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Thursday, March 5, 2009 A NOMADIC LOGIC; AN INTELLECTUAL IMAGE: DIVERGENT MEANINGS ON THE CONCEPT OF STATE IN KUWAIT.



Statement of problem:

This study examines the ways in which social science portrays the Bedouin tribal population in Kuwait. Two main questions are raised here: how are Bedouins misrepresented in contemporary social science writing on Kuwait? And why are there ideological and moral disparities between the intellectual and the Bedouins sociopolitical conception of the state?


It is argued that because most social science research on Kuwait is carried out by western, intellectual Arab, or urban-based Kuwaiti scholars who adhere to modernist and liberal premises; tribes in Kuwait are portrayed in very generalized, sometimes contradictory, schemes. Bedouins are seen as a barrier to civil society and state; as a mistrustful group that must be acculturated into modernity; or as a loyal crowd used as an ideological tool by rulers. These writings misapprehend Bedouins social organization, dehistoricize their experience of encapsulation into the states boundaries, and overlook the significance of a peculiar and continuing nomadic logic of comprehending change, all vital elements in understanding Bedouins self-perception within the state. It is also posited that Bedouins view the state as a mere source of survival because they identify its susceptibility to persistent threats with its being temporary.


A growing body of research in political science, sociology, and anthropology deals with the problems of society and state in Kuwait. It largely focuses on formal and state politics including election, political organizations, development, and so on. These writings share a common ideological posture regarding the state, its history, and the sociocultural characteristics of its inhabitants, yet each field of research suffers limitations of its own.


Interested in state and formal politics, political science failed to see the significant role of subtler aspects of society in state formation. Tribes active involvement in the electoral process, for instance, is thought of in terms of electoral blocs maneuver and a way of integrating Bedouins into civility. Political science seeks its data from state bureaucrats, elitist intellectuals, and members of the ruling family, all of whom share similar persuasions on Bedouin and the function of the state. Some political science scholars have rightly viewed such activity as an adaptive technique to changing circumstances, but only to the extent that this technique will eventually lend itself to the modern politics, and hence altering its traditional political organization. Thus, an unquestioned presumption in political science is that the more there is institutionalized representative processes, the most likely practices of tribal kinship organization will dissolve into modern politics. Political science is a top-down view that starts from the state as an analytic tool and goes back to it narrowing the perspective on the wider social context.


Sociology has been influential in the construction of a specific image of tribes in Kuwait. As I reveal later, not only sociological research is predisposed to a defective developmental explanation of social change disregarding sociohistorical consciousness of Bedouins, but it also operates within the statism theory that guides political science. Sociologists have tended to reproduce, for example, the tribe vs. state dichotomy that oversimplifies complexities of social reality. The danger of this dichotomy is that in most cases it led sociologists to think of tribal people as representation of a pre-state disordered social universe. Scholars who address tribal organization and its values maintain that change of these values is a prerequisite for social stability and progress, and that there is a mismatch between the idea of modern state and Bedouin practices. Some of the key sociological solutions to the persistence of tribalism are democratization, a free market, and urbanization of tribal peoples. Although sociology addresses important aspects of the Kuwaiti society at large, it largely suffers from methodological and ideological problems. Sociological studies depend on questionnaires, formal interviews, general quantitative data, and the analysis of visible features of social structures. These techniques, though important in certain settings, do not highlight the historical or cultural context significant to any interpretation of Bedouins view of the state. Revealing such contexts requires a systematic day-to-day interaction with tribal people in Kuwait which is a common limitation to most of the research under investigation


Anthropological research on Kuwait is problematic for many reasons. First, there are few ethnographies on Kuwait. This contrasts with a significant number of ethnographies on other parts of Arabia, particularly Yemen (i.e. Dresch 1989), although the latter stand at the other extreme showing an obsession with the concept of tribe at the expense of its broader political economy (cf. Mundy 1995). Second, none of the ethnographies I came across were conducted among Bedouins nor does any raise the questions discussed here. Third, anthropologists who focus on concerns or subjects raised by sociology and political science routinely adopt their methodological and ideological biases. Thus, we find anthropologists interested in elections, citizenship, and class issues in a state framework, disregarding the Bedouins ideology of egalitarian individualism or their politico-economic standing. To establish an adequate interpretation anthropologists often use linguistic data such as oral tradition and daily talks as a primary substantiation of their interpretation of what people think or do. Anthropological reports on Bedouins in Kuwait are largely based on official documents, accounts of urban intellectuals, and a feeble application of ethnographic comparison. This lack explains why anthropologists are the least quoted in publications dealing with the state and society in Kuwait.
Although distinct disciplines, political science, sociology and anthropology draw on a single prototypical image on the ways Bedouins have reacted to political change. This image assumes that prior to centralized government Bedouins were in a state of chaos, wandering the desert struggling for pasture, raiding towns whenever desert resources deteriorate. But after the establishment of the territorial state and the discovery of oil, Bedouins came to the nourishing resources and began to benefit from them. Then, as the image figures, Bedouins did not understand the conditions of modernity and thus often defied reform and progress.


The flaw of this intellectual image lies in its rendering the tribe a political element that appeared with the emergence of the state, thus denying nomadism any genuine cultural content disregarding all forms of its social continuity and their role in comprehending change. Cultural content and the continuity of patterns of social organization constitute the nomadic logic of dealing with change. Bedouins do not think of the state, for example, as an institution that grows or diminishes, they see it as another resource, something, although imposed, has to be dealt with. Bedouins conceptualize the Kuwaiti state historically: this state has always been threatened, and was never intended for them. Thus Bedouins contribute to the state insofar as it provides them with security.



Methodology:





Though important to anthropology in general, the question of method takes on a particular significance for this research. Social research discussed here rarely collected data directly from Bedouin informants. When it did, it largely relied on general hints from public figures or Bedouin academics (often state officials) who never question the theories they have learned in their intellectual milieu. Much of the views developed on tribes have been quoted from Arab urban intelligentsia mothaqqafeen (i.e. Aljabri 2000; Alansari 1995; Ibrahim 1985 etc.) who share the prejudice that Bedouins are backward, corrupted with desert values, or should be integrated into civil processes.


These writings, along with other resources discussed subsequently, comprise an essential corpus for this research by virtue of their methodological lack. I chose the Bedouin context for two reasons. First, because there is a conspicuous lacuna of studies on, and misunderstanding of, nomadic experience under modern conditions. Second, there is a striking gap between social science views and social knowledge and reality. But for lack of space I only examine those Kuwaiti and western writings who are prominent among scholars of this area and are representative of the problem discussed here. I will analyze these writings as an ideological construct, examining their value foundations and their conceptual schemes regarding the interrelations of Bedouins, modernity, and state. In addition to social scientific research I will draw on my personal experience and observations but a few words about cultural location are in order.


I was born, raised, and still live in a tribal Bedouin home. My hometown Aljahra (some 40 kilometers north of the capital Kuwait city) is predominantly populated by various tribal divisions who were settled there in the 1940s early 1950s. For some years I collected information from Bedouins on history and the role of oral tradition in the state context (compiled elsewhere). As an insider I attended and participated in tribal occasions and have lived among older Bedouins who experienced the transition from nomadic to urban life. This gave me a relatively easy understanding of how conditions of the past influenced their present thinking.
Yet, being a Bedouin person, acquainted with the local tongue, does not always ensure a critical eye on how or why people think or behave in a certain way. Some Bedouins assumed that I knew enough hence provided me less information than they might have otherwise. There is also the moral question of being an unsuspected observer to my kin and other friends from other tribes, which stopped me at some point from seeking information. Political restrictions are also present. Many Bedouins are sensitive to subjects that touch on state power and its history, and therefore, many refrain from revealing their experience. Occasionally people looked at me as a Bedouin who knows how to speak and act like intellectuals. This placed me in a liminal position. Bedouins have a certain sociospatial concept of intellectuals as people of inner cities (called Hathar areas) whereas Bedouins live at their outskirts. Verbal and sociopolitical actions express physical and psychological space that distances Bedouins from the state and most intellectual activity. Thus, being identified with intellectuals places me at a certain distance. Since most anthropologists experience some state of liminality during phases of research, thus I hope that my peculiar position provides a new perspective on Bedouins and intellectuals alike.
In addition to social science writings, my direct observations and Bedouin oral tradition, I utilize comparative anthropological writings related to nomadism, state, and sociocultural transitions in the region. These include: Salzman 1978; Khoury Kostiner 1991; Lindholm 1986; Chatty 1996; Sweet 1971; Lewis 1994; Lancaster 1997; Cole; 1985; Fabietti 1998. These resources do not directly deal with Bedouins in Kuwait, yet they deal with nomadic modes of organization in states contexts.


Some definitions are necessary. I use the term tribe to refer to a group of people who claim to be related genealogically at different levels of organization and who act under varying circumstances as such. In this sense, my focus is not on the origins of a tribal tradition (i.e. segmentary lineage) but, as Nicholas Thomas has suggested (1992), against whom and under what circumstances tribal identity formulates. The term intellectuals refers to a wide category of those who depend on social scientific knowledge for strategic planning such as academics, intelligentsia, and states officials. Finally, the term nomadism refers to the Bedouin population and to the continuing sociopolitical patterns of dealing with change, and attaining security among Bedouins and not necessarily to a pastoral way of life.


In the next section I provide an ethnohistorical-ethnographic reconstruction of the formation of the Kuwaiti state and the interaction of its social groups. In this context I will provide a reconstruction of Bedouin culture and organization. Subsequently, I examine examples of social science and discuss their shared limitations. Then I discuss the characteristics of nomadic logic, and conclude with a discussion.



The State:





Kuwaits formation as a modern state can be seen in the context of three major episodes: (1) a small coastal settlement within a predominantly nomadic environment: from 1760s to mid 19th century; (2) a colonially-protected city-state: mid 19th century to 1920s; (3) an independent rentier-state: 1930s to the present.


The first episode does not differ markedly from the overall pattern of interaction in Arabia between coastal town dwellers (Hathar) and surrounding nomadic populations (Bedouins or Badu). This pattern shows that this period is not as chaotic as the literature commonly suggests. During summer, when desert resources depreciate, nomadic tribes gather around oases and towns water-wells. The process of economic exchange (msabalah) between Hathar and Bedouins begins and old political alliances are reasserted. In spring, nomads spread into the inner desert following pastures. Generally, nomads-settlers relationship was at once hostile and symbiotic. Hostility heightens as a result of either a political or economic interruption of the pattern of interaction. For instance, many tribes maintain an alliance with settled traders who depended on Bedouins for their caravan protection in and out of town; in return tribes receive a payment called khuwwah (brotherhood). However, whenever there is a highly centralized authority in town, conditions of such agreements become controversial (Chatty 1996: 5-7). This is usually so when town leaders impose heavy taxes on locals who would scarify one alliance at the expense of another. When a centralized authority refrained from paying khuwwah or prevented nomads from using water-wells, raid is expected. Nomadic raid took place to resurrect an economic pattern seen to be based on equal partnership to a free, multi-resource system that ensured their security with the least damage. But raid did not reflect a desire to an enduring government. Bedouin alliances were preserved as long as this form of exchange is proportionately defined, however, they shifted easily with any transition of rule in towns, the town of Kuwait included.


At the opening of 18th century the Bani-Khalid tribe dominated the surrounding desert of Kuwait, and through agreements with the Ottomans, they facilitated trade coming in and out of Kuwait. However, Bani-Khalids power deteriorated for several reasons. Besides their troubled relationship with ottomans, Bani-Khalid were turning into a settling expansive rule with a vertically organized hierarchy. They prevented other tribes from reaching pastures and attempted to integrate and threaten the independence of other groups. This invited intensive Bedouin raids and gradually diminished Bani-Khalids power (Crystal 1995; Anscombe 1997). This is the nomadic factor that always contributed to the destabilization of the Ottomans rule in Arabia and encouraged early attempts to settle Bedouins. Such attempts took place in Transjordan and Iraq, but faced considerable resistance in Arabia until the establishment of modern state. For the Ottomans, political stabilization and the success of taxation were conditioned by the settlement of Bedouins and the end of their mobile and disruptive way of living. When this failed, the Ottomans continued to form alliance with towns leaders and extracted taxes through them. Anscombe asserts that The nomadic Arab tribes remained the most dangerously unstable element in Arabia, and the Ottomans may be rightly criticized for not showing greater initiative in seeking to control, even sedentarize, them (Anscombe 1997: 168). Consequently, and only since the mid of 19th century raid on settlements became regular, and political turmoil characterized the towns life (Anscombe 1997: 143-144) which intensified with the British intervention.


British intervention demarcates the second episode. By the end of 19th century the desert-town opposition continued and took more violent forms. As the Ottoman rule declined, urban political powers had already shifted alliance to Britain and maintained treaties of protection. Alsabah shaikhs of Kuwait signed a treaty in 1899 and Kuwait was given the title of independent protectorate without well-defined territories. This implied British recognition of an absolute rule over the town of Kuwait and its inhabitants. But before I elucidate the identity of Alsabah, it is fundamental to understand general societal features of nomadic tribes at this stage of state formation.


Tribal aggregates were dominating the surroundings of the town of Kuwait at the beginning of the 20th century (Peterson 1988: 28; Sweet 1971: 208). Bedouin social and political interaction, were organized around segmentary and patrilineal rules of kinship. A descent group is independent in its decision to migrate, pay the diyyah (Blood-wealth), or to take vengeance (thaar) to name but a few examples. Its decision has no bearing on other segments or the tribe as whole. Yet, descent groups maintain their tribal belonging through activities at the lineage level such as the arrangement of alliances, marriages, raids, and far-off movements.


The whole tribe may carry on a collective activity such as defending a body of the tribe against another tribe in a major battle (Manakhah). This, however, was a rare event in Arabia (Caskel 1954: 37). Since movement was an autonomous decision dependent on pasture and political calculations, it prevented the whole tribe from settling together for long periods and made it difficult to develop a centralized decision making.


Egalitarian individualism characterizes the Bedouin system where tribal authority is an honorific title continuously checked by others and rarely enjoys a wide consensus. In this tribal organism there was no official leader, let alone a hierarchy. A leader can acquire a position of any official character only by being appointed to, or confirmed in, his office by non-Bedouin power; otherwise he is only primus inter pares. His authority is usually inherited, but it is sometimes won by his own efforts (Caskel 1954: 37). Leadership involved a continuous construction of effective character, mediation skills, personal dispositions such as linguistic or poetic abilities, and most significantly maintaining a good reputation within and beyond the tribe. Bedouins call someone shaikh who is respected for having all these dispositions without showing desire to overpower the others.


Lancaster (1997) and Lindholm (1986; 1995) have shown that inasmuch as there is great emphasis on individual autonomy in the Bedouin system, it is unachievable outside the egalitarian social ideology. Unlike chiefdoms structures where chief and his lineage is ranked at the top of social hierarchy and social integration is practiced through loyalty to the chief, Arabian tribes are highly decentralized (Lindholm 1986: 343). Whereas economic exchange in chiefdoms takes the form of redistribution through the chief, reciprocity and communalism are the dominant economic types among Bedouins tribes. Production in the tribal economy was subsistence-oriented with very limited surplus, and if any, it was not concentrated within any existing political leadership, but toward the kin units basic economic security. This should not mean that nomadic tribes did not experience any form of inequality. It only means that such inequality, when existed, did not entail submission or coercion as it did in chiefdoms (Earl 1991: 5). Coercion and direct exercise of power was a social practice in towns even when a nomadic group settle in an urban center and begins to use its norms of political governing (Rowton 1973).
The autonomy of individuals and kin groups, freedom of mobility, charismatic leadership, and reciprocal economy are general societal features of nomadic society. These served as mechanisms oppressive of rigid hierachization of political power and they resulted in a horizontal structuration rather than a vertical centralization of power in a specific polity. But each of these mechanisms is connected with perhaps the most important objective of nomadic context: security. For instance, the autonomy of the individual or descent group guarantees that someones leadership can openly be contested, or avoided through temporary withdrawal, or by seeking refuge with another tribe. In the Bedouin system every individual is responsible for his action, which will receive group support only if it enhances the groups security as whole. Ones generosity, for instance, increases his reputation and that of his immediate group and should he be killed or grow too old, his past generosity will ensure that others will, in turn, be generous to him and/or his group, if they are in real need. (Lancaster 1997: 147). Scholars of tribal peoples are familiar with these aspects, yet, as Lindholm rightly noticed, the tribes of Arabia are peculiar in their ability to transmit traditional value into their social practices today (1986: 350). Analyses of Bedouins in Kuwait, however, overlook such aspects and their significance in the construction of Bedouins political ideology. Now I turn to Alsabah Rule of Kuwait.


Alsabah is an ideal example of an urban polity that became a colonially institutionalized Sheikhdom. Alsabah is a group of families that migrated from Najd a semi-agricultural region in central Arabia to settle in the area of Kuwait around the middle of the 18th century. Kuwait was then a small fishery community with small-scale agricultural practices, maritime trade and pearling. Contrary to the widely held belief that Alsabah is a section of Bani Utub, which, according to this claim, is a section of the Amarat lineage of the huge Bedouin tribe, Anizah, shaikh Abdullah Alsabah (reign 1950-1966) mentioned to his biographer that their name Bani-Utub meant the people who moved north and that It was never the name of an actual segment of the Amarat section of Anizah(Dickson 1956: 26). Crystal (1995) has also shown evidences that Alsabah family is stratified by originsedentary not nomadic(37) but these accounts remain in the minority. Just after the Alsabah camp was set in Kuwait, the family decided to send to AlBasrah a messenger who would explain to the Turkish governor that they were poor settlers who had came from Najd to Kuwait to try to eke out a living there and that they meant no harm to anyone. The man selected for this mission was called Sabah. Having age, experience and what the Arabs call hath [Luck] he was successful (Dickson 1956: 27). This marks the beginning of the rule of Alsabah in Kuwait and falsifies the myth that they ruled by virtue of their nomadic origin and power.


Through their contact with the populace in Kuwait, especially its merchants, Alsabah showed great administrative skills of negotiation and neutralization of conflict which invited British attention. Until after the discovery of oil in the 1930s, colonial efforts were directed toward political centralization of power and a rapid foundation of nuclear settlements along the Arabian Gulf coast (Peterson 1977: 299). In their contacts with Alsabah the British followed the Ottoman pattern in Arabia, which was to deal with or reinforce a viable urban power and to communicate through it with the rest of the population. Colonial efforts sought a stable political elite that could execute the colonial interests of protecting maritime trade and safe access to ports (Crystal 1995). By the end of the 19th century Alsabah family has already succeeded in creating a hierarchical and highly centralized urban polity that matched colonial expectations. The 1899 protection treaty marked the beginning of the third episode.


Under the 1899 treaty Alsabah family was recognized as the only political authority in Kuwait. A new title, Amir, was given to the head of the family and the rule of Alsabah became an absolute. In 1922 a territorial extension was recognized between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and a treaty (still contested by the Iraqis) was signed under British supervision. Kuwait now covers around 18,000 square kilometers, but by this time, Alsabah and locals had completed the construction of a four miles fort (Alsour) around the tiny town. Kuwaits socio-spatial boundaries were now defined. Kuwaitis are those who lived in or participated in Alsour construction (Longva 2000: 185-187). These boundaries are fundamentals in understanding nomadic logic regarding the cultural identity of the state. Many old Bedouins remember the famous saying of its ruler then elly wara el bab lilklab those behind the walls are for the dogs to eat. Closures, taxation, and persecution burdened nomads who sought to trade their goods there.


With the discovery of oil in 1938, the power of the ruling family expanded tremendously. Alsabah became exclusively reliant on oil companies, and owed their existence to the pax Britannica strategies (Crystal 1995). Oil created a rentier state (Mahdavi 1970:428) where the state undertakes the distribution, allocation, and circulation of all oil revenues. In a rentier economy, the states main function is to distribute and allocate income through public expenditure, recruitment in the bureaucracy, and specific public policies such as economic subsidies and land allocation for loyal families. (Ayubi 1995: 227-228).


Alsabah shaikhs became interested in territorial acquisition, a matter reflected in the policies of land acquisition in and around Kuwait city. In the 1940s and 1950s (the period of settling Bedouins) shaikhs took over huge areas and claimed them their own. They then resold them at much higher rates to the government or to an individual merchant who would do the same or rent it out for the government or one of the companies. A few merchant families preserved their privileged position within the state in terms of access to wealth, decision making (including opposition to Alsabah). These included Hathar merchants, wealthy families of Persian origin who maintained close ties with the Amir, and Hathar families who were traditionally related to Alsabah or one of the merchant families in a patron-client relationship; an extended practice of Kuwaits pearling socioeconomy (Ismael 1982: 63).


The new territorial and economic developments had their impact on tribal population. The encapsulation (sedentarization) of Bedouins was not an arbitrary process; it had very clear objectives. From 1940s until independence in 1961 borders became means of asserting state sovereignty. As a result, Bedouin herding across borders was seen as a transgression of law. Bedouins movement was accordingly restricted and required official permission and identity papers. It is not surprising that this is also the period when Bedouin smuggling activities flourished across Arabian states. Gradually, Bedouins turned into a semi-nomadic existence, living in crowded shantytowns (asheesh) around Kuwait city and its Hathar neighborhoods. Members of a descent group would now live apart in two neighboring states, while members of one lineage would form clusters dominating a section of an urban area. Because oil exploration companies were in short of cheap labor, Bedouins were given rent loans to settle around these companies (ARAMCO 1968). The government also encouraged Bedouins to seek work in road constructions, trucking, security, and in the police and armed forces.


As the state began executing its urbanization plan in the 1960s, the shantytowns were demolished and Bedouins were allocated housing projects officially dubbed limited-income-houses (Almoosa 1976). Bedouins live in what Kuwaitis call external areas which form a tribal belt around the capital and Hathar inner areas. Unlike Hathar areas, Bedouins cities lack quality state services and commercial and educational activities. In this context, citizenship, education, and election, all new concepts for Bedouins, became a matter of daily living. Election for instance is a new opportunity to form tribal corps, reaffirm tribal identity, reinforce lineage relations, and more independence. Education enables individuals direct access to official positions in the state and reputation within the tribe. Citizenship guarantees education and economic attainment and security in the state. All these practices are carried out through ongoing reactivation of a nomadic logic of the state and all its representations (Lancaster Lancaster 1998: 32-33). Next I demonstrate how social scientists accounted for Bedouins experience of the state. A critique of these writings will be weaved into the discussion.



The Social Science:





Sociological writings are full of generalized, yet contradicting schemes about Bedouins. Well-known Kuwaiti sociologist Kaldun Alnaqeeb (1987; 1996) argues that political tribalism is the major obstacle for democracy and civil society in Kuwait. Political tribalism is, according to Alnaqeeb, an emergent political mentality of organizing social activities taken place among Bedouins in a modern context. It is a primitive, backward archetype of the myth of tribal democracy (1987:151). Political tribalism is the organizing principle for Bedouins during elections and when dealings with bureaucracy. The dominance of such principle on all aspects of life is what enabling oppressive shaikhs to uphold their positions and recoil political development (1987: 125,151). Because tribalism is patriarchal, oppressive in nature, based on patron-client relationships the historical extension of tribalism is congruent with pre-Islamic age of ignorance, and Bedouinism as its inherent element. (1996: 9). Yet, Alnaqeeb makes a distinction between tribalism before and after the state. The former is characterized by flexible politics where, for example, leadership is honorific and cyclical, while the later (political tribalism) finds its expression in the manner of the shaikhs of Kuwait and their monarchic rule. Still, because blind obedience to shaikh of the tribe is ingrained in Bedouins social ideology, they are naturally loyal to the person of the ruler (1996: 18).


Alnaqeeb (1996) suggests that sociologists, as naturally distanced from ordinary citizens and political events (175), must seek different tools of inquiries to understand the socio-structural history of tribalism phenomenon. Alnaqeeb adopts a Braudelian reconstruction, dependency theory, and liberal politics. Political tribalism resulted from the interruption caused by colonialism and oil of the natural affair economy (mercantilism) that characterized the area for centuries. Alnaqeeb believes that nomadic economy was secondary to the processes of natural affair, for the dominant pattern was commercial. Natural affairs were the collective relations between major towns where once all major politico-economic and cultural productions had originated. Alnaqeeb views this economy as an example of the maturity of production forces then, but should not imply any evolution from one stage to another. This is despite his characterization of it as a pre-capitalist representation of production relations (1987: 27, 30). The emergence of the modern state as rentier and hegemonic transformed the political weigh from the outer Hathari coast of Arabia to the tribal interior. This determined the political map of Kuwait in its current outlook: hegemonic, corrupted with political tribalism, and a stumbling democracy (1987:101).


There are reasons, according to Alnaqeeb, for the continuation of Bedouinism in Kuwait. With socioeconomic growth tribes simply head for cities and looked for jobs and benefited from citizenship and economic privileges. But they actually form a type of lumpenproletariat living in air-conditioned ghettos around the inner cities (1987: 135). Alnaqeeb continues, when it comes to higher position employment in the state, Bedouins are the least privileged, for this is decided by Alsabah, patron merchants, and their Hathar clients (1987: 170-171). Disenfranchisement drove Bedouins to form a type of tribal corporatism based on kinship, favoritism, and loyalty to the tribe not the state. And this is why Alnaqeeb warns that education and modernity are even reinforcing the tribalism and the need to aggregate against the state (173). Yet puzzlingly, in an advocative mood, Alnaqeeb says that Bedouins are not a lumpenproletariat because they share the state through education and citizenship, and thus they must be integrated into civil society. This can be achieved when democratic-nationalist powers (defined as Hathar middle class) approach Bedouins and try forming an alliance for common objectives (1987: 181). And, education will inevitably eliminate tribalism and in its place alternative civil institutions will be established by Bedouins themselves (1996: 134). Even more, Alnaqeeb believes that the losers of processes of social transformation in Kuwait are not the Bedouins but urban people who form the new middle class and on which civil society, the state, and democratic opposition depends (1987: 175).


Alnaqeeb lumps different forms of tribalism together and never maintains a clear distinction. Also, tribes are either marginalized and in need of guidance, or are dominating (having the political weigh) the whole picture being loyal to rulers and the state. The origins of Alnaqeebs contradictions reside in his misapprehension of the historical dynamics of tribal organization and how it operates and changes under varying circumstances. Moreover, Alnaqeebs frustration with Bedouins resistance of full assimilation and inactivity in civil politics lead to his biased views regarding their political theory of the state. Finally, seeing society through the states lenses, Alnaqeebs analysis resembles the official discourse; a discourse viewed by Alnaqeeb as oppressive and unscientific.


In Women in Kuwait (2001) Haya Almughni analyzes politics of gender in relation to the state focusing on elite and merchant class women organizations, and in which she is a member. Almughnis book represents an example of how social scientists have been using Bedouins tradition, as an impediment to change and as a justification for the language of liberalism, feminism, and so on. Kuwaits society is exclusively controlled by men (17), however, Almughni does not explain how women then have the power to recreate an orderly society, resisting change, and reproducing traditional practices (14). She complains that western penetration did not weaken family ties and obligations, or reduce marriage between kin, thus Kuwaiti society preserves its patriarchal and authoritarian character (14). Almughni being a feminist (without defining it), thinks that these women organizations are not working for all women for they do not attract enough members of society at large (19). Organizations are not devoted for a struggle against the patriarchic ideology on which the whole state is founded (Almughni 2001; Tetreault Almughni 1995).


Almughni (2001) holds that subordination of women in Kuwait is attributed to the penetration of tribal traditional organization, such as kinship system, and emphasis on patrilineal descent into urban Kuwaiti society (21, 26, 175). Hence it is imperative to examine structure of Bedouin society which would reveal the nature of Kuwaiti society. According to Almughnis historical reconstruction, Kuwait originally means the flourishing commercial urban community first established by Alsabah and Hathar merchants in the 18th century. At this time, tribes in Kuwait area were isolated, with no economic alternative than pastoralism. To describe how Bedouins lived at the time when Kuwait town was enjoying prosperity, Almughni uses this quote: nomads were still wondering from oasis to oasis with no further thought than surviving one more rainless summer. (Anani Willington 1986: 33). Almughni informs that each section of a tribe has a shaikh chosen by a tribal council, and at the top of the tribe stood the paramount shaikh. Consultancy or Shura was significant in the tribal organization, and this allowed the tribe to be an independent unit, but not a unified political entity (2001: 21-22).


With capital and work, says Almughni, tribal people came to settle in Kuwait (2001: 24) and this is how internal structure of nomadic society in terms of residential units and kinship ties based on a common patrilineal descent-became firmly established in Kuwait (26). In addition, naturalization of large numbers of Bedouins in the 1970s and 1980s undermined the power of the liberals, and reinforced their traditional backing of Alsabah policies (31). Bedouins citizenship resulted in the process of desertization causing the penetration of the ultra-conservative values of the desert into the urban milieu.(175). Finally it is among Bedouins communities where threat to civil society and women thrive (177).


There are serious errors in Almughnis analysis. First, that nomads were wondering the desert insignificantly contradicts the ethnographic reconstruction of patterns of socioeconomy in the region, and the nomadic sophisticated productivity (Fabietti 1998: 50-57). Second, Bedouins never came by choice to where they are now, for they were systematically incorporated into state confines. Third, the assumption that Bedouins political life was structured by distribution of shaikhs and a paramount shaikh (i.e. paramount chief) only resembles chiefdoms organizations that Bedouins never experienced. In addition, if consultancy and independence were characteristic of tribal organization, then how would this be considered an ultra-conservative value in the liberal sense? Finally, Almughnis proposition that Bedouins patrilineal descent penetrated urban Kuwait and hence societys embracement of patriarchy as a result, is completely false. For, it is known, even in Almughnis words, that urban Kuwait was neither matrilineal nor were most tolerant towards women.


Ethnography (Lewis 1994) and Bedouins oral tradition (Ibn Raddas 1976) tell us that Bedouin women lost much of their economic and social power when they were urbanized and became dependent on their men who are in turn totally reliant on the state for their living. At the time when Bedouins were being settled, oppression of women was a characteristic social value and practice of urban Kuwait (Robertson 1940: 161-165; Alqinaie 1968: 78). Modernist and liberalist hooplas that motivated more Hathar than Bedouins women are not without a reason:
When, in the mid-1950s, the old houses were being demolished to make room for modern buildings, a young merchant-class woman exclaimed, much to the bewilderment of an English resident let them be demolished! Who wants them now? It is the new Kuwait and not the old which is worthy of admiration! The old town represented everything that Kuwaiti women wanted to forget it symbolized their seclusion and reminded them of their oppression (Almughni 2001: 44).

Almughnis misrepresentation of Bedouins is a dominant conviction and not questioned among other scholars, including anthropologists. Anh Longva is a Norwayan anthropologist working on citizenship concept in Kuwait. Her understanding of Bedouins social structure, for example, is identical to that of Alnaqeeb and Almughni. Longvas analysis of citizenship conceptualization (1997; 2000) is distorted by linguistic confusion and methodological bias.


Longva suggests that citizenship is an urban phenomenon, and in Kuwait citizenship is a battleground for questions loyalty to the state closeness to Hathar urban values. This is because, as Longva convincingly has shown, all nationality laws since 1948 to the present implies the meaning of originality of the Kuwaitis as those inhabitants of the Kuwaiti town. Urban Kuwaitis think of themselves as the real Kuwaitis, and bear special resentment against the new citizens of Badu origin (2000: 187). Also, Hathar antipathy is typical of the relationship between settlement and desert, but it increased when government naturalized Bedouins to get their political support. Now, Longva argues, Kuwaiti society is largely Badu where conservative values are dominating politically and socially, and until the 1990s Badu had consistently voted loyally to Alsabah, thus obstructing liberals call for modernization of politics (2000: 187-188). According to Longva, there are two ways of conceptualizing citizenship in Kuwait. Hathar conceptualize citizenship as jinsiyya meaning to be alike, to assimilate and be a part of a nation, an idea built on similarity and horizontal community and can be extended to equality (192). Jinsiyya is very close to western concept of citizenship, for it does not posit a priori an idea of hierarchy which underlies Bedouins understanding of citizenship


The tribes in Kuwait understand nationality and citizenship in the sense of tabaiyya, which can be translated as the following of or allegiance to a leader, in this case Kuwaits ruling family. The root verb of tabaiyya means, among other things, to walk behind someone, to be subordinate to, to be under someones command. The concept is clearly built on an idea of hierarchy and vertical leadership (Longva 2000: 192).

Longva identification of citizenship with equality and similarity follows a secularist western model that routinely betrays the reality from which it had supposedly stemmed. The assumption that western concept of citizenship implies equality is refuted by the reality of power differentials and socioeconomic variations present in all western societies (Asad 1999: 180). But to return to the Kuwaiti context, among Hathar Kuwaitis jinsiyya is a battleground for authenticity and accessibility to states wealth. Categories such as aseel vs. baisery (noble vs. non-noble); eymy vs. naydy (Persian vs. Najdi origin); ahal sharg vs. ahal jiblah (Hathar of the eastern part of Kuwait town vs. Hathar of the western part) are all common identity markers among Hathar communities and have deep political, marital, and economic implications and practices. Thus, the proposition that urban Kuwaitis understand jinsiyya as equality is at the very best debatable. It is more coherent to suppose that the concept of similarity indicates assimilation, containment, and political submission.


Longvas main argument rests on a semantic confusion between standard Arabic and oral dialect identifying tabaiyya with taabiyyah. The former is a term used by Arab intellectuals to indicate the peripheral socioeconomic position of their countries to western ones. The term spread under the influence of dependency and world-system theories a time when Arab nationalism was at its peak in the 1960s and 1970s (Amin 1977). It is still used in political discourse.


However, taabiyyah means to follow up, trace, or track in a course of investigation. It is a process that took place when Kuwait Bedouins applied for a second citizenship (in Saudi Arabia in particular), and were asked by an investigation committee, as it was called, to identify themselves, their tribal origins and divisions, and to name some tribal events in order to be granted a Saudi citizenship. If one is traceable to one of the known tribes he is granted a Taabiyyah.


Longvas semantic confusion is compounded by her erroneous logic. From the problematic assumptions that Hathar are the antithesis of Bedouins, and that Bedouins follow a vertical structure, she falsely concludes that the structure of Hathar life must be horizontal and communal (2000: 186). Longvas methodological error lies in disregarding Bedouin informants and relying instead on urban based or non-Kuwaiti informants. It is not surprising then to find many Arab and Kuwaiti writings supporting the same kinds of interpretations she proposes (Alhaddad 1981: 50, 98, 247, 251-256; Alzubi 1999: 39, 58, 89, 91-104).


Social bases of political loyalty are often diverse, hence support in election is not an automatic process (Layne 1987: 11). But, awareness of social diversity vanishes when anthropologists like Nicolas Gavrielides is mislead by ethnohistorical confusion and romanticism. Gavrielides (1987) studied social and ideological boundaries of election in Kuwait. Nothing in Gavrielides research says that Bedouins informed him about the way they see such activity (also Davis Gavrielides 1991: 142, 148). In what he calls tribal democracy Gavrielides holds that despite dramatic socioeconomic changes tribally-organized social structure continues to prevail tribal ideology provided for the settlement of a large number of desert tribesmen in Kuwait who came as clients of the Sabah. These tribesmen became an important electoral constituency. (1987: 153-154 italics mine). Given that, in Gavrielides conception, Alsabah themselves are desert tribals; they are also patrons to all Bedouins. The later are loyal supporters under arms and in parliament (163). Patron-client relationship was behind the naturalization of tribals in Kuwait. Gavrielides goes on to say that tribalism fits the ideology upon which the state is built (170), a view that he contradicts in later writings (Davies and Gavrielides 1991: 142). Bedouins practice of tribal democracy is stabilizing and securing the anxious state. Tribal democracy is represented by the practices such as tribal primary elections or lineages elections. This is a technique tribes use to reduce competition among the often high numbers of Bedouins runners in a district. The tribe can then vote for one or two members as their candidates, yet the decision may not be followed by all. The practice gained social and political value among Bedouins but was opposed by leftists/liberalists, and merchants because it promoted tribalism and sectarian characteristics considered inappropriate and detrimental to a modern state (1987: 168).


Tribal ideology and loyalty to Alsabah that Gavrielides holds to be responsible for Bedouins settlement is baseless as shown earlier. Bedouins settlement was a result of new circumstances and was from the beginning a cultural and economic separation between the town and desert people initiated by Alsabah themselves and still persists. Moreover, if the Kuwaiti state, given the tenuous loyalty of most of the populace to Alsabah rule rests on a weak ideological foundation (Davis and Gavrielides 1991: 118), then how might Bedouins, the majority of the population, be seen as loyal clients. In another place, Gavrielides suggests that the sea, pearling, and trading were the ideological symbols of the state and are used by Alsabah to legitimize their rule (1991: 142). The assumption that a pattern of patron-client relationship was behind Bedouins' settlement and citizenship and their political loyalty is ethnographically wrong and analytically simplistic. Patron-client relationship was a practice of Arabian agricultural, trading, and pearling centers. There are many Kuwaiti studies that show this to be the case, and recently Lancaster (1997) has reworked his use of such term among Rwala Bedouins because as Bedouins believe there cannot be patron-client relations, given the internal logic of Arab tribal social practice (1997:163; Gilsenan 1977: 183). The individualistic nature of Badu system and oral genres and histories that can still be seen today negates the existence of such a relationship among nomads.


Ethnohistorical resources and romanticism confused Gavrielides. The first is based on his intensive use of urban folkloristic writings (like [Alshamlan 1959]) about old Kuwait town in which patron-client practice was never questioned. Romanticism is based on Gavrielides mistaken assumption that primaries were an extended form of a tribal democracy. Gavrielides believes that tribal primaries and elections correspond to Bedouins indigenous political structure which allowed them to reach a consensus, their members used to having direct access to their leaders through the majlis, shura, and diwaniyah. Modern elections then, do nothing more than formalize an already existing informal process. (1987: 168). However, the three terms used here have no sociohistorical reference in nomadic life. Same place regular gatherings of a group all year is intensive in urban Arabia but was a rarity in desert. Majlis and shura are used by urbanite Kuwaitis and almost all social scientists here to refer to the place and process whereby Alsabah supposedly have chosen their leadership. Diwaniyah is a modern concept in Kuwait; it is the section of mens gathering in concrete houses. Hence, Gavrielides analysis blends not only different social histories and structures together, but also cultural practices, which resulted in his misrepresentations of Bedouins.


Political science shares, methodologically and ideologically, the same erroneous predispositions of earlier scholarships about Bedouins. Political science revolves around two discourses: state development, and civil society. The two discourses are a framework for research but are virtually carried in opposition to one concept, that of tradition (tribalism, desertization, prestate era, etc.). In fact, Kuwaiti political science research of state and society starts from such opposition (Ghabra 1997; Alnajjar 2000; Tetreault 2000). Ghabra (1997) asserts that Kuwait developed from a tribal entity into a state (395) but contradicts himself when describing pre-oil Kuwait as a composite of three harmoniously interacting groups: a ruling family who protected the city from tribal attacks, merchants who were the core of traditional Kuwait, and finally a majority of pearl divers and seamen who worked for the merchants (361-362). Not until 1950s does tribal migration to urban Kuwait begin (364). But more significant is Ghabras understanding of the relation between Bedouins and the state. Ghabra holds that although integrated into Kuwaiti society, Bedouins retained many of their customs and traditions such as tribal solidarity and cohesion and patriarchal family; a tradition that interrupts the social cohesion of Kuwait at large (365). This is called desertization: transfer of desert customs, traditions, beliefs, dress code, and mentality into the city [and] brings into the urban milieu the ultraconservative values of the desert it puts the national, civil framework at risk (367). Therefore, Bedouins, according to Ghabra must be adequately acculturated (366) through education in order for the state to maintain stability and continuity (371).


Although not directly concerned with the issue of Bedouins in Kuwait, Alnajjar (2000) is a significant example of how political scientists in Kuwait perceive of the democratic process. Alnajjar calls for the institutionalization of democratic political culture and political process. His discussion of Kuwait politics revolves exclusively around reinforcing practices of modern political representation, election, policymaking, and constitution laws discounting their traditional, personal and social relevance (245). Such disregard to the cultural relevance of the political process is highlighted in Alnajjars passage about the positive aspects of the Kuwaiti constitution: it upholds most of the principles that exist in most western democracies, such as the separation of powers [therefore] it helped eliminate dependence on traditional norms and values (254).


In Stories of Democracy (2000), Tetreault discusses politics and society in contemporary Kuwait. Tetreault gathered all needed data from one specific cultural category: Kuwaiti diplomats, sociologists, political scientists, Hathar politicians, Arab intellectuals, and Tetreaults American colleagues. So, when Tetreault asserts that nomadic tribal values such as the subordination of women and young men will eventually clashes with entrepreneurial values of the town with its horizontal orientation (48), it is not expected that this theme will be contested because it is reproduced within its own ideological milieu. But the real issue here is not only that Tetreaults never attempted to verify such assertion from hundreds of thousands of Bedouins. It is that the whole political research on Kuwait and tribes is based on this or similar themes (Shuhaiber 1981; Aljasim 1973; Ghabra 1994).


Tetreaults analysis revolves around three main concepts: tradition, modernity, and political space. To Tetreault, Kuwait Bedouins tribal values are tradition, remnants of the dynastic realm in the modern world tradition and traditional life [mean] timelessness and subjection. (Tetreault Almughni 1995: 65, 68). Tribal tradition is the patriarchy of the state and because Bedouins remain part of the old imagining (2000: 47), bonding vertically, they behave like subjects to authority (216). As such, tribalism is anti-democratic speaking of a world of particularistic qualities such as culture and religion, unlike urban pro-democratic universalistic values that strive to integrate Kuwait into the larger world (13). The claim that tribal tradition is associated with the identity of the state or that they organized vertically has been shown by studies to be wrong (Khoury Kostiner 1990: 18; Irons 1971: 152-154; Lindner 1982: 689-710). Also, any tradition is in essence a transmission of values, genres, and adaptive techniques through time. Subjection was expressed in towns values of hierarchy, and this might explain the uneventful settlement of Alsabah in the town of Kuwait the hierarchy was already there.


Tetreault resonates Kuwaiti intellectuals and local urban administrators focusing only on modernity and Bedouins inability to break with their tradition. Modernity is inevitable because modernity is a global project, therefore Tetreault says: I make explicit comparison between Kuwait and the west sharing common experience of moving from traditional to modern status (4). Tetreault defines modernity from an American liberal perspective. Accordingly, modern persons are individualistic who belong to a middle class: middle class in Kuwait as elsewhere often is synonym for modern (129). A modern Kuwaiti identity is acquired through professionalism rather than a consequence of family membership (129). However, implied in Tetreaults version of modernity is that being global and western means it is fair, good, and must be accepted. Yet, such generalization is criticized by anthropologists (Long Long 1992) who showed ample evidences that the assumption that all change inevitably follows the Western model of modernity is both ethnocentric and empirically incorrect (Gardner Lewis 1996: 14). There are varying and unequal trajectories of modernity where the most powerful dominates using Tetreaults own liberal rhetoric. The connection between a middle class and modernity naively applies western models of individual mobility on a context where professional identity cannot be established or maintained without social connections and cultural identity.


Political space is congruent with modernity, but essentially assumes the existence of an autonomous state, which, in Tetreaults understanding, only partially coincides with the interests of the holders of power (2000: 7). Thus, political space is created by the divergence of states interests and interests of those in power (7). Tetreault adopts Habermass public sphere to assume a possible separation between tradition and political space. Yet, anthropologists have shown that Habermass formulation is false, for a public sphere cannot be created without the existence of a tradition, economic interests, and powers conflict (Van der Veer 2001: 27-28). Finally, Tetreaults analysis is diluted by the assumption of an autonomous character of the Kuwaiti state. On reality, and as anthropology shows (Hansen 2000) the states very existence depends on daily intervention in every societal organization and peoples activities at all levels.


These examples from social science reveal a shared intellectual image that depicts the relation between Bedouins and the state. This image consists of a few presumptions. First, nomadism is threatening the growth of civil state and nationalist integrative values. Second, Bedouins must be guided through acculturation into modernity. Acculturation is based on the righteousness of urban life and its historical precedence as the place where the meaning of being Kuwaiti was first established. Lastly, tribes are an ideological tool for rulers. In all these schemes the state is a reference point for societal relations which masks the variety of contextual factors that determine how Bedouins conceptualize the state.



Nomadic Logic:





Kuwaits territorial sovereignty has always been endangered. Some argued that its very existence is built on balancing regional powers and conflicts through financial and security treaties with international powers (Assiri 1990). Alliance with the Ottomans, the British, and later building Alsour reflect the state of constant threat. In 1961 just after independence Iraq threatened to annex Kuwait, it was in this period when the ruler of Kuwait called on many nomads to join the armed forces and many given citizenship. In 1980s a spate of bombings and an assassination attempt of the ruler shock the small state. In 1990 the whole state was eliminated by Iraq. Political and financial insecurity are also a matter of fact in Kuwait. For example, calls for elections and dissolution of parliaments are constitutionally in the hands of the Amir and few prominent families who are privileged enough to be consulted in major decisions. Future-generation-funds and state foreign investments are routinely embezzled or stolen by ruling family members and their merchant clients, but though discussed in the parliament, no one suffers legal consequences. Dispute among factions in the ruling family continue to take place and have recently taken more aggressive forms. Education, state media, and national symbolism emphasize the cultural identity of Kuwait as the sea, the town, and Alsour.


For Bedouins these are all signs of the states insecurity and their insecure position within it. The Badu do not regard themselves as part of the state and they have the deepest suspicions about the dowla (The State) (Lancaster 1980: 11-12). Since change is imposed, one way to cope with the new situation is by getting the most out of it (Helander 1990: 122) through different nomadic mechanisms. There are three main mechanisms that Bedouins employed in their interaction with the state: lineage relations or ideology, role-playing, and oral strategies. These mechanisms facilitate adaptation to change, but they also maintain the Bedouin cultural organization away from melting into state system. This is a general pattern of nomadic peoples interaction with the state (Cole 1985: 287).


Embedded in Bedouins ideology are alternatives, organizational forms, and values selected or reactivated whenever environment presents challenges. Thus, as Salzman (1978) notes, lineage ideology is maintained in different historical contexts, even though sometimes actual social behavior does not reflect it. For instance, Alslaiman is one lineage of Alejman tribe who never had a position called shaikh of the lineage, yet under current circumstances almost every Fakhath has this position. The shaikh is a person who knows the system and becomes a middleman between state authority and tribe. But within the tribe a shaikh has no power over any individual, he is only a kind ideal of Everyman (Fernea 1970: 134; Chatty 1996: 4; Lancaster 1981: 46-48). Today every Bedouin member of the parliament, though not called shaikh, work as a middleman. It is true that many became attached to ruling members, but this does not turn tribes into hierarchies, as lineage primaries show. A lineage shaikh rarely succeeds in primaries, usually they prefer avoiding the embarrassment of their possible failure (Gavrielides 1987: 196-170). Through primaries egalitarian structures are reactivated and individuals free choice is reassured. All tribal events, relations, and cultural repertoire reactivate nomadic ideology. This is what Salzman has called asserted ideology or social structures in reserve by which variations in environment are met by flexible structural arrangements (1978: 618). [A]rrangements expressed by the asserted ideology are an important resource in coping with the challenges of existence and are needed for ongoing security (1978: 625). The continuation of lineage ideology and its various forms in Kuwait are not adequately grasped by social scientists.


The second mechanism is what might be called contextual assessment or in Lancasters terms role playing (Lancaster 1981: 47). Much of the Bedouins interaction with the outside world (government; non-Bedouins) is individually organized, that is, each individual assesses the options available and the role to presume. A role, then, is a relation with the outside world driven by personal and tribal interest. [E]ach man presents to the outsider a façade which suits his purpose at that moment. He is an actor. Which act he puts on depends largely on the audience. To a merchant with whom he had [good] relationship, he will be honest towards a government official who has real power over him, he will appear deferential; towards an itinerant peddler he may act in an over-bearing and off-hand fashion (Lancaster: 1981: 47). For example, Kuwaiti Bedouins who work at the state citizenship division are not considered by kin or by themselves as state representatives. A position is an opportunity for reputation building by yielding kin access to citizenship and hence economic services. Lancaster says that many urban-minded officials, who are committed to hierarchical principles, fail to understand that a Badu who joins the bureaucracy is not committed to it (1981: 50). Role-playing under modern conditions is also evident in a Bedouin shaikh. As said earlier, a shaikh is not a genealogically defined social position, and does not imply a superior-inferior relationship. A shaikh has wider networks, knows how to manipulate bureaucratic system, but he is as dependent as any other individual on recommendation and consensus. In Kuwait a tribal shaikh is practically a serviceman to his fellows, his role is mostly limited to bring about more social services. In a state or non-Bedouin context, however, he acts like authority, a spokesman, and acts like a political leader imitating the dominant form of hierarchy. It is only in such context that he gets the most respect by tribals. This is done for many practical and solidarity reasons. Yet, as Lancaster has observed, Arab intellectuals and government officials think of this role playing as reality and generalize that Bedouins have a hierarchical power structure. This Lancaster believes has had far reaching effects on social science representation of Bedouins particularly on Bedouins concept of loyalty (1981: 48). Thus, Lancaster argues that what appears to be total loyalty to the state is an illusion that some writers have established based on misapprehension of how such mechanism works or how Bedouins view themselves under different contexts.


Oral traditions are not only a source about the past, but an account of how people have interpreted it and how such interpretation influence their present (Vansina 1985: 196). Genres can be seen as a shared discourse of social existence, they communicate significant cultural information, ideology, political interests norms, and relations. Because of their socializing effect among Bedouins, genres have always been authoritative. But they also provide flexible oral strategies that reinforce, or change, an interpretation of environment dynamics, hence the judgment or action to be taken. Misra (1992) argues that one characteristic of nomadic oral strategies is their resilience. They are adopted by nomads to manage their life-style particularly when they live amidst people who nurture a degree of hostility towards nomadic values (1992: 215). Through these oral strategies Bedouins construct their own interpretation of the past, the state, and where they stand. However, such particular interpretations are often attached to the integrity of tribal values, they orient individuals and encourage certain attitudes towards the state, its identity, and its future. Proverbs like take the bite from the rotten beard is used to refer to state employment. Another indicates the competitiveness over state resources by other groups that who gets a grip of it will give it to his sons [mann githabha ashaha ewaleh]. Bedouins refer to their settlement as only being used as a shield protecting the inner cities we are put in the cannons muzzle. Such uncertainty is expressed in a variety of old poems and narratives. All these are socialized through interaction in which the younger generation is taught to be prepared for new situations. These three mechanisms comprise the nomadic logic of apprehending change. During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait I witnessed first hand how these mechanisms carried Bedouins through the event. Older tribal alliances were reaffirmed, Bedouin Nabat poetry flourished, and kinship played the most important part in Bedouins arrangement of refuge and residence. Ironically, the invasion confirmed Bedouins suspicions that the state is a temporary answer for collective security.



Conclusion and Discussion:





I have argued that there are disparities between what social scientists theorize and Bedouins reality. The gap is widened by a set of contradicting schemes that employ ineffective methodologies and draw on ideological, theoretical, and political biases. But most importantly is the paradigmatic commitment to the state, which, in effect, produced only state-centric views neglecting other significant cultural contents and political traditions. Critics have shown that state-centrism is a limiting problem for social scientific method and interpretation, particularly among third world scholars (Lent 1991). Tylor argues against embedded statism which he suggests is driven by nationalization of social knowledge (1996: 1917). Tylor and Johnston (1991) argue that the social sciences, as intellectual children of the state, treated states in unproblematic manner (2). One of the problematic aspects of the state-centric understanding is space. In the writings I discussed, space is rarely problematized, this, I believe, is based on the assumption that the state is where space begins and shapes. This is why political space in the liberal sense cannot be understood from without a state. And since state is the space, its identity in the Kuwaiti context is urban.


That these observations have been generally absent from social scientific literature is in some degree alarming, especially among Arab writers. Lent (1991) notices that the impact of western modes of theorizing has gone largely uncontested because Third World scholars themselves, trained as most were in the West, were not comfortable denouncing theories and approaches that were the backbone of their own educational experiences (vii). The notion of nomadism as I have defined it provides us with two analytic advantages. First, it represents a continuity of an interactive social universe not just a uniform set of social organizations defined by particular environmental exploitation (Salzman 1980: 6). Second, it illustrates the multilayered complexity of political reality (Gledhill 2000: 20) when we study interrelationships of state-society. Social scientific writings discussed here have chosen to focus on the event (here the state) neglecting its contexts, mechanisms, and structures. My account is also distinct from the narcissistic discourse of nomadism flourishing in cultural criticism (Robertson et al., 1994) where celebrated metaphors like the intellectual nomad, stranger, traveler, are used as a role model of th e politically-correct intellectual and lead to misleading interpretations (Pels 1999: 63). The main venue for future research that opens up out of this one is the critical examination of academic knowledge as a politico-cultural practice among intellectuals and how this influences society at large. Anthropology is intrinsically capable of carrying out such a research, and this study is only a first attempt.



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