad Leader in Alpha Company. That did not last long, a couple of months later, a slot opened for a TOW Section Leader in the Combat Support Company. I was TOW qualified, so I was moved over to that position.A TOW section consisted of eight soldiers in two squads (gun crews), four M151A2s, a.k.a. “Jeeps,” and two TOW systems. I have included a picture of one TOW squad for reference in the attached diagram below. Note: the picture is of the earliest version of the TOW system, circa 1974 and the vehicles are M151A1s not A2s. I had only 7 soldiers assigned but otherwise had a full complement of gear. In those days, TOW qualification was an additional infantry “skill identifier” not an MOS. There was a formal gunners’ course at Fort Benning but it never met the requirements in the field. Most soldiers, myself included, OJTed on the system at some point and were awarded the identifier after 90 days and a unit recommendation.One day my Platoon Leader and Company Commander pulled me aside after morning formation in the Battalion Quad (Barracks Area). They told me that my Section had been “volunteered” to act as aggressors for an upcoming Battalion Command Post Exercise (CPX). I was to report to the Battalion Commander (BC) for additional guidance. I hustled over to the Battalion Headquarters and met the CSM first. He explained that the Battalion and Company level leadership would be going out to the Kahuku Training Area (KTA), in order to practice establishing CPs, troubleshoot communication systems, and work through the mechanics of issuing and disseminating tactical plans and orders. All of this was to get the Battalion C2 ready for the upcoming Team Spirit Exercise in Korea. As part of that preparation, a Rifle Platoon from Alpha Company had been tasked to provide security for the BN CP.We went in to see the BC. He asked me if I had any questions about my mission. I asked only one question “is there anything specifically that you want me to do?” He said something to the effect that “No, the tactics are up to you. Your job is to take out the CP. Their job (the Platoon) is to stop you.” I said “Roger that,” saluted, and left. I received no additional guidance from anyone in the chain of command, nor did I seek it out. I had some thinking to do. I gathered my soldiers and we started to plan our patrol. The “patrol’ level order was about as far as any of us were familiar with mission planning. It was good enough. We had our organic assets of men, vehicles, radios, rifles (M16A1s) and even four PVS5 Night Vision Goggles for the drivers. We had no machine guns, but I could have gotten those from the arms room. I could have even scrounged up a few more men and trucks; however, I decided it was our mission and we would do it ourselves.I knew what was expected. Everybody from the BC on down anticipated that we would drive to KTA, dismount, and “probe” the CP’s perimeter security. That was a losing proposition. The most we would accomplish would be to keep a platoon’s worth of soldiers awake for a few nights and still never get within striking distance of the CP itself. The platoon had the positional, manpower, and (overwhelming) firepower advantage in a fair fight. Moreover, although it was only a blank gunfight we were bound to take significant notional casualties. An inferior force bumbling blind into even a poorly prepared defense was tactically suicidal. I do not believe in suicide missions or training my people to get killed – even notionally. I wanted to win, I wanted to take out that CP, and I wanted my soldiers to have no doubt that we could do it. Therefore, a fair fight was out.I pulled out the Ranger Handbook and looked up Raid first. I do not have that old 1970s version for reference, but the fundamentals have not changed much over the years. The 2011 Handbook says in part, “A raid is a form of attack, usually small scale, involving a swift entry into hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations followed by a planned withdrawal. Squads do not conduct raids [emphasis added]. The sequence of platoon actions for a raid is similar to those for an ambush. …Fundamentals of the raid include: Surprise and speed. Infiltrate and surprise the enemy without being detected. Coordinated fires. Seal off the objective with well synchronized direct and indirect fires. Violence of action. Overwhelm the enemy with fire and maneuver. Planned withdrawal. Withdraw from the objective in an organized manner, maintaining security.”It was obvious that a Raid in the traditional sense was out of the question. However, one of the fundamentals sounded particularly applicable to our situation, “Infiltrate and surprise the enemy without being detected.” So, I next looked up Ambush. “An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or temporarily halted target. Ambushes are categorized as either hasty or deliberate and divided into two types, point or area; and formation linear or L shaped. The leader considers various key factors in determining the ambush category, type, and formation, and from these decisions, develops his ambush plan.” That was it. I had my Eureka moment. The CP was certainly a “temporarily halted target.” Therefore, if we could not successfully raid the CP, by God we would ambush it!We did have some advantages. No one was paying attention to our planning so we were able to maintain airtight operational security (OPSEC). As the plan started to flesh out, my soldiers became more and more enthusiastic and understood the need for absolute secrecy. We also knew the enemy – well. I had been in the same company as had my Squad Leader. We knew the platoon selected and their leadership. The Platoon Sergeant was a Vietnam veteran (as almost all of the senior NCOs were). However, he was one of those guys who made it clear that he though peacetime training was bullshit and “you’ll learn the real deal when you get to combat.” Apparently that is how it worked for him in the Nam. In other words, while he probably knew how to do it right, he was a “half-stepper” who was not going to put much effort into this tasker. His squad leaders and even the Platoon Leader took their cues from him.I was not a half-stepper and my men knew it and, unlike our enemy, we were highly motivated. A big advantage. I visited the S4 and picked up some scraps of training ammunition they had on hand. A can of 5.56 blank; about enough for each of us to have 5-6 loaded 20 Round magazines. A half dozen grenade simulators, several smoke grenades and four CS Ball Grenades. The Ball Grenades were designed for crowd control. When thrown, they broke apart and dispensed a chemical irritant in powder form. The grenade could not be thrown back, and the powder “contaminated” an area for an extended period of time. I expected to use them to deter pursuit if we had to break contact. During planning we figured out that we would need to divide into two elements. A mounted team with three vehicles and drivers and a dismounted ambush team of four. That was just enough.Our most important advantage was that we knew where the CP was going to be established. The KTA is relatively small with highly compartmentalized terrain and thick vegetation. There was only a couple of places suitable for a BN CP and one of those was marginal at best. Therefore, because of the terrain constraints, we knew the location and the likely layout of the site. I had been there more than a few times. On one side was a guava thicket about 15 feet by 30 feet on the edge of a steep ravine (see diagram). We even knew how the platoon defense would be established in a horseshoe anchored on that ravine. Every unit that went out there for years had used the same fighting positions; including the machinegun position we expected to be sited to control the access road entrance into the CP. I had no doubt that the security platoon would take the easy way and fall into those same holes.Our last advantage was our autonomous mobility. I could leave when I saw fit and had no requirement to make any additional checks with anybody. We left early the next Monday morning – day one of the CPX. The S-3 (Operations) shop and the S-6 (Communications) were just starting to load their vehicles when we left. I do not think anyone noticed our departure. We got to the CP site and confirmed our plan. My Squad Leader, acting as one driver, would take the vehicles one ridge line over and be prepared to support a hasty extraction of the ambush team if necessary. The vehicles moved out. The ambush team familiarized ourselves with the area (MG position, etc.) Again, refer to the diagram. I had two men crawl into the thicket and we confirmed that we would be concealed from view in that thick tangle of vegetation – even if someone got into the prone and looked.We then rehearsed our ambush actions twice before crawling into the guava and establishing our Objective Rally Point (ORP). We were ready. Around mid-morning, the first people to arrive were the communicators and the NCOs from the S2 (Intelligence) and S3 sections. They went completely admin and stripped down to t-shirts to put up the tent and antennas. They surrounded the tent with one strand of concertina wire. Not for security, but just to keep people from running into the tent’s guy lines. They decorated the concertina with white cloth engineer tape to make the wire visible and to guide people to the single entrance. The security platoon arrived sometime around lunch. They were just as admin as the first crew. No one systematically cleared the objective area. They meandered out to their defensive positions a few at a time – and out of our sight. Then apparently, rather than improve their fighting positions, everyone took a late lunch of C-Rations. We could tell from the clanging of cans and the chatter. No noise discipline in effect until the BC, CSM, and S3 arrived around 1500 hours.We waited quietly. No chow for us. The sound or the smell might give us away. We sipped water, took turns watching and slept. Just after dark, around 2130, all the Company Commanders arrived from their CPs for the Battalion Operations Order. It was time. They had walked themselves precisely into the kill zone of our ambush. I led the team out of the guava. We had put our ammo in our jungle fatigue shirts and left our LCE in the brush. We did not want to risk being hung up going out or back in. We lined up directly in front of the entrance and initiated the ambush with full auto fire from our M16s. A PFC by the name of Teague was the last man in the line. He had a special job. We had made up a dummy demolition charge and he was going to deliver it inside to complete the destruction of the CP.Teague ran into the tent and then did some adlibbing. He told us later that he was startled when he went in because everyone was looking at him in shock. So he sprayed them with his remaining rounds and put the “demo charge” on the field table in front of the BC. We could hear clearly outside the tent as the BC asked, “Are you done, son?” Teague replied “No Sir, I’ve got a whole nother magazine!” So, he reloaded and gave them another 20 rounds before running back out. In the meantime, we had thrown smoke grenades behind us to block the view of anyone near the MG position or road and a couple more towards the vehicle parking area in case the drivers were looking. We finished with two grenade simulators for the demo charge detonation and then did a right face and crawled back into the guava. The ambush took less than 90 seconds. We waited for the reaction and the possibility we might be found out and have to run for it or slide on our asses down the side of the ravine behind us.Not much happened for a while. The sounds had echoed among the trees and, unless one was looking in the right direction and saw the flashes, it would be unclear where the attack had originated. Indeed, standard procedure would be for soldiers on the perimeter to remain in place and scan their immediate sectors. Again, knowing my enemy, I had been certain that there would be no sentinels at the CP entrance or any quick reaction force (QRF) to respond. The platoon leadership would be trying to figure out what was going on before coming back to the CP and reporting to the BC. In the interim, the BC, Company Commanders, and the Staff had pushed on to issue the operations order. The S3 was a particularly loud talker and we could hear most of the plan as he presented it. After all, we were only about 35 feet away.Eventually the briefing broke up and the S3 and Alpha Company Commander came out, actually moved next to our guava hideout, and yelled for the platoon leader. He showed up with the platoon sergeant for his ass chewing. He confessed that he did not know how we got past his people or got back out. But, he assured them, he would keep the platoon at 100% security for the rest of the night and it would not happen again. None of them considered for a moment that the aggressors might not be doing the expected or fighting fair. Without any immediate threat, we again started to take turns sleeping for the rest of the night. During the night there were several bursts of fire from the perimeter as the platoon stayed awake and engaged shadows.We were not done. The next day we continued to rest and observe. I did not expect another big meeting on the second night, but I wanted everyone to know that the first night had not been a lucky fluke. We waited until about 0300 this time. Again, there was the occasional burst of random fire from the perimeter throughout the night. We crawled out in the same formation as the first time – this time with all our gear. It was time to leave. We initiated the ambush with our M16s and threw our remaining ordinance: simulators, smoke, and three of the CS Grenades right at the entrance of the CP. Then we faced left and moved deliberately to the road and downslope with me in the lead. I had the last CS grenade in my hand and was prepared to throw it at the MG position if necessary. I expected that the MG would be on the tripod and the crew would not be quick to turn it back toward the CP in any case. The CS powder would certainly distract them until we could get away.As we came up to the position, someone – the gunner presumably – whispered, “What’s going on?” I whispered back, “The aggressors hit the CP again! Stay Alert! And, for God’s sake don’t fire us up when we come back!” “Roger that” came the reply. We kept moving at a walk. Fifty meters and less than a minute later we were entirely out of their sight and line of fire. We kept walking and, although I did not expect it, I threw the last grenade behind us on the road to deter any pursuit. I had carried one of our radios in my ruck for contingencies but had kept it off in the ORP. We turned it on and sent the codeword for extraction. The vehicle team had heard the explosions and the trucks got to the link up intersection just as we arrived. A 30 second accountability check and we were on our way back to Schofield Barracks. My soldiers were hungry but morale was sky high. We got back in time for breakfast at the Messhall. We spent the rest of the day cleaning up and slept that night in our own beds.The next morning I was crossing the Quad after PT when the security platoon came back in. One of the Squad Leaders I knew pretty well stopped me. He told me that he was impressed how we got past them for two nights, but last night they had shut down every one of our attempts to infiltrate thru them. I could see that the guy was exhausted after 72 hours without sleep so I told him “good job” and went on my way. It appeared that not only had we taken out the battalion CP twice – killing most of the leadership the first time – but had also simultaneously managed to harass the rifle platoon and keep them awake for three nights without ever engaging them. I was proud of my men and how they handled the mission. No one had even fired a shot at us so we had zero compromises or casualties. Mission success in my book.I cautioned my men to go with the “official story” that we had slipped stealthily through twice and did not get inside on the third try. I did submit some security suggestions to the BC a few days later including having the security element always go in first and clear the objective thoroughly, posting sentries at the CP itself (with night vision), and having some form of QRF. He asked me directly how we did it. Did we climb up and down the sides of the ravine he wondered? So, I told him. He said “I’ll be damned.” Then he looked at me and said, “I could have done without the CS. We had to move the CP entrance to the other side and they still haven’t gotten the smell out of the canvas.” I said, “Yes, Sir. We won’t use it next time.” As far as I know, the BC never shared that story with anyone else. I was never asked to aggress against the CP again either.I suspect that the BC also made a mental note to himself to be more explicit in his instructions the next time he gave someone like me a mission. It is true that I had not given him exactly what he expected. In fact, I had given him something better than he originally wanted from me. I gave him what he actually needed – an honest and complete evaluation on the security posture of his CP. Simply probing the perimeter would have provided little useful feedback. The BC went on to validate our work by having his people apply my recommendations during Team Spirit and incorporated them into the CP SOP.When it comes to initiative, there are a couple of “rules” leaders need to follow. If you are the subordinate, never ask for more guidance then you absolutely need to understand the mission and the commander’s intent. Always leave yourself some room for initiative. If you are the senior, never give any more guidance than you absolutely have to. That usually means only those essential constraints and limitations required to synchronize actions between units. Give your subordinates as much time and space as possible to exercise their individual initiative. Imagination, audacity, and initiative are always value added and powerful force multipliers. A wise leader encourages and harnesses that power. Good units develop bold soldiers at all levels who are never afraid to carpe diem.De Oppresso Liber!LTC Terry Baldwin, US Army (Ret) served on active duty from 1975-2011 in various Infantry and Special Forces assignments. SSD is blessed to have him as both reader and contributor. Posted in Guest Post, Profession of Arms | 1 Comment WASHINGTON An Army Ranger who risked his life to save dozens of hostages facing imminent execution by ISIS fighters will be awarded the Medal of Honor, the White House announced Thursday.Sgt. Maj. Thomas “Patrick” Payne, who is assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, was part of a joint task force that assisted Iraqi security forces Oct. 22, 2015, in raiding an ISIS prison near Hawija in northern Iraq.Payne and his teammates liberated 70 hostages many of whom were captured Iraqi security forces personnel after a request by the Kurdistan Regional Government.Soldiers had to quickly rescue the hostages amid heavy enemy gunfire and suicide-vest detonations during the contested nighttime operation, which left one U.S. Soldier and at least 20 insurgents dead.“Time was of the essence,” Payne said in an interview. “There were freshly dug graves. If we didn’t action this raid, then the hostages were likely to be executed.”After being infilled by CH-47 Chinook helicopters, Payne and members of the task force climbed over a wall into the prison compound. Payne, an assistant team leader at the time, helped lead his team as it cleared one of the two buildings known to house hostages.Once inside the building after light resistance from the enemy, Payne said his team used bolt cutters to pierce through the locks of a prison door, freeing nearly 40 hostages.Payne and others then heard an urgent call for help over the radio from other task force members engaged in an intense firefight at the second building.Payne and his team maneuvered about 30 yards to the heavily-fortified building, which was partially on fire.Once there, he and others scaled a ladder onto the roof of the one-story building as a sustained rate of enemy machine-gun fire shot out from below. From a vantage point on the roof, they engaged the enemy with hand grenades and small arms fire.At that point, enemy fighters began to detonate their suicide vests, causing the roof to shake. Payne and others then moved off the roof to an initial breach point on the ground level.With barricaded enemies firing rounds toward him, Payne entered the structure to open another fortified door. After he managed to cut the first lock, he had to run out due to the heavy smoke and handed off the bolt cutters to an Iraqi partner. After the partner came out for fresh air, Payne took the tool again to sheer off the last lock and kicked open the door.Still being engaged by the enemy, Payne and others escorted about 30 more hostages out of the burning building, which was about to collapse.“We had to use speed to our advantage,” he said.With disregard for his own safety, Payne then reentered the building two more times to ensure every hostage was out. One of those times he had to forcibly remove one of the hostages who had been too frightened to move during the chaotic scene, he said.For his actions, Payne was initially given the Army s second-highest award, the Distinguished Service Cross, which was later upgraded to a Medal of Honor.President Donald Trump will present the medal to Payne on Sept. 11.Originally from Batesburg-Leesville and Lugoff, South Carolina, Payne joined the Army in 2002 as an infantryman with hopes of becoming an Army Ranger.Since then, he has deployed several times to combat zones as a member of the 75th Ranger Regiment and in various positions with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.He earned a Purple Heart medal after being wounded in a separate 2010 mission in Afghanistan. And as a sergeant first class in 2012, Payne won the Army’s Best Ranger Competition, representing USASOC.He is married with three children and is currently stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.For more information about Sgt. Maj. Thomas P. Payne s heroic actions, visit Medal of Honor: Sgt. Maj. Thomas Payne.By Sean Kimmons, Army News Service Posted in Army, Guest Post, Profession of Arms, SOF | 1 Comment Manager – Expeditionary Support (PM-ES), will conduct an Austere 3D Printing Assessment Event (AE) to identify 3D printer capabilities designed to meet the unique requirements of Special Operations Forces (SOF) Operators in austere environments.Current U.S. commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 3D printers are not designed to meet the unique SOF requirements (i.e. size, weight, power, mobility, survivability, etc.) needed in support of USSOCOM SOF missions.the USSOCOM MTRC program is interested in assessing 3D printer technologies ranging from small – single SOF Operator portable systems with niche capabilities that can be hand-carried and/or transported via non-standard commercial vehicles, to moderate – SOF Team portable systems with robust adaptive manufacturing capabilities that can be palletized and/or transported by C-130 aircraft.They desire the following system attributes:-U.S. 3D printer technologies designed, developed, produced, manufactured, and/or supported predominantly in the United States.-U.S. 3D printer technologies that are self-contained, ruggedized, mobile, and capable of printing at SOF point of need in a wide array of environmental conditions.-U.S. 3D printer technologies that allow for forward deployment, into the field, at the point of SOF equipment failure, reduce hardware replacement times, enable SOF Operator innovation, are reliable, and/or are easy to operate and maintain.Interested parties must submit, NLT 30 September 11:59 PM ET. Visit events.sofwerx.org/3dprint for full details and to enter. Posted in Disruptive Tech, SOF | No Comments In 1959, the Navy built the first real satellite navigation system, which was called TRANSIT. The system was designed to locate submarines and started out with six satellites and eventually grew to ten. The subs often had to wait hours to receive signals from the satellites, but the model set the stage for accurate GPS with continuous signaling from satellites in space. The GPS project was launched in the United States by the Military in 1973 to overcome previous navigation systems limitations, integrating ideas from several predecessors, including classified engineering design studies from the 1960s.In 1983shortly after the Russians shot down Korean Air flight 007 after it wandered off course into Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula, president Reagan offered to let all civilian commercial aircraft use the GPS (once it was completed) to improve navigation and air safety.The original system used 24 satellites. It was initially developed for use by the United States military and became fully operational in 1995. When I first joined the Military in the late 80s, the first GPS I used was the AN/PSN-8; you had to put it on an Alice pack frame and carry it by itself like it was a radio. Because it basically was the size of one. We would use a cargo strap to secure it to the back of the bolster seats on the RHIBS. It was used until after the 1st Gulf War. Later it was replaced by the AN/PSN-11 Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver(PLGR, plugger”) that was used during the invasion of Somalia.The network now consists of about 30 satellites orbiting the Earth at an altitude of 20,000 km. Not all 30 are in use; some are set aside as spears.Since 1993, the US Air Force has made its Global Positioning System (GPS) available to the world, and ever since then, that technology has found its way into our everyday lives. Once it has information on how far away at least three to four satellites are, your GPS receiver can pinpoint your location thru trilateration (it also uses cell towers if close enough). The system is made up of three parts: satellites, ground stations, and receivers. Satellites act like the stars in constellations—we know where they are supposed to be at any given time. The ground stations use radar to make sure that you are where you think you are. The receiver is continuously listening for a signal from satellites. Just about everything, today can tell you your position on the Earth from your phone to your watch and dive computers.I remember when the first GPS watches came out, you had to make sure it had a clear view of the sky. You would also have to make sure the older military GPS s had the most updated crypto in them, or it didn t work and had to carry dead weight with you. Today there are a lot of options for handheld or even dive mask mounted. The SCUBAPRO Galileo HUD Pro can hold up to 31 GPS waypoints and a full dive computer. It will give you a compass heading, tell you the time and distance to your target. The one bad thing about all the civilian GPS is if there ever is a full out war, they will be the first things turned off. So, don t forget the basics of time, speed, and distance. With two new satellites in orbit and eight more in various stages of development, the latest, GPS III, is already being built. The next generation of GPS should go fully operational around 2023.The first GPS III satellite launched by Lockheed Martin cost anestimated $529 millionto build. The satellite s outstanding longevity will offset some of this upfront cost. Unlike the early GPS satellites, which have a design life of 7.5 years, the new GPS III satellites will last 15 years — twice as long as the oldest satellites in orbit and 25 percent longer than the latest satellites in the GPS fleet. The new GPS III satellite system is designed to adapt to new technology, and its mission objectives change. The next generation of GPS will be up to 3 times more accurate than existing GPS technology. That means the 5 to 10-meter accuracy you see now with current GPS technology will be more like 1 to 3 meters.With all these improvements aimed at the civilian side of things, it s easy to forget that GPS is first and foremost a military technology. There will be new command centers capable of controlling the existing GPS satellite and the new GPS III satellites from the ground. The next generation of GPS is expected to be available by 2022-2023. Posted in Comms, Press Release | 2 Comments This is the Raptor Tactical Peltor Ear Pro Wrap paired with Koffin Wurks Krypt.The Peltor Ear Pro Wrap features an air mesh liner to keep you cool and comfortable all day on the range along with a top loop for name badge, carabiner loop on the backsideand low profile PALS panel for cord management.Offered in MultiCam, Coyote, Black, and Ranger Green with others in stock occasionally. Check the website to see what s available.Order online at www.raptortactical.comOr stop by the shop704B Festus AveFayetteville, NC 28303The Coffin Wurks Krypt is a means to manage the down leads on popular ear protection/headsets like Peltor Comtacs and MSA Sordins. They are handmade from military spec materials and easily attach to the headset with industrial strength hook and loop. Posted in Advertiser, Comms | 2 Comments HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. Air Force Special Operations Command’s 2020 Strategic Guidancecalled for a change in developing and providing unique capabilities valuable to the broader joint force while remaining an integral part of the joint special operations forces team.Those priorities brought an aviation background into the Special Tactics ranks.Earlier this summer, U.S. Air Force Col. Allison Black made history as she joined the Special Tactics leadership team and became the vice commander of the 24th Special Operations Wing.“With any leadership team, you want to have people that cover each other’s blind spots and are able to bring the best out of the organization,” said U.S. Air Force Col. Matt Allen, commander of the 24th SOW. “Not only does Col. Black have a rich history as an aircrew member within AFSOC, but she also has key insights working on staffs within U.S. Special Operations Command and she is a female colonel, which provides really good insight as we look at our diversity and inclusion aspects of the force to make sure that we’re making good organizational decisions on bringing in the first wave of female operators onto the line.”Black’s commissioned background entails being a navigator on the AC-130H Spectre gunship. She was known as “The Angel of Death” as she was the first female Spectre navigator in combat operations during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.“When I was in Afghanistan, she was certainly popular because she was the only female voice you would hear when you’re out in the field as a [joint terminal attack controller],” said U.S. Air Force Chief Master Sgt. Jeff Guilmain, former command chief of the 24th SOW.Black credits working on the gunships supporting the ground forces, to her gaining a better understanding of the Special Tactics community and their mission.“When you talk about diversity of thought, I think it’s great having an individual come in with a long standing, very successful career in AFSOC, who has been around Special Tactics and worked with us as joint partners forward in Afghanistan directly in the fight,” said Guilmain. “It’s powerful to have her experience as an outsider looking at us both operationally and in garrison to help us look at hard problems to build the force of the future.”When asked how she felt toward this milestone position, Black said she was “honored, humbled and little-kid excited.”“It’s a great honor to serve the Special Tactics community as their vice wing commander,” said Black. “I’m now a direct part of the machine that I’ve directly supported my entire aviation career from the air. I couldn’t ask for a better teammate than Col. Matt Allen. He’s a dedicated leader and consummate professional who deeply cares about our people. As Col. Allen’s vice, it’s my role to follow his lead and drive the organization toward a successful future.”The Long Island, New York, native enlisted in the United States Air Force in 1992, originally expecting a job in radiology.Little did Black know what the next 28 years would entail.During the first week of basic military training, all of the flights were briefed on what is now called Special Warfare career fields. Survival, evasion, resistance and escape caught Black’s attention – a predominantly male career field.SERE specialists train Airmen on how to survive in the most hostile and remote environments.“For me, overall, it was the challenge,” Black said. “As hard as it was going to be, I just wasn’t going to quit.”Breaking through barriers, Black graduated and became a SERE specialist where she excelled for the next six years.In 1998, Black sought out yet another challenge and commissioned through Officer Training School and became a navigator on the AC-130H Spectre gunship with the 16th Special Operations Squadron, which landed her at Hurlburt Field in early 2000 where she would remain for the next decade.As a navigator, now known as a combat systems officer, Black acted as the eyes for the ground forces below her. In communication with Special Tactics operators, Black also assisted bringing airpower down on the enemy.As Black advanced through the ranks, she took a brief break from the AFSOC community and headed on to be the Chief of the Operational Integrated Communications Team at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, from 2010-2012.She quickly returned to Hurlburt Field and was integrated as the Director of Operations into the 319th Special Operations Squadron, an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance unit that operates U-28s, which she later commanded from 2015-2017.Black then moved to USSOCOM headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, before returning to Hurlburt Field as the vice commander for the 24th SOW.Black’s unique background, involving SERE and navigating a gunship, has left her with an extraordinary knowledge set to bring to the Special Tactics community.“Let’s just make a difference. Let’s exploit what I have learned throughout my career on operations, risk management, and regulations,” Black said. “Let’s uncover all of that and let’s roll up our sleeves and use that to make our community stronger and more effective. Let’s exploit technology and work to define what the future holds. We need to determine what niche capabilities our current Special Tactics force must bring to the future fight.”Black is hopeful that her presence makes a difference and inspires others to “work hard and continue to take the risk to try.”“I hope that my perspective makes our team stronger,” Black said. “Even though I look different than most of our force… and even though I don’t wear a beret, I’m confident that my background in AFSOC, and in the Air Force, will be seen as a positive.”By SSgt Rachel Williams, 1st Special Operations Wing Public Affairs Posted in AFSW, Air Force, Guest Post, Profession of Arms, SOF | 2 Comments Sorry for the longer than usual time in between articles guys. I had a death in my immediate family this past month I have spent a lot of time over the last month working through those issues and trying to work in the Covid world. In any case I hope you all are staying healthy and as upbeat as possible during these challenging times. 2020 has sure been one for the books (so far). Hang tough, it will pass. Looking forward, people who have followed my articles here on SSD and/or have read my book, know that I am a big believer in the mental aspect of heath and fitness. IMO it’s actually more important that sets/reps, eating, etc., when trying to get and stay in top condition. The body always follows the mind in the success, or failure of anything. With that aspect I have come to learn (the hard way), that there is another part of all this that is very important and all too often overlooked. That is understanding who is fundamentally responsible for your health? That would be you and if you don’t take charge of it, it could lead to some bad outcomes, or at the least prevent you from achieving your goals.Now on the surface this may seem obvious, but it isn’t that obvious to everyone and in my own case it really wasn’t until recently. In some past SSD articles I have shared a little of my own battle with TBI, not a lot as I don’t come on here to complain about my own (reactively minor) health issues, but to share my experience and information that I think could help people with their weight loss and fitness goals. Plus, I know fellow services members with much worse battle field injuries and chronic service related conditions than mine. I learned many years ago, when you start to feel sorry for yourself, look to your left or right and you’ll see someone who has it worse. So suck it up buttercup.However in the spirit of trying to help others through my own experience I will share a little more today. For some background info, a little over a year ago I started having these weird headaches. They weren’t really what you would call a headache, but more of a dizzy, lightheaded thing. Out of nowhere, they would sneak upon me, when I was teaching a class, trying to do some computer work, driving, or even just watching TV? My balance was affected sometimes too. It would just happen and there was never an apparent cause? At first I thought it was an ear problem, as I’ve been prone to ear infections, especially as I travel a lot and when I climb above 10,000 ft, which I had been doing a fair amount of. So after trying my usual denial and just gut it out for a few weeks method, it only got worse, so I went to see a doctor.As I’m retired military I have Tri-Care and go the hospital here on base. Which over the last 10 years has been fine. The fact was it was just like I was still on active duty as I would go and see what ever Navy doctor (or Corpsman) was on duty that day. No problem. Yearly physicals, flu shots, tests, blood work, etc., it was all good. So I go to the doctor this time and take a bunch of tests and the young female Navy Doc tells me that she can’t find anything wrong with me? But this thing was just getting worse, I felt like I was severely hung over 24/7. The only time I actually felt good was when I sweating, like during PT or climbing. However, as soon as I would stop and settle down, it would come back. So she set me up with a Neurologist.So to make a (very) long story short with this part, I go and had a whole series of MRI’s, soft tissue, with contrast, etc. etc and I go to a ENT. Again nothing, but after a lot of discussion with the Neurologist and his review of tests and my service medical records he tells me that he is 99% sure I have some level of TBI. Ok, I get it, that figures, now what? He says medication is the answer. Now at age 60 I have never been on any long term prescription medication, for anything. So he prescribes me something and I go get it. My wife (who is a nurse) looks at it and tells me that it’s an anti-depressant, something commonly prescribed for PTSD? I call the doctor and he tells me that’s true, but it has been known to help people with TBI and he also thinks I may have some underlying PTSD. Huh? Really? However, as I have always trusted doctors without question, I start taking this stuff as directed.Right away this shit makes me nuts. I couldn’t sleep with crazy nightmares and it had me ready to cut my own F’ing head off as my TBI symptoms actually got worse. The doctor tells me to just hang in there as it takes awhile to get into your system, call him back in two weeks. After after two weeks and I’m about ready to go active shooter he decides that it’s not right for me and he prescribes something else. My wife looks at this new stuff and tells me that this is high blood pressure medicine? Huh? I don’t have high blood pressure, never have? So like before I call the doc and he says, Yes, it’s for high blood pressure, but it has been known to help people with TBI. Now my blind trust in doctors is starting to fade, but there’s still enough to do what he tells me.This new medication isn’t as bad as the first, I stopped having zombie nightmares and homicidal thoughts, but it really wasn’t helping the original problem either. After a few weeks I call the doctor and he wants me to try another, different drug? This is where I decide just throwing drugs against the wall (my wall) to see what sticks isn’t going to work, not for me. Thanks, but no thanks. I stop taking the drugs (and actually feel a little better) and my wife sets me up with a civilian doctor, which I m seeing in a few weeks. In the meantime, I started doing my own research on TBI, PTSD and the medications that are associated with with their treatment. There is a metric F ton of information out there and much of it is written by people who suffer with these problems. The point is that now that I have taken charge of my issue by educating myself about it, as i’m in a much better position to decide on how I want to try and fix it, (if possible). Does that mean I will not listen to doctors and do just what I think is best? No, of course not. What it means is I’m better informed about the potential consequences of different treatments and medications before I buy into it. It helped me look my situation in a better more informed way and will help me discuss this better with a doctor going forward. I was too trusting and frankly lazy about this and it bit me in the ass.It’s the same thing with something like losing weight and getting your health and fitness on line, you need to take charge of your own situation. Do some research and cut through all the slick marketing and media hype that promotes new workout routines, equipment, supplements and diet plans. Keep in mind that the bottom line is the #1 purpose of any of these products is to make money. If they actually help people is secondary. Now before you say anything, I don’t give a shit if I ever sell another book, the little money I have made from book sales wouldn’t add up to minimum wage when you add up the hours I’ve invested in. It’s always been more about talking to others about a subject I love than making money. The fact is I actually wrote my book at the urging of other Marines that followed my program and advice and it helped get people in better shape for their career. Yes, I ve sold a lot of books. Way more than I ever thought I would and certainly a lot more than my publisher thought I would. LOL However, I think it’s only sold so well over time is because the advice is sound, honest and timeless. It doesn’t not work because some time has gone by or it’s some new high tech break through. It just works, that’s all.But forget my book and any other book and take charge of your own health and fitness by doing your own research and figure out for yourself what makes sense for you. The fact is only you know what s best and will work for you.Till next month: “Be Safe Always, Be Good when you Can”.Semper FiMGunz Tags: Corps Strength Posted in Corps Strength | 2 Comments I agree to have my personal information transfered to MailChimp ( more information )

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